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I. INTRODUCTION
The Court was beginning to get very tired of sitting by its
sister branches in the capitol, and of having nothing to do but
judging; once or twice it had peeped into the legislative book
its sister was reading, but it had no Black Letter Rules or So-
cratic Dialogues in it, "and what is the use of a book," thought
the Court, "without Black Letter Rules or Socratic dialogues?"
So the Court was considering, in its own mind (as well it
could, for the hot day made it feel very sleepy and stupid),
whether the pleasure of writing a decision would be worth the
trouble of getting up and collecting the necessary prior cases,
when suddenly a white rabbit with pink eyes ran close by it.
There was nothing so very remarkable in that; nor did the
Court think it so very much out of the way to hear the Rabbit
say to itself, "Oh dear! Oh dear! I shall be too late!" (when the
Court thought it over afterwards, it occurred to it that it ought
to have wondered at this, but at the time it all seemed quite
natural); but when the Rabbit actually took a precedent out of
its waistcoat-pocket, and looked at it, and then hurried on, the
Court started to its feet, for it flashed across its mind that it
had never before seen a rabbit with either a waistcoat-pocket,
or a precedent to take out of it, and burning with curiosity, it
ran across the rotunda after it, and was just in time to see it
pop into the legislative chamber.
In another moment in went the Court after it, never once
considering how in the world it was to get out again.1
In his introduction to The Annotated Alice Professor Martin Gard-
ner (no, a different one2) notes that G. K. Chesterton once "voiced his
1. With apologies to Mr. Carroll, I have borrowed both elements of my title and
various passages from Alice's Adventures in Wonderland to introduce each sec-
tion of this Article. In the best scholarly tradition, I have used as my version of
the text LEWIS CARROLL, THE ANNOTATED ALICE: ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WON-
DERLAND & THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS (Martin Gardner ed. 1960) [hereinaf-
ter, respectively, ALICE and M. Gardner]. Any edition would do, however, and
the interested reader may find it amusing to occasionally consult the original,
rather than my version. This initial passage appears, as it should, in Chapter I:
Down the Rabbit-Hole, at 25.
2. That is to say, not the Martin Gardner who is Steinhart Foundation Professor of
Law at the University of Nebraska College of Law. References to his work tend
to appear in somewhat more exalted places. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 111 S.
Ct. 1982, 1989 (1991)(citing Martin R. Gardner, Searches and Seizures of
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'dreadful fear' that Alice's story had already fallen under the heavy
hands of the scholars and was becoming 'cold and monumental like a
classic tomb.' "3 Uncowed, Professor Gardner defends his decision to
annotate the classic child's tale with these observations:
There is much to be said for Chesterton's plea not to take Alice too seri-
ously. But no joke is funny unless you see the point of it, and sometimes a
point has to be explained. In the case of Alice we are dealing with a very
curious, complicated kind of nonsense, written for British readers of another
century, and we need to know a great many things that are not part of the text
if we wish to capture its full wit and flavor....
The fact is that Carroll's nonsense is not really as random and pointless as
it seems to a modem American child who tries to read the Alice books.
4
Recently, in Haman v. Marsh,5 the Supreme Court of Nebraska
issued a decision that offers, at least in my estimation, precisely the
sort of "very curious, complicated kind of nonsense" that cries out for
explanation. Haman wrote, at least in theory, the final judicial chap-
ter in the Commonwealth saga, the sad and sometimes tragic sequence
of events precipitated by the failure of one of Nebraska's "industrial"
savings and loans and the subsequent inability of a state "guaranty"
mechanism to honor its obligations to the depositors it supposedly pro-
tected.6 Haman was actually the court's third foray into the events
precipitated by Commonwealth's demise. In two earlier decisions, Se-
curity Investment Co. v. State7 and Weimer v. Amen,8 the court held
that the narrow and precise terms of the various applicable statutes,
and in particular the State Tort Claims Act,9 barred recovery of the
Automobiles and Their Contents: Fourth Amendment Considerations in a Post-
Ross World, 62 NEB. L. REv. 1 (1983)); id. at 2000 n.11 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)(same).
3. M. Gardner, supra note 1, at 7.
4. Id.
5. 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836 (1991).
6. A full explanation of what one means by an "industrial" and the history of such
institutions, both in Nebraska and nationally, would be interesting, but would
also tend to make an already long article even longer. While the characterization
may be a bit extreme, industrials have been referred to as "no-bank banks, for
lack of a better term." Barry Stavro, As Good as Their Word, FORBES, Feb. 25,
1985, at 52. Industrials, sometimes referred to as Morris Plan Banks, originated
in Virginia as a means of evading that state's usury laws. The plan "spread rap-
idly," and while the number of states authorizing such institutions had declined
since the 1930's, over twenty retained the mechanism in the early 1970's when
Nebraska enacted the guaranty law. See generally BARBARA A. CURRAN, TRENDS
IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 52-60, 204-19 (1965); LouiS N. ROBINSON &
ROLF NUGENT, REGULATION OF THE SMALL LOAN BusINEss 90-92 (1935); Marion
Benfield, Money Mortgages and Migraine-The Usury Headache, 19 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 819, 840-43 (1968); John M. Ordway, Note, The Mortgage Banking
Act A New Way Around California's Usury Laws?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 460,464-66
(1974).
7. 231 Neb. 536, 437 N.W.2d 439 (1989).
8. 235 Neb. 287, 455 N.W.2d 145 (1990).
9. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-8,209 to 81-8,239.06 (1987).
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full insured value of lost deposits, even though it appeared that state
officials had engaged in what might otherwise be described as culpable
negligence in their "supervision" of Commonwealth. The state, it
seemed, had no legal obligation to reimburse the depositors. In Ha-
man the court then took what seemed to be the final analytic step,
indicating that not even moral grounds would be sufficient to sustain
an attempt by the state to reimburse those who had lost their funds.
The court accordingly struck L.B. 272A, a measure enacted in April
1990 and designed to fulfill what many believed to be the state's moral
obligations to the individuals who had lost their funds, as unconstitu-
tional "special" legislation and an impermissible pledge of the "credit"
of the state.
There are many who will protest that the opinion and result in
Haman are neither "random" nor "pointless." That case, after all,
posed for the court an extraordinary dilemma, forcing it to deal with
what at times seem to be the intractable conflicts between the quest
for "justice" and the dictates of "law." The court's response to L.B.
272A, couched in appropriately judicial terms, was to remind us that
"ignorance of the law is no excuse and that everyone is presumed to
know the law."10 In this instance the "legal" lesson was that
"'[c]learly it has not yet come to pass that the state, in its supervision
of the banking business, has become an eleemosynary institution.' ",1
The court's rhetoric was powerful, conjuring up visions of political
chaos and economic ruin if a different result was reached. L.B. 272A,
it warned, "would instill fear rather than confidence, for it indicates
that every time someone is injured, the state will rescue him or her.
The result could be either economic bankruptcy or economic suffoca-
tion through taxation."12 These were dire predictions, but they
clearly struck a responsive chord in the minds of a large number of
citizens, who believed that "taxpayers can't be asked to cover the
losses of every investor who makes a bad decision, no matter how
much sympathy might be extended."' 3
The sequence of events leading to Haman technically began the
day the State Department of Banking ("Department") closed Com-
monwealth, although a compelling argument can be made that they
started many years earlier when the Department first learned that
Commonwealth was in trouble and adopted a policy of virtual benign
neglect. The direct impetus was provided the day our version of the
10. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 715, 467 N.W.2d 836, 848 (1991).
11. Id. (quoting Weaver v. Koehn, 120 Neb. 114, 117, 231 N.W. 703, 704 (1930)).
12. Id. As I will indicate, see infra text accompanying notes 625-32, the bankruptcy
"prediction" is itself a virtual impossibility and the taxation warning, even if ar-
guably accurate, none of the court's business.
13. Editorial, High Court Was on the Money, Omaha World Herald, Mar. 31, 1991, at
12B.
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White Rabbit, pursuing what it believed to be a just cause and sup-
ported by what seemed to be the operative precedents, entered the
legislative chamber with L.B. 272A in hand.14 The Rabbit was, in one
sense, decidedly late, arriving on the scene almost seven years after
the depositors discovered they were in danger of losing their invest-
ments. There were, of course, good reasons for the delay, since it was
prompted in large measure by initial efforts to pursue the legal re-
courses available under operative Nebraska statutes. Those attempts,
as Security Investment Co. and Weimer attest, were unsuccessful, and
there are compelling arguments that they should have failed given the
restrictions on state liability imposed by the strict language and nar-
row exceptions of the State Tort Claims Act. But for many individu-
als, and not just the aggrieved depositors, the results in those cases
sent precisely the wrong signal about state government and the obliga-
tions of elected officials toward those who trusted them. Accordingly,
the message the White Rabbit carried, in the form of L.B. 272A, was
that "principles of fairness"--rather than the dry abstractions of
law-"require that the State of Nebraska fulfill the thirty-thousand-
dollar guaranty of each and every deposit."' 5 The state's obligations
were moral, rather than legal, and the Unicameral, with the passage of
L.B. 272A signaled its belief that passage of the act "serve[d] a neces-
sary public purpose and will effect a sound and necessary public pol-
icy," the restoration in the citizens of Nebraska of their "confidence in
the Legislature and in the financial institutions that are organized
pursuant to the enactments of the Legislature."' 6
But the White Rabbit once again had company, albeit not of quite
the same nature as the arguably innocent Alice. For when it entered
the legislative chamber an aggrieved citizen invited the Nebraska
Supreme Court to follow, an offer it accepted with fatal consequences
for L.B. 272A. That is not necessarily an evil thing, as things go, since
our constitutional scheme entrusts to the court an essential role in the
protection of the public from the excesses of its elected representa-
tives. Indeed, the provision of the Nebraska Constitution that pro-
vided the primary basis for invalidating L.B. 272A, Article III, Section
18, was inserted in that document precisely because experience indi-
cated that the legislature all too often became the captive of special
14. There will be a strong temptation to assign identities to the various characters
drawn from ALcE, an impulse I have tried to resist. Former Governor Crosby
played a significant part in the drafting of L.B. 272A, and it is inviting, and per-
haps appropriate, to cast him as the White Rabbit. I do not know how he would
feel about this, but it has to be a better role than his prior incarnation as a whoop-
ing crane.
15. L.B. 272A, § 2, 6. L.B. 272A may be found at 1990 Neb. Laws 114. References to
L.B. 272A in this Article cite only the specific portion of the Act, without the
parallel citation to 1990 Neb. Laws.
16. Id. § 3.
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interests whose objectives were at odds with the common good.17
The vision of Moral Obligation Land projected by the court in Ha-
man is, however, at odds with that embraced by almost every other
state court that has had occasion to explore that realm. More tell-
ingly, careful examination of the methods employed by the court, and
the precedents it supposedly applies, reveals, "[t]o paraphrase Church-
ill.... much that is obviously true, and much that is relevant; unfortu-
nately, what is obviously true is not relevant, and what is relevant is
not obviously true."18 It is, of course, entirely possible that the court
said what it means and means what it said in Haman. If that is the
case, then the decision becomes even more intriguing, for it confirms
that the court's vision of its role, and its theory of judicial review, are
at odds with both widely accepted notions and its own prior declara-
tions. Concepts of judicial review are necessarily elastic, and it is the
prerogative of the court to define them for us. Nevertheless, the inevi-
table consequences of the approach taken in Haman are likely to
prove troubling for a court that may not have fully considered its deci-
sion to enter this particular arena, much less understood how it is that
it will "get out again," if indeed it truly ever wishes to.
It is important to understand at the outset that I assisted one of the
parties on the losing side in Haman, Security Investment Company,
which sought and was granted Intervenor status by the court in order
to participate in the defense of the act. My reaction to the decision is,
accordingly, clouded somewhat by the perspectives and emotions of a
spurned suitor. Nevertheless, I believe that Haman offers valuable
lessons, not just about Commonwealth but about the role, responsibili-
ties, and techniques of Nebraska's court of last resort. I also believe
that as someone who has invested considerable time and energy in the
case I have a special ability to capture, if not its wit, at least whatever
wisdom it imparts. With that disclaimer in mind then, I invite the
reader to join me in a trip through Moral Obligation Land.
II. SETTING THE STAGE: THE COMMONWEALTH FIASCO
So the Unicameral called softly after it, "Mouse dear! Do
come back again, and we won't talk about torts or sovereign
immunity either, if you don't like them!" When the Mouse
heard this, it turned and swam slowly back to the Unicameral;
its face was quite pale (with passion, the Unicameral thought),
and it said in a low, trembling voice, "Let us get to the shore,
and then Il tell you my history, and you'l understand why it
17. I both quote the operative language of article III, section 18 and discuss it in con-
siderable detail at infra Section V.C.
18. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 682 (1989)(Scalia,
J., dissenting).
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is I hate torts and sovereign immunity."19
The Nebraska State Department of Banking took possession of
Commonwealth on November 1, 1983.20 At the same time the Depart-
ment issued an order directing all other industrials in the state to
freeze their depositors' accounts until the "certificates of indebted-
ness" issued pursuant to the provisions of the Nebraska Depository
Institution Guaranty Corporation Act had matured.2 ' One week later,
the district court for Lancaster County declared Commonwealth insol-
vent and appointed the Department as receiver and liquidating agent
for the company. The actions of the Department and court, as anyone
(and most assuredly the Department) might have anticipated, de-
stroyed whatever shreds of confidence the citizens of the state might
have retained in the industrials. Depositors withdrew whatever funds
they could; new deposits became virtually nonexistent. Those indus-
trials that were able to, merged with other financial institutions or
sought deposit insurance under the various available federal guaranty
programs. Two industrials, American Savings Company of Omaha
and State Securities Savings Company of Lincoln, were unable to find
a willing partner or secure insurance coverage. They were, accord-
ingly, forced to file for protection and reorganization under the fed-
eral bankruptcy statutes.
The Department had known for several years that Commonwealth
was in a precarious position; indeed, it had become aware of problems
within Commonwealth even before the company became a member of
the N.D.I.G.C.22 Successive examinations of the company's books re-
19. ALICE, supra note 1, at 44 (Ch. 2: The Pool of Tears).
20. This detail, and those that follow, are taken from the separate accounts found in
the three decisions of the court that have dealt with Commonwealth to date, Ha-
man v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836 (1991), Weimer v. Amen, 235 Neb.
287, 455 N.W.2d 145 (1990), and Security Inv. Co. v. State, 231 Neb. 536, 437
N.W.2d 439 (1989). I provide citations only where the information is either
quoted directly or especially pertinent.
21. The Act was passed in 1976. See L.B. 948,1976 Neb. Laws 738. It was initially the
Nebraska Cooperative Credit Union Guaranty Corporation Act. That was
changed in 1977 to the Nebraska "Depository Institution" Guaranty Corporation
Act (N.D.I.G.C.). L.B. 291, § 1, 1977 Neb. Laws 888. Other changes were subse-
quently enacted, most of which are not material for the purposes of this article.
The provisions of the act are codified at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-17,127 to 145
(1987), and remain in force, even in the wake of Commonwealth. In fact, the only
post-Commonwealth legislative response, other than technical amendments to
various provisions of the statutes governing industrials, was to require, in 1984,
that notice be given to all depositors that "as provided by the laws of the State of
Nebraska you are hereby notified that your deposit, savings certificate, certificate
of indebtedness, or other similar instrument is not insured." L.B. 899, § 2, 2 1984
Neb. Laws 922, 924. The horse, as they say, was already out of the barn.
22. At the hearings held by the Committee on Banking regarding L.B. 356, the prede-
cessor to L.B. 272A, Dr. Michael Breiner testified that Commonwealth was "short
of capital" a year and a half before it became a member of N.D.I.G.C. Committee
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vealed "excessive" insider loans, insufficient paid-up capital, insol-
vency, and fraudulent loan activities. The situation eventually became
so bad that the Department, in June, 1983, "appointed a special prose-
cutor to investigate alleged criminal activities involving Common-
wealth and its officers."23 Nevertheless, up until the very end, the
Department believed it inappropriate to do anything other than keep
Commonwealth under "supervisory control." Indeed, as the court
noted in Security Investment Co., the Department actively concealed
Commonwealth's condition, believing that "[d]issemination of infor-
mation concerning Commonwealth's precarious financial condition
would likely have had a widespread adverse impact on the industrial
loan and investment industry in Nebraska-a situation which the De-
partment undoubtedly desired to avoid or minimize." 24
The prospects for those who had deposited funds with the industri-
als were, at least in theory, not terrible. Deposits in industrials were
"insured" under the provisions of the Guaranty Act, which "provide[d]
a mechanism whereby the shareholdings, savings, and deposits of any
member or depositor of a member depository institution shall be pro-
tected or guaranteed up to amounts which are established by the cor-
poration. ,,."25 The corporation, which could be formed by any ten or
more depository institutions, established an initial guaranty amount of
$10,000 per account. That ceiling was subsequently raised by the De-
partment in April 1980, at the corporation's request, to the $30,000
level in effect at the time Commonwealth was seized.
The guaranty was clearly a private one. The statutes made it clear,
at least to those who were aware of or read them, that "[n]o state
on Banking, Committee Records for L.B. 356, at 38. Dr. Breiner, who as a Com-
monwealth depositor and activist was arguably not a disinterested witness, was at
this point referring to a document prepared by a special legislative committee
chaired by former Senator Vard Johnson.
23. Security Inv. Co. v. State, 231 Neb. 536, 540, 437 N.W.2d 439, 443 (1989).
24. Id- at 547, 437 N.W.2d at 447.
25. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-17,128(1)(1987). State guaranty legislation became wide-
spread in the wake of the protracted depression of 1893 and was associated with
the Populist movement in Nebraska and other central and western states. For a
general history and description of the various approaches, see 1 MCHIE ON BANKS
AND BANKING §§ 18-24 (1986); THOMAS B. ROBB, THE GUARANTY OF BANK DEPOS-
ITS (1921); 9 CARL F. ZOLLMANN, THE LAW OF BANKS AND BANKING Ch. 219 (1 &
Cum. Supp. 1950); A.B. Butts, Guaranty of Bank Deposits in Eight States, 3 Miss.
L.J. 186 (1931); A.B. Butts, State Regulation of Banking by Guaranty of Deposits,
2 Miss. L.J. 208 (1929). The original Nebraska system is discussed at length in
THOMAS B. ROBB, Supra, at 131-44. For a discussion of the problems associated
with state systems, and their general replacement by the federal system now in
place, see RICHARD HENRY TIMBERLAKE, JR., ORIGINS OF CENTRAL BANKING IN
THE UNITED STATES (1978); EUGENE NELSON WHITE, THE REGULATION AND RE-
FORM OF THE AMERICAN BANKING SYSTEM 1920-1929 (1983); Robert G. Rodkey,
Banking Reform by Statute, 32 MICH. L. REV. 881 (1934).
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funds of any kind shall be allocated or paid to the corporation."26
They also indicated that there would be "no liability for damages on
the part of, and no cause of action in tort of any nature [to] arise
against" any member institution, the corporation, or the Department
"unless such action shall be willful, wanton, or fraudulent."27 That, at
least in theory, was not a problem since the corporation was author-
ized to levy an "initial membership fee," annual "growth fees," and
"uniform annual assessment[s]" from each member institution.28
These funds would, in turn, be applied to the payment of any "covered
claim," a deposit "guaranty" that each member institution was obli-
gated to "display at each place of business maintained by it [in] a sign
or signs indicating that its member or depositor accounts are protected
by the corporation and shall include in all of its advertisements a
statement to the effect that its member or depositor accounts are pro-
tected by the corporation."29
Unfortunately, the corporation turned out to be, just like Com-
monwealth, a hollow shell. At the time Commonwealth was seized
the corporation had assets of approximately two million dollars. The
claims against Commonwealth at the time of its collapse were esti-
mated at some $58 million, a sum that far exceeded both the available
N.D.I.G.C. funds and what could be realized by liquidating Common-
wealth's own assets. Accordingly, when the pittance in the hands of
the corporation was paid to the Commonwealth receiver, it left both
the Commonwealth accounts and those from the other eligible indus-
trial accounts legally uninsured. Since the payment represented only
a small fraction of the funds owed to the Commonwealth depositors,
much less the additional millions required to reimburse the depositors
in the other two institutions, the receiver filed two claims with the
State Claims Board ("Board"), alleging that "negligent, willful, wan-
ton, and fraudulent acts of the officers and employees caused the cred-
itors' losses."3 0 The allegations were, of necessity, expressed in terms
implying a high level of culpability because of both the express terms
of the Guaranty Act and the provisions of the general Tort Claims Act,
which in large measure shielded the state from liability for what
might be characterized as "discretionary" acts.
The Board issued an initial decision indicating that it" 'has decided
that there is a strong possibility of some liability on the part of the
State of Nebraska arising out of certain actions of the Banking Depart-
ment with regard to the Nebraska Depository Institution Guaranty
26. NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-17,135(4)(1987).
27. Id, § 21-17,141.
28. Id. §§ 21-17,135(3) & (4).
29. Id- § 21-17,144.
30. Weimer v. Amen, 235 Neb. 287, 290-91, 455 N.W.2d 145, 149 (1990).
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Corporation Act.' "31 That determination was subsequently reversed
by a special three judge panel of the district court for Lancaster
County, which characterized it as "unsupported by competent, mate-
rial and substantial evidence," "based on conclusions of law which are
clearly erroneous," and "arbitrary and capricious." 32 The three judge
court, as the Nebraska Supreme Court later noted in Weimer, "clearly
went to great lengths in striving to discharge its duty of making a legal
determination of whether the board's decision should be approved
... ."33 And, while it characterized the statement as "dicta," the court
nevertheless took pains to quote a portion of the district court's order,
statements that carried special significance in light of subsequent
developments:
Were it within our power to base our approval on moral grounds or on
concepts of fundamental fairness, we would not hesitate to do so. However,
our decision, as the structure of society as a whole, must rest upon the rule of
law.... Almost all the applicable law is clearly contrary to the position taken
by the Receiver. The statutes are clear.
... Frankly, we do not and cannot expect the majority of these people
[who suffered grievous losses] to understand or appreciate the decision we
must make which may appear to be based on legal technicalities. However, we
are not free to depart from the law as clearly set forth in the applicable stat-
utes and judicial decisions.3 4
Additional legal maneuvers followed, including both new claims
and a lawsuit against the state. During their pendency an agreement
was negotiated to "settle" the Receiver's claims in return for payment
of $8.5 million, a sum that was less than one-half of that originally
proposed and that the legislature eventually appropriated for that pur-
pose.3 5 The district court, after reviewing the proposed settlement,
concluded it "was fair, adequate, and reasonable to both the claimants
and the State, and could find no legal or other reason to disapprove
it."36 A "substantial majority" of the depositors disagreed, expressing
in a hearing before the district court opposition to both the amount of
the settlement and the release of all claims by the Receiver it con-
tained. Nevertheless, the district court approved the settlement and
the Receiver signed the release on September 26, 1985, a document
that contained the following legislative declaration:
It is specifically understood and agreed that this release shall not prejudice
or prevent the Department of Banking and Finance of the State of Nebraska
as Receiver of Commonwealth Savings Company from attempting to obtain an
additional appropriation from the Legislature of the State of Nebraska as such
legislative body may in its discretion determine to be appropriate in the public
31. Id at 291, 455 N.W.2d at 150 (quoting the Claims Board decision).
32. Id- at 292, 455 N.W.2d at 150.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. L.B. 1, 1986 Neb. Laws 57 (1st 1985 Special Session).
36. Weimer v. Amen, 235 Neb. 287, 295, 455 N.W.2d 145, 152 (1990).
[Vol. 71:1
MORAL OBLIGATION
interest or to meet any moral obligations of the State of Nebraska. It being
specifically understood and agreed that this release is not conditioned upon
any such appropriation being made nor is it subject to any such appropriation
being constitutionally and legally valid.3 7
The first of the cases to reach the court, Security Investment Co.,
followed. In that action Security Investment, successor to the bank-
rupt State Securities Savings Company, advanced two theories of re-
covery: that the Banking Department had been "willfully and
wantonly negligent,"38 and that principles of equitable estoppel pre-
cluded any denial of liability given the Department's decision to
"'knowingly conceal material facts regarding the financial stability
and management of Commonwealth."'39 The court, in an opinion
written by Justice Shanahan,40 rejected each theory.
The negligence claim could not prevail, the court observed, because
the acts complained of fell within the discretionary function excep-
tion, a provision of the State Tort Claims Act indicating that the act
"does not apply to '[a]ny claim... based upon the exercise or perform-
ance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or
duty on the part of a state agency or an employee of the state, whether
or not the discretion be abused.' "41 Quoting from both a previous Ne-
braska case, Wickersham v. State, and a decision of the United States
Supreme Court construing a similar federal tort claims exemption, the
court emphasized that the exception covered "'policy decisions made
in governmental activity,' "42 a limitation necessary to "'prevent judi-
cial 'second-guessing' of legislative and administrative decisions
grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium
of an action in tort.' ",43 The exception applied in this instance because
"while the Department is obligated to enforce Nebraska banking laws
* . .the Department is nevertheless vested with broad discretion to
determine the method and manner of enforcing state banking laws."44
The court accepted the argument that "[d]issemination of information
concerning Commonwealth's precarious financial condition would
likely have had a widespread adverse impact on the industrial loan
and investment industry in Nebraska-a situation which the Depart-
37. L.B. 1, 1986 Neb. Laws 57, 58 (1st 1985 Special Session).
38. Security Inv. Co. v. State, 231 Neb. 536, 541, 437 N.W.2d 439, 443 (1989).
39. Id at 548, 437 N.W.2d at 447.
40. This was the only one of the three Commonwealth opinions for which a member
of the court was willing to claim authorship. For my views on that subject--and
those of the legislature-see infra note 77.
41. Security Inv. Co. v. State, 231 Neb. 536, 541-42, 437 N.W.2d 439, 444 (1989)(quoting
NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-8,219(1)(a)(1987)).
42. Id at 543, 437 N.W.2d at 444 (quoting Wickersham v. State, 218 Neb. 175, 180, 354
N.W.2d 134, 138 (1984)).
43. Id at 545,437 N.W.2d at 445 (quoting Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531,536-
37 (1988)).
44. Id. at 547, 437 N.W.2d at 447.
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ment undoubtedly desired to avoid or rinimize."45 Accordingly, it
held, without addressing in any detail any of the specific negligent
acts alleged, that "each of SIC's allegations concerns matters within
the discretion of the Department."4 6
Security Investment's second theory of recovery was predicated on
the argument that the Department had "knowingly" concealed certain
material facts about Commonwealth, making decisions that under-
mined the ability of the corporation to insure Security Investment's
deposits and "induc[ing] SIC to forebear obtaining alternate deposit
insurance." 47 Security Investment argued that the Department was,
accordingly, estopped from denying its obligations under applicable
state banking laws and regulations. The court characterized this the-
ory as "based on the Department's alleged concealment of Common-
wealth's unsound financial condition."48 This was, to say the least, a
somewhat interesting description in light of what the court had just
said about the Department's deliberate, albeit "discretionary," deci-
sions to conceal information about Commonwealth. Be that as it may,
the court stated that "the State is not liable for misrepresentation or
deceit," citing a provision of the State Tort Claims Act to that effect.49
Once again, Wickersham provides an interesting counterpoint, even
though the particular aspect of tort liability explored in Wickersham
differed in certain material respects from that present in Security In-
vestment Co.. In Wickersham the question was whether the state ex-
ercised "reasonable care" once it undertook a voluntary act. The court
observed that "[any allegation that the State failed to take proper ac-
tion, namely, failure to disseminate information to Wickersham or to
conduct proper tests, is not a reference to any misrepresentation by
the State."50 The court then held that "[w]here the gravamen of the
complaint is the negligent performance of operational tasks rather
45. Id
46. Id at 548, 437 N.W.2d at 447. This technique is curious in light of the posture of
the case-which had been dismissed on a demurrer at the district court level-
and the indication in Wickersham-which came to the court after summary judg-
ment-that "[w]hether the State is entitled to the exemption for 'discretionary
function or duty' under the State Tort Claims Act at this stage of the proceedings
is a question of fact." Wickersham v. State, 218 Neb. 175, 182, 354 N.W.2d 134, 139
(1984). Demurrer and summary judgment present different sets of concerns, and
it is entirely possible that the court itself weighed what it believed the facts to be
in light of the detailed point and counterpoint created by the Department's ac-
tions and the various mandatory and discretionary provisions of the applicable
statutes and regulations. Nevertheless, if that determination took place it was
without the benefit of any exploration of the facts through the trial process, and
was reached in ways and for reasons never explained by the court.
47. Security Inv. Co. v. State, 231 Neb. 536, 548-49, 437 N.W.2d 439, 447 (1989).
48. Id- at 550, 437 N.W.2d at 448 (emphasis added).
49. Id (citing NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,219(1)(d)(1987)).
50. Wickersham v. State, 218 Neb. 175, 182, 354 N.W.2d 134, 140 (1984).
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than misrepresentation, the State cannot rely on the misrepresenta-
tion exclusion found in... the State Tort Claims Act."5 1
Slightly over one year later the court decided Weimer, an action
brought by one of the depositors and an association of depositors. This
time the challenge was to the settlement, with the plaintiffs contend-
ing that the Receiver's acceptance of the settlement and agreement to
the release did not bind them and that, if those actions did in fact pre-
clude additional claims by them, they unconstitutionally denied the
depositors access to the courts.
The court rejected the first claim in light of the "plain, direct, and
unambiguous language" of the applicable statute, which "allows the
receiver to enforce 'all debts or other obligations of whatever kind or
nature due' to the creditors of the failed institution, including those
asserted by the appellants." 52 The court conceded that there were
other avenues available to the depositors. It stated, for example, that
"Nebraska law has long recognized that a depositor may have an indi-
vidual action under this scenario," namely "if the bank officers fraud-
ulently accepted deposits while knowing the bank was insolvent."53 It
also held that "a depositor may bring a derivative action to recover for
wrongs against the bank or financial institution, which wrongs have
indirectly injured depositors, but only after having made an unsuccess-
ful demand on the bank or its receiver to bring suit."54 In each in-
stance, however, the claim or theory was not properly before the court
since, respectively, "appellants do not sufficiently state such a cause of
action" 55 and "[tihe petition makes no such allegation, thereby failing
to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action."5 6
The provision allowing the receiver to act on behalf of the deposi-
tors, within the limits specified by the court, was sustained as reason-
able. The court indicated that the access provision of the Nebraska
Constitution, Article I, Section 13, "is not violated when one party
brings an action on another's behalf."57 Due process guarantees were,
in turn, not offended, since "the statute has a reasonable relationship
to the receiver's purpose of wrapping up the business of the insolvent
institution and treating all creditors equitably and fairly."58 Finally,
51. Id.
52. Weimer v. Amen, 235 Neb. 287,296,455 N.W.2d 145,152 (1990)(quoting NEB. REV.
STAT. § 8-199 (1987)).
53. Id. at 296, 455 N.W.2d at 153 (citing Higgins v. Hayden, 53 Neb. 61, 73 N.W. 280
(1897), and Wilson v. Coburn, 35 Neb. 530, 53 N.W. 466 (1892)).
54. Id. at 304, 455 N.W.2d at 157.
55. Id. at 296, 455 N.W.2d at 153.
56. d. at 304, 455 N.W.2d at 157.
57. Id. at 298, 455 N.W.2d at 154.
58. Id. at 299, 455 N.W.2d at 154. The court's invocation of the low "reasonable rela-
tionship" threshold is ironic in light of its subsequent quest for a higher standard
in Haman. See it fra Section V-A.
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the court rejected an "unconstitutional takings" argument, stressing
that "appellants' 'property' is not being taken without compensation,
but, rather, the enforcement of those rights is given to the receiver
(pursuant to the Legislature's power to do so) in order to secure com-
pensation for all creditors in an equitable and nonpreferential
manner."59
The nuances and vagaries of tort law and sovereign immunity thus
combined to deny the depositors redress, at least to the extent that
legal claims might be recognized on the theories advanced by these
parties. The doctrinal landscape was one that would almost certainly
seem alien to those not versed in the intricacies of sovereign immunity
and the State Tort Claims Act. For example, the line of analysis pur-
sued in Security Investment Co. established that the state cannot be
held liable when state officials refuse to act, precisely because those
actions, while consistent with their duties under the law, might have
an "adverse impact" by revealing the truth about an institution on
whose stability a large number of citizens depended. Wickersham, on
the other hand, provided the analytic foundation for this holding in a
decision indicating that if the state does act when it does not have to, it
must exercise "reasonable care," a standard far below the "willful and
wanton" negligence threshold articulated in the Guaranty Act. More-
over, Wickersham stated that if the case is one of action, rather than
inaction, the misrepresentation exclusion does not apply. These are
the very sorts of distinctions that led Justice Blackmun to decry the
"sterile formalisms" that drive courts to "draw a sharp and rigid line
between action and inaction" and, in doing so, fail to recognize that
"compassion need not be exiled from the province of judging." 60 Lit-
tle wonder then that our Depositor Mouse turns pale and trembles at
the mention of torts and sovereign immunity.
As the extract from the district court decision quoted in Weimer
indicated, the court was very much aware that the issues posed in that
case and in Security Investment Co. required adherence to "the rule of
law" in almost certain contravention of "concepts of fundamental fair-
ness." The willingness of the court to recognize that reality was com-
mendable, even if it provided little real solace to those whose
59. Id. at 300, 455 N.W.2d at 154-55.
60. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Social Servs. Dept., 489 U.S. 189, 212-13
(1989)(Blackmun, J., dissenting). The parallels between DeShaney and the Com-
monwealth fiasco are striking. Chief Justice Rehnquist, for example, observed
that "[t]he most that can be said of state functionaries in this case is that they
stood by and did nothing when suspicious circumstances dictated a more active
role for them." Id. at 203. It would be interesting to see what response the Wis-
consin Supreme Court would have if a measure to compensate "poor Joshua,"
predicated on moral obligation, reached it. At least one prior decision of that
court, State ex reL Garrett v. Froehlich, 94 N.W. 50 (1903), suggests that it would
reject the claim. My suspicions are, however, that it would not.
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supposedly insured deposits now seemed likely to disappear forever.
At the same time, the release authorized by L.B. 1 seemed to recognize
that there might in fact be reasons "in the public interest" and, in par-
ticular, "moral obligations of the State of Nebraska," that could con-
ceivably produce full settlement of all claims. It was in that spirit that
L.B. 272A was crafted, and began its journey to the court.
III. CLOSING THE SHOW: THE HAMAN DECISION
"Oh, so the Bill's got to come down the judicial chimney,
has it?" said the Court to itself. "Why, they seem to put every-
thing upon the Bill! I wouldn't be in the Bill's place for a good
deal; the precedents are troubling, to be sure; but I think I can
kick a little!"
The Court drew its foot as far down as it could, and waited
till it heard a little of the argument (it couldn't guess of what
sort it was) scratching and scrambling about close above it,
then, saying to itself, "This is the Bill," it gave one sharp kick,
and waited to see what would happen next 61
L.B. 272A was signed into law by Governor Orr on April 2, 1990.
One week later, the constitutionality of the measure was questioned
by Ms. Gayle Haman of Omaha, "a resident of the State of Nebraska"
who filed the "action on her own behalf and on behalf of all others
similarly situated,"62 that is, "taxpayers" who "were not depositors in
[the] three failed saving institutions."63 Ms. Haman brought her chal-
lenge as an original action before the Supreme Court, invoking the
constitutional provision granting the court original jurisdiction in mat-
ters "relating to the revenue" and in "civil cases in which the state is a
party."6 4 As filed, her complaint alleged that L.B. 272A violated Arti-
cle III, Section 18 of the Nebraska Constitution since it created a
"closed class, to-wit: the depositors of the failed institutions, which
class can never be expanded to include other parties."65 She also ar-
gued that the act denied her "equal protection of the laws because
funds... obtained from sales and income taxes upon all taxpayers
within the State [would be] expended for the benefit of a special closed
class of persons,"66 and that it "deprives the Plaintiff and all others
61. ALIcE, supra note 1, at 62 (Chapter IV: The Rabbit Sends in a Little Bill).
62. Plaintiff's Verified Petition, 1, Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836
(1991)(No. 90-474)[hereinafter Petition].
63. Id. % 4. The class was never certified, and the action proceeded as an individual
challenge to the act.
64. NEB. CoNsT. art. V, § 2.
65. Petition, supra note 62, 6.
66. Id. 7. It is worth noting, in light of the court's decision, that the plaintiff alleged
only a state equal protection claim, predicated on the implicit equal protection
guarantee of article I, section 1. The plaintiff did not couch her equal protection
claim in terms of the article III, section 18 calculus the court actually employed.
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similarly situated of property without due process of law."67
Three different entities appeared in defense of the act: the state, as
the primary defendant; Security Investment Company, the reorga-
nized successor to the bankrupt State Securities Savings Company,
which was granted Intervenor-Defendant status; and the Receiver,
Commonwealth Savings Company, which filed a brief amicus curiae.
The prognosis seemed favorable. The parties defending L.B. 272A,
and the individuals who drafted and supported it, had compelling rea-
sons to believe their efforts to shift the inquiry from legal to moral
grounds, thereby sustaining the act, would be successful. They argued,
for example, that Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland, Ohio, and Utah had all en-
acted somewhat similar measures allocating state tax revenues to re-
imburse depositor losses in those states. 68 They also knew that the
Attorney General had issued two opinions during the course of the
legislative debate indicating that L.B. 272A and its predecessor, L.B.
356, were, in his estimation, constitutional.69
More importantly, they knew that the legislature had, on numer-
ous occasions in the past, passed measures predicated on considera-
tions and circumstances far less extensive and arguably far less
compelling than those articulated in L.B. 272A. They also knew that
the court had responded favorably to many of those measures. In the
years prior to the establishment of the Sundry Claims Board in 1943,70
67. Id 8. Once again, since the court characterized it as one of "four arguments
attacking the constitutionality of L.B. 272A," Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 707-
08,467 N.W.2d 836, 844 (1991), it is significant that none of the plaintiff's filings or
briefs alleged, as an independent claim, that the act violated article XIII, section
3, which states that "[t]he credit of the State shall never be given or loaned in aid
of any individual, association, or corporation ...." That issue surfaced as a collat-
eral argument in the discussion of whether the class was "permanently closed."
See Reply Brief of Plaintiff at 15-16, Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d
836 (1991)(No. 90-474).
68. Statement of Mr. Robert Crosby, Committee on Banking Records Regarding L.B.
356, at 8-9 (Feb. 13, 1989). This information was also contained in the Barry
Stavro article, supra note 6. The specific appropriations, and their legal implica-
tions in each of these states, are discussed infra in Section VII-B-3.
69. The Constitutionality of L.B. 272A, Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. No. 90002 (Jan. 18, 1990);
The Constitutionality of L.B. 356, Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. No. 89051 (May 18, 1989).
Both opinions concluded that the measures were constitutional, a fact the court
noted as to the opinion on L.B. 272A when it awarded $10,000 in fees to the attor-
neys for Ms. Haman. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 723, 467 N.W.2d 836, 852
(1991). Ms. Haman's attorneys requested the fees on the basis of NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 24-204.01(1)(a)(1989), which authorizes their payment when an original "action
challenges the constitutionality of an act which the Attorney General has previ-
ously ruled constitutional or unconstitutional or as to which he has made no rul-
ing .... ." The wording of this section seems to authorize the fees regardless of
what the Attorney General says or does, and one wonders what it was supposed
to accomplish. At least five opinions considering options for reimbursement have
been issued in the wake of Haman. See infra note 573.
70. L.B. 5, 1943 Neb. Laws 432. The Sundry Claim Board was to "receive and care-
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for example, the legislature had routinely appropriated funds for the
relief of individual citizens,71 their widows and children,7 2 and for
what could only be characterized as "gifts" to the widows of state sena-
tors who died in office, in the form of a specific appropriation of the
salaries the deceased members had not lived to collect. 73 Those acts
and resolutions had, by and large, gone unchallenged. When con-
tested, they had generally survived judicial scrutiny, either expressly
or by implication. In 1893, for example, the court noted-with appar-
ent approval-a "legislative gift, or donation, to [one] Maurer con-
tain[ing] an allowance for physical suffering."74 In 1922 the court
seemed to recognize that there was an exception to the general bar to
retroactive legislation "where the retroactive law is based upon the
moral right of the class benefited to the remedy given ... ."75 There
were exceptions, measures that failed in large part because their
terms were either too narrow or belied their expressed purpose.76
The court had seemed to make it clear, however, that the problem was
not the ability of the state to honor such commitments, but was in-
stead to be found in specific defects in the legislative acts that belied
their declarations of intent.
Those deficiencies, it seemed, were not present in L.B. 272A, or at
least so the parties arguing in its defense believed. They were, at least
according to the court, wrong. On March 29,1991, the court, in a unan-
fully investigate all claims against the State of Nebraska for the payment of
which no moneys have been appropriated." Id. § 2, 1943 Neb. Laws 432-33. Its
origins and development are discussed in Robert A. Barlow, Jr., Legislative Set-
tlement of Claims Against the State of Nebraska, 29 NEB. L. REv. 426 (1950).
While various other measures have since been enacted, such as the various tort
claims acts, the Sundry Claims Board survives in the form of the "miscellaneous
claims" provisions of NEB. REV. STAT §§ 81-8,236 to 81-8,238 (1987).
71. See, e.g., House Roll No. 85, 1893 Neb. Laws 460 ("An Act for the relief of George
Maurer").
72. See, e.g., L.B. 398, 1941 Neb. Laws 454 ("Appropriation for Lela Brock"); L.B. 18,
1939 Neb. Laws 285 ("Appropriation for Benefit of Lillian Irene Smoyer").
73. See, eg., L.B. 197, 1945 Neb. Laws 434 ("Appropriation of Salary of Deceased
Member of Legislature" (Harry E. Bowman)); L.B. 51, 1945 Neb. Laws 436 ("Ap-
propriation of Salary of Deceased Member of Legislature" (Peter P. Gutoski)).
74. State ex rel. Sayre v. Moore, 40 Neb. 854, 863, 59 N.W. 755, 758 (1893).
75. Wakeley v. Douglas County, 109 Neb. 396, 399,191 N.W. 337, 338 (1922). The ellip-
ses in the quoted language show my editorial deletion, for the time being, of the
second half of the court's statement, which begins with the "disjunctive" word
"or," a usage that (to me at least) indicates judicial recognition of two bases for
sustaining retroactive laws recognizing moral obligations. The Haman court, as I
will note in Section IV.B of this Article, did not choose to recognize this reality.
76. The references here are to L.B. 20, 1937 Neb. Laws 455, invalidated in Cox v.
State, 134 Neb. 751, 279 N.W. 482 (1938), and Senate File No. 269, 1921 Neb. Laws
514, struck by the court in Wakeley v. Douglas County, 109 Neb. 396,191 N.W. 337
(1922). I discuss these acts and cases in detail infra at text accompanying notes
389-99 and 136-55.
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imous, per curiam opinion,77 "held L.B. 272A unconstitutional in
three separate particulars, any one of which is sufficient to declare the
act void .... ,"78 The act, the court found, was predicated on an "unrea-
sonable classification," created an impermissible "closed class," and
unlawfully pledged the "credit" of the state.
The court began its analysis with the reminder that "[t]he party
claiming that a legislative act is unconstitutional has the burden of
establishing such unconstitutionality, and all reasonable doubts will be
resolved in favor of constitutionality.... Unconstitutionality of a stat-
ute must be clearly demonstrated before a court can declare the stat-
ute unconstitutional." 79 These burdens, which fall equally on the
party challenging the statute and the court assessing their claims, are
deliberately high. The substantive focus of the Haman court was on
the constitutional ban on "special legislation," articulated in a lengthy
section of the constitution indicating that "[t]he Legislature shall not
pass local or special laws," either of certain specified types or when a
"general law can be made applicable."80 In this instance the court
looked to see if either of two limitations were violated, the ban of
"[g]ranting to any corporation, association, or individual any special or
exclusive privileges, immunity, or franchise whatever," and the admo-
nition that "[iun all other cases where a general law can be made appli-
cable, no special law shall be passed." The court stressed that "[b]y
definition, a legislative act is general, and not special, if it operates
alike on all persons of a class or on persons who are brought within
the relations and circumstances provided for and if the classification
77. The fact that the court indulged, yet again, in its predilection for using the per
cuiam device in an extraordinarily important and potentially divisive case is
both consistent with prior practice and curious. Per curiams seem to have be-
come the accepted mode for the court when a decision offers the prospect of
either receiving intense scrutiny or causing severe distress. See, e.g., State ex rel
Spire v. Conway, 238 Neb. 766,472 N.W.2d 403 (1991); MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline
v. State Bd. Equal. & Assess., 238 Neb. 565, 471 N.W.2d 734 (1991); Natural Gas
Pipeline Co. v. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 237 Neb. 357,466 N.W.2d 461 (1991);
Banner County v. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 226 Neb. 236, 411 N.W.2d 35
(1987); State ex reL Spire v. Public Employees Retirement Bd., 226 Neb. 176, 410
N.W.2d 463 (1987). One wonders what the court makes of the statutory command
that "the reports of every case must show the name of the judge writing the opin-
ion, the names of the judges concurring therein, and the names of the judges, if
any, dissenting from the opinion." NEB. REv. STAT. § 24-212 (1989)(emphasis ad-
ded). Perhaps this illustrates yet another instance of the interpretive phenome-
non, venerable in its origin, wherein the terms "must" or "shall" are read to
mean "may" or "might." In Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490
(1989), for example, Chief Justice Rehnquist used "well-accepted canons of statu-
tory interpretation" to read the Missouri statutory command that a physician
"shall" perform certain viability tests to mean that the statute "require[d] only
those tests that are useful." Id. at 514-15 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.).
78. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 723, 467 N.W.2d 836, 852 (1991).
79. I& at 708, 467 N.W.2d at 844 (citations omitted).
80. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 18.
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so adopted by the Legislature has a basis in reason and is not purely
arbitrary."81
The court did not find, nor arguably could it have, a violation of the
first part of this standard. It noted that "the defendants argue [L.B.
272A] was enacted in response to a unique situation involving a class of
individuals who suffered a real difference in harm from those outside
the class."8 2 That was clearly the case. As the court conceded in Se-
curity Investment Co., the decision on the part of the Department to
conceal the perilous condition of Commonwealth was "guided and in-
fluenced by important considerations of public policy."83 Neverthe-
less, the actions of the Department, as the court implicitly recognized,
contributed to the series of events that led to the inability of the corpo-
ration to honor the guaranty, particularly in the case of State Security
and American Savings. Thus the court in Haman neither discussed
nor denied the argument that the class recognized in L.B. 272A was
either unique or one that "suffered a real difference in harm." It did
not, because it could not.
Problems arose, however, at the second part of the standard: the
requirement that the classification have "a basis in reason" and not be
"purely arbitrary." The court stated that "special legislation" arises
"in one of two ways: (1) by creating a totally arbitrary and unreasona-
ble method of classification, or (2) by creating a permanently closed
class."84 It discussed each of these independent requirements in turn,
characterizing the first inquiry as "whether payments to a class of
failed industrial company depositors bear a reasonable and substantial
relation to instilling confidence in the Legislature, its enactments, and
the state banking system."85
The court held that it did not, rejecting the claim that there was in
fact a moral obligation of the sort the legislature could recognize. It
then stated that "[ilt appears the opposite result of that intended by
the Legislature in enacting L.B. 272A would occur," arguing that
"[t]he act would instill fear rather than confidence, for it indicates that
every time someone is injured, the state will rescue him or her."86 Fi-
nally, it rejected the legislature's claim that L.B. 272A served a wider
purpose, stating that "[t]here is no question that L.B. 272A was en-
acted strictly on behalf of the Commonwealth, American Savings, and
81. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 709, 467 N.W.2d 836, 844 (1991)(citing Bauer v.
State Game, Forestation & Parks Comm'n, 138 Neb. 436, 293 N.W. 282 (1940)).
82. Id. at 710, 467 N.W.2d at 845.
83. Security Inv. Co. v. State, 231 Neb. 536, 548, 437 N.W.2d 439, 447 (1989).
84. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 709, 467 N.W.2d 836, 845 (1991)(citing City of
Scottsbluff v. Tiemann, 185 Neb. 256, 175 N.W.2d 74 (1970)).
85. Id. at 714, 467 N.W.2d at 847.
86. Id. at 715, 467 N.W.2d at 848 (1991). I explore the validity of this claim infra at
text accompanying notes 625-32.
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State Securities Savings depositors."87 That, the court stressed, was
not and could not be a valid exercise of the state police power, citing a
1930 decision, Weaver v. Koehn, that held "[c]learly it has not yet
come to pass that the state, in its supervision of the banking business,
has become an eleemosynary institution."8 8
The court then stated that L.B. 272A created a "permanently
closed class" because "the group of recipients under the act is identi-
fied and fixed by historical circumstance to include only the depositors
of Commonwealth, State Securities Savings, and American Savings." 8 9
The court apparently conceded that the actual terms of L.B. 272A
were open-ended, for rather than discussing its precise terms, it sih-
ply noted that the parties defending the act had argued that there was
a "possibility for future growth"90 and that the "plaintiff must prove
that the class defined by LB 272A is absolutely closed." 91 It declared,
however, that "[i]n determining whether a class is closed, this court is
not limited to the face of the legislation, but may consider the act's
application."92 The arguments advanced by the state and amicus, the
court then argued, were incorrect:
In deciding whether a statute legitimately classifies as special legislation,
the court must consider the actual probability that others will come under the
act's operation. If the prospect is merely theoretical, and not probable, the act
is special legislation. The conditions of entry into the class must not only be
possible, but reasonably probable of attainment.9 3
L.B. 272A failed this test; "[t]he realities of the situation are that ex-
cept for a highly improbable set of events the class is permanently
closed to future members."94 To hold otherwise, the court stressed,
"would be to accept artful draftsmanship over reality."95
The final question was whether L.B. 272A violated the command
that "[t]he credit of the state shall never be given or loaned in aid of
any individual, association, or corporation. ... "96 This specific point
was neither advanced as a ground for striking the act nor discussed by
the plaintiff in her brief on the merits. It arose, rather, as a subset of
87. Ia
88. Id. (quoting Weaver v. Koehn, 120 Neb. 114, 117, 231 N.W. 703, 704 (1930)).
Weaver is discussed in detail infra at text accompanying notes 455-80.
89. Id. at 716, 467 N.W.2d at 848.
90. Brief of Defendants at 46, quoted in Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 717, 467
N.W.2d 836, 849 (1991)(No. 90-474).
91. Brief of Amicus Curiae Receiver, Commonwealth Savings Company at 24, quoted
in Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 717, 467 N.W.2d 836, 849 (1991)(No. 90-474).
92. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 717, 467 N.W.2d 836, 849 (1991)(citations omitted).
93. Id. at 717-18, 467 N.W.2d at 849 (citations omitted).
94. Id. at 718, 467 N.W.2d at 849.
95. Id.
96. NEB. CONST. art. XIII, § 3.
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the plaintiff's argument that the class was in fact closed,97 a reality
that meant that the parties defending the act did not have a chance to
brief the issue. The court nevertheless seized the opportunity
presented and elevated the point to the status of a third independent
ground for attacking the validity of L.B. 272A. This was, it should be
stressed, entirely appropriate, since the court has held that "'where
the invalidity of the act is plain, and such a determination is necessary
to a reasonable and sensible disposition of the issues presented, we are
required by necessity to notice the plain error in the premise on which
the case was tried.' "98 It meant, nevertheless, that the court did not
have the benefit of any insights on the issue that the other parties to
the action might have had.
The court indicated that a successful article XIII, section 3 claim
required the plaintiff to "prove each of the following elements:
(1) The credit of the state (2) was given or loaned (3) in aid of any
individual, association, or corporation."99 The first element was met
because "under L.B. 272A the state would be forever liable for the
losses of industrial company depositors if we accept, arguendo, that
the class in L.B. 272A is open."10 0 That, the court observed, "obli-
gat[ed] present and future taxes from the state's general fund[,J ...
precisely the activity article XIII, § 3, was enacted to prohibit."Olo
This "credit" was "given," in turn, because the state received no "valu-
able consideration" in return for the funds appropriated; there was no
moral obligation, and "[t]he state could never come close to receiving
an equal amount to the proposed disposition of funds by acquiring
legal claims against industrial companies that had gone bankrupt or
were in receivership."302 And, since the objective of the act was to
fulfill the corporation's guaranties, the credit was given "in aid" of a
"private corporation." The fact that a collateral public purpose might
97. Reply Brief of Plaintiff at 15-17, Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836
(1991)(No. 90-474).
98. MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline v. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 238 Neb. 565, 584,
471 N.W.2d 734, 746 (1991)(quoting State v. Goodseal, 186 Neb. 359, 368, 183
N.W.2d 258,263-64, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 845 (1971)). There is considerable room
to argue whether resolution of the credit issue was "necessary to a reasonable and
sensible disposition" given the court's statement that "any one of [the two special
legislation grounds] is sufficient to declare the act void." Haman v. Marsh, 237
Neb. 699, 723, 467 N.W.2d 836, 852 (1991). Since it was an original jurisdiction
action, however, it seems clear that the court would have been within its author-
ity to address the credit question if it truly had been necessary, which I believe to
have been the case given the serious flaws I describe in the plaintiff's and court's
special legislation analysis. By the same token, I also believe that the credit of
the state discussion is unsound and unconvincing for reasons I outline infra at
text accompanying notes 633-59.
99. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 719, 467 N.W.2d 836, 850 (1991).
100. Ici at 720, 467 N.W.2d at 850.
101. Id. at 720, 467 N.W.2d at 851.
102. Id, at 721, 467 N.W.2d at 851.
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exist, the court argued, was irrelevant: "[t]he prohibition against the
pledge of the state's credit does not hinge on whether the legislation
achieves a 'public purpose,' when the pledge benefits a private individ-
ual, association, or corporation."'1 3 The state, the court stressed, sim-
ply "is not empowered to become a surety or guarantor of another's
debts."104
Both the state and Ms. Haman filed petitions for rehearing. The
state, understandably, sought to have the entire case reexamined, ar-
guing both that the decision was incorrect and that, "if unchanged,
may draw into question long existing state programs such as the State
Welfare System, the Crime Victim's Reparation Fund, state tort and
miscellaneous claims, tax deductions for theft losses, and other pro-
grams designed for a defined class of persons."105 Ms. Haman, in turn,
was incensed that the court had taken it upon itself to award, without
what she believed to be a necessary factual inquiry, attorneys' fees in
only the amount of $10,000.106 She also felt that she had served a valu-
able public purpose and was entitled to a larger fee under the "Com-
mon Fund" theory.O7
The court, unconvinced and unimpressed, administered the final
kick, denying both petitions without opinion.108 Whether that in fact
lays the matter to rest, either as a political question for the legislature
or a legal dilemma for the court, is quite another matter, for there is
much more than meets the eye on first reading of the court's particu-
lar and, as we shall see, peculiar vision of Moral Obligation Land.
IV. WHAT'S A WORD? JUDICIAL TECHNIQUE IN HAMAN
"Come, we shall have some fun now!" thought the Court.
"I'm glad they've begun asking riddles-I believe I can guess
that," it added aloud.
"Do you mean that you think you can find out the answer
to it?" said the March Hare.
"Exactly so," said the Court.
"Then you should say what you mean," the March Hare
went on.
103. Id at 722, 467 N.W.2d at 852 (citing McGuffey v. Hall, 557 S.W.2d 401 (Ky. 1977)).
104. Id- at 722, 467 N.W.2d at 852.
105. Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion for Rehearing at 24, Haman v. Marsh, 237
Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836 (1991)(No. 90-474). The plaintiff did not file a response
to any of the state's substantive contentions.
106. Brief in Support of Motion for Rehearing or New Trial and in Support of Motion
for Award of Attorneys' Fees on Behalf of Class at 4-6, Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb.
699, 467 N.W.2d 836 (1991)(No. 90-474).
107. Id. at 6-14.
108. The order denying a rehearing is not reported.
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"I do," the Court hastily replied; "at least-at least I mean
what I say-that's the same thing, you know."
"Not the same thing a bit!" said the Hatter. "Why, you
might just as well say that 'Law and Justice' is the same thing
as 'Law or Justice!"109
One of the striking things about Commonwealth Trilogy is the
court's apparent insistence that it, and the parties before it, must ad-
here strictly to the language and letter of the law. The pervasive
theme in both Security Investment Co. and Weimer, for example, is of
a court laboring within the strictures imposed by the precise language
of the applicable statutes. That is especially evident in Weimer,
where the court found it appropriate (indeed, perhaps necessary) to
quote at length from the district court's order regarding the unfortu-
nate conflicts between principles of fundamental fairness and "legal
technicalities.""10 This need to toe the line-to mean what one says,
say what one means, and adhere to the letter of the "law"-also sur-
faces in Haman, playing a critical role in the court's treatment of two
threshold issues, the appropriate standard of review and the legal
foundations for judicial recognition of moral obligation.
A. And Versus Or: Basting the State Goose
The court begins its discussion of the standard of review by seizing
on what, in my estimation at least, can at worst be characterized as an
unintended grammatical error in the defendant's brief. The court
nevertheless felt compelled to elevate that error to the level of "un-
cited" divine revelation, stating that "[t]he defendants argue, without
citation, the proposition that 'legislative classifications will be upheld
as long as there is some rational basis for establishing the classification
or there is a valid public policy reason for establishing the legislative
classification.' (Emphasis omitted.) Brief for defendants at 14."' 11
The court then lectured the defendants for offering a "disjunctive"
and "erroneous" test.112 The test was "disjunctive," the court tells us,
because it would allow "either a rational basis or public policy [to] sup-
port the constitutionality of L.B. 272A," a proposition that "we have
previously disposed of ... ."113 The test was erroneous, in turn, be-
cause the inquiry is not in fact rational basis, but "[tihe narrower spe-
cial legislation prohibition [which] supplements the equal protection
109. ALICE, supra note 1, at 95 (Ch. VII: A Mad Tea-Party).
110. See supra text accompanying note's 52-60.
111. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699,710,467 N.W.2d 836, 845 (1991). The court actually
does this twice, stating later in the opinion that the state "presupposes" an
"either/or" approach. Id. at 711, 467 N.W.2d at 846.
112. Id. at 711-12, 467 N.W. 2d at 846.
113. Id.
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theory."l14
There is, admittedly, a problem with the formulation the state em-
ployed. A careful reading of the applicable cases indicates that the use
of the disjunctive "or" was an error, and that the conjunctive "and"
was clearly called for. State ex rel. DougZas v. Marsh,11S for example,
seemed to provide the analytic matrix adopted by each of the parties;
it certainly seems to articulate the foundations for the test recognized
by the court. Nothing in that decision indicates that the court envi-
sioned an either/or approach. The operative rule, rather, was that
"[c]lassification is proper if the special class has some reasonable dis-
tinction from other subjects of a like general character, which distinc-
tion bears some reasonable relation to the legitimate objectives and
purposes of the legislation."116 That is, there must be both a "reason-
able distinction" and a "reasonable relation" to a legitimate public
purpose; all that is lacking from the court's statement of the standard
is the conjunction.
Normally, quibbles of the sort raised by the court are of at best
passing interest. One accepts the rebuke, the proper standard is out-
lined, and is then applied to the case at hand. The court's public cor-
rection of the offending party may prove embarrassing, but is hardly
the end of the civilized world as we know it. In this instance, however,
there is a much more serious issue lurking in the court's treatment of
an otherwise insignificant point, for the court's grammatical lecture is
simultaneously both a sham and excoriates a technique that the court
itself subsequently employs, deliberately and to its discredit, at a criti-
cal juncture in the Haman opinion.
The first thing one notices about the court's treatment of what the
state wrote is that the court found it either necessary or appropriate to
recast somewhat the sentence it criticizes, deleting the "emphasis"
employed in the original. The reason for this becomes obvious when
one examines in somewhat greater detail the passage within which the
"offending" sentence is found:
Similarly, the Nebraska Supreme Court, in State ex rel Douglas v. Grad-
wohl, 194 Neb. 745, 235 N.W.2d 854 (1975), stated the basic rule for determin-
ing the validity of legislative classifications: "[t]he applicable principles which
must guide us are: 'The Legislature may classify the subjects, persons, or ob-
jects as to which it legislates if such classification rests upon differences in
situations or circumstances between things dealt with in one class and those
114. Id. at 713, 467 N.W.2d at 846 (citing McRoberts v. Adams, 328 N.E.2d 321 (1975)). I
explore the "erroneous" test accusation at length, infra text accompanying notes
111-18. As that discussion indicates, if the test relied on was "erroneous" it was a
mistake induced by the state's belief that the court had previously said what it
meant and meant what it said.
115. 207 Neb. 598, 300 N.W.2d 181 (1980).
116. Id. at 609, 300 N.W.2d at 187 (quoting Campbell v. City of Lincoln, 195 Neb. 703,
709, 240 N.W.2d 339, 342 (1976)).
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dealt with in another.'" (Emphasis added.) Id. at 749,235 N.W.2d at 858. Ad-
ditionally, the Court has held that legislative classifications will be upheld as
long as there is some rational basis for establishing the classification or there
is a valid public policy reason for establishing the legislative classification.
With respect to reasonable legislative classifications, the Court has stated:
"[w]hile the question of classification is one primarily for the Legislature and
in the exercise of this power the Legislature possesses a wide discretion, there
must, nevertheless, be some rational basis for the classification." Marsh, 207
Neb. at 607, 300 N.W.2d at 186.117
The "emphasis omitted" elements of the passage, as the court re-
produces it, are the phrases "rational basis" and "public policy." As
the sentence immediately following the one on which the court
pounces indicates, the approach adopted by the state was to provide
the general rule (quoting Gradwohl) and then flesh out its parameters
with successive quotations on the question of rational basis from
Marsh (as quoted above) and Gradwohl (not quoted, but trust me).
The state then, with regard to the "public policy" parameter, quoted a
lengthy passage from City of Scottsbluffv. Tiemann that indicated, in
pertinent part, and with the state in its brief again adding "emphasis,"
that classifications "'must be based upon some reason of public pol-
icy'" and are "'proper if the special class has some reasonable distinc-
tion from other subjects of a like general character, which distinction
bears some reasonable relation to the legitimate objectives and pur-
poses of the legislation.' "11s The entire passage is then an exercise in
one, two, three; rule, then illustration, supported by lengthy quota-
tions from the court's prior decisions.
Admittedly, the language the court seizes on does not itself consti-
tute a direct quote from a specific decision of the court. Instead, the
brief proceeds, in the previous and following sentences, to use the
court's prior caselaw to establish that "rational basis" and "public pol-
icy" are operative elements of the applicable tests. Thus, the entire
segment from which a single sentence is lifted-that sentence suppos-
edly creating a new test from whole cloth-begins by stating the "basic
rule" and ends (almost a full page later) with additional quotations
documenting the two points the state wished to make. This is hardly
the creation of a test without citation. Indeed, if there is any vice evi-
dent in this segment of the state's brief it is that the state has quoted
ad nauseam, believing that the sheer mass of quoted material, rather
than reasoned explanation, would prove persuasive. The court's state-
ments to the contrary, that the state argues "without citation" and
"presupposes" an "either/or," are simply untrue. It is, accordingly,
difficult to escape the conclusion the unnamed author of the opinion
117. Brief of Defendants at 13-14, Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836
(1991)(No. 90-474).
118. Id. at 14 (quoting City of Scottsbluff v. Tiemann, 185 Neb. 256,266,175 N.W.2d 74,
81 (1970)).
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either relied on seriously defective assistance from his clerks or pro-
ceeded in this manner on the assumption, clearly mistaken, that no
one would reread the briefs and call his bluff.
These, admittedly, are harsh statements, criticisms levied with
some reluctance and a deep awareness of their seriousness. They are,
nevertheless, observations I feel compelled to make in light of the con-
sequences that the court's approach had for citizens who relied, appar-
ently mistakenly, on the good faith and honor of Nebraska's public
officials. For even assuming that it was proper for the court to seize so
tenaciously on the state's grammatical error, it is clear, given what
follows, that there is a deeper irony in the court's technique. For the
court's treatment of the ultimate issue in Haman, moral obligation,
ignores important realities, realities of which the court most certainly
was aware, and which cast the court's discussion of moral obligation in
a light far less favorable than the one by which it would have us ex-
amine the logic and result of Haman.
B. And Versus Or: Cooking the Judicial Gander
Virtually every aspect of Haman comes down to two questions.
May the State of Nebraska, speaking through the legislature, and sub-
ject to appropriate judicial review, recognize a moral obligation? If so,
did such a moral obligation in fact exist and provide constitutionally
sound predicates for L.B. 272A?
The court leads us to believe that the first question is irrelevant:
"we need not rule whether a moral obligation would provide reason-
able and substantial support for the classification in question, for we
find that no moral obligation existed."1l 9 It reaches this "result,"
however, by first quoting from Wakeley: "this court [has] held that a
moral obligation attaches when there is 'a law [which] is passed notify-
ing and warning the taxpayer and the citizen generally that the state
... will undertake the burden of such damages.' "120 This, the court's
protestations to the contrary, seems to answer at least a portion of the
first inquiry, for the quoted language can only be read as an affirma-
tion that moral obligations can be recognized, albeit, if the court's re-
counting of Wakeley is correct, not in the sort of circumstances it
believed arose pursuant to L.B. 272A. This is true, the court informs
us, because "[n]owhere in the NDIGC legislation was such a notifica-
tion or warning present. In fact, the NDIGC Act provides that '[n]o
state funds of any kind shall be allocated or paid to the corpora-
tion.' "121 The court then rejects the argument that "an average de-
119. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 714, 467 N.W.2d 836, 847 (1991).
120. Id- (quoting Wakeley v. Douglas County, 109 Neb. 396, 400, 191 N.W. 337, 339
(1922)).
121. Id. (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-17,135(4)(1987)).
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positor would not know this and would understand that the manner
and form of the guaranty notice meant that the NDIGC was backed by
the state" with the stern admonition that "[f]or this, we remind the
defendants and Amicus of the maxims that ignorance of the law is no
excuse and that everyone is presumed to know the law."122
This line of analysis seems compelling, if the question was one of
legal rather than moral obligation, and if the doctrines the court relies
on are correctly stated. As we have seen, the first of these conditions
is not met, nor was it ever intended to be, since no party appearing
before the court in support of L.B. 272A argued that the measure rep-
resented a discharge of a legal duty. Indeed, the state expressly dis-
claimed any contention of that sort, stating "[a]t the outset, it should
be noted that the defendants do not claim that there is a legal obliga-
tion to reimburse depositors of failed industrial savings and loans es-
tablished and guaranteed pursuant to state statute."
This being the case, the court's invocation of venerable legal max-
ims warrants closer scrutiny. As any first year law student knows, the
notion that "ignorance of the law is no excuse" plays an important role
when the focus is indeed on legal obligations. The court has empha-
sized that this "is a maxim sanctioned by centuries of experience" and
has stressed that the fact "[t]hat it works a hardship in individual in-
stances is [both] a matter of common knowledge [and] of little impor-
tance, when compared with the evils which would result from
measuring the rights of a litigant, not by the law as it is, but by the law
as he understands it to be."124 The court has, accordingly, refused to
allow an alien to plead ignorance of the requirements of federal immi-
gration law,'2 5 a stockman to be unaware of brand areas, 2 6 and has in
particular demanded that attorneys not plead ignorance of either
changes in the law2 7 or advisory opinions of the State Bar Association
guiding their conduct.'28
That is as it should be. But it does not seem unreasonable to argue
that the calculus should be entirely different when the average citi-
zen-who presumably neither approaches a bank nor reads its adver-
tisements with the Revised Statutes of Nebraska in hand-makes a
122. Id at 714-15, 467 N.W.2d at 848. As someone who worked on the Intervenor's
Brief I suppose I can take some small comfort in the fact that the court did not
extend this "gentle reminder" to us.
123. Brief of Defendants at 8, Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836
(1991)(No. 90-474).
124. City of Plattsmouth v. Murphy, 74 Neb. 749, 753-54, 105 N.W. 293, 295 (1905).
125. State v. Wilson, 194 Neb. 587, 590, 234 N.W.2d 208, 210 (1975).
126. Satterfield v. State, 172 Neb. 275, 280, 109 N.W.2d 415, 418-19 (1961).
127. State ex reL Neb. State Bar Ass'n v. Holscher, 193 Neb. 729, 736-37, 230 N.W.2d 75,
79-80 (1975).
128. State ex reL Neb. State Bar Ass'n v. Hollstein, 202 Neb. 40, 57-58, 274 N.W.2d 508,
517 (1979).
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deposit in an institution that is required by state law to inform her
that her accounts are "protected by" the "Nebraska Depository Insti-
tution Guaranty Corporation." Both the name of the entity providing
the "guaranty" and the requirement of notice were, after all, dictated
by statute,12 9 realities that lent credence to the notion that the average
citizen would suspect that the state is somehow involved. We can, for
the sake of argument, grant that the state's involvement did not rise to
the level of a legally binding, state funds guaranty, and that the aver-
age citizen should somehow, notwithstanding the signs on the bank
and language of the advertisements, be aware of this legal fact. For
these realities have absolutely no bearing on the issue actually before
the court in Haman, whether it was constitutional for the legislature
to respond to the problems caused by these impressions because it was
the morally proper thing to do. There is, for example, a world of dif-
ference between a claim for reimbursement predicated solely on mis-
conduct by the guaranty corporation, and one whose foundations are
provided by a multi-year record of mis-, mal-, and nonfeasance by the
state officials charged with seeing that the corporation and the institu-
tions it "insures" comply with the law. It was, of course, the latter
situation toward which the remedial actions of L.B. 272A were
directed.
Interestingly enough, this appears to be a line of argument to
which the court should have been receptive, at least given what were
presumably the lessons of its own prior decisions. In In re Preisendorf
Transport, Inc., for example, the court stressed that "[ilt is true that
ordinarily ignorance of the law is no excuse .... ,,130 It countenanced
such "ignorance" in that instance, however, "for appellee was operat-
ing under color of authority, color meaning an appearance or sem-
blance, as distinguished from real; that is, an apparent right."131 The
intriguing aspect of the decision is not presented by the "apparent au-
thority," which does not directly arise in the context of Haman, since
no one (at least to date) has claimed that state officials were actively
soliciting deposits in Commonwealth. Rather, the focus here is on the
process by which the appearances were created.
It seems that the State Railway Commission had assumed, incor-
rectly, that "all holders of certificates issued prior [to In re Neylon, 151
Neb. 587, 38 N.W.2d 552 (1949)] [could] continue to operate thereun-
der, apparently feeling such authority was not subject to collateral at-
tack in the courts."1 32 The erroneous nature of that judgment was
subsequently confirmed by the court in R.B. "Dick" Wilson, Inc. v.
129. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-17,127 & 21-17,144 (1987)
130. 169 Neb. 693, 703, 100 N.W.2d 865, 872 (1960)(emphasis added).
131. Id.
132. Id-
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Hargleroad,133 a determination that arguably revealed the extent of
the operative "ignorance." Nevertheless, the parties in Preisendorf
Transport 'had some right to trust in the judgment of the commission,
a body which, under the Constitution and laws of this state, was cre-
ated for and given authority to regulate the rates and services of com-
mon carriers and have general control thereof."134 The same sort of
reliance and authority permeated the events leading to Haman. The
State Department of Banking was given general supervisory control
over both the industrials and the guaranty corporation. The Depart-
ment, exercising its "discretion," elected not to apprise either the
other industrials, the corporation, or the depositors of Common-
wealth's perilous condition. The Department also decided, again in its
"discretion," not to qualify the binding force of the guaranty advertise-
ment requirements in the statutes. Indeed, the Department author-
ized an increase in the guaranty level from $10,000 to $30,000 at a
period in time when it was already very much aware of the precarious
condition of Commonwealth.13 5
Those decisions may well, as the court held in Security Investment
Co. and Weimer, have been within the range of discretion required to
give meaning to the strict requirements of state tort claims immunity
and legal liability. It is, however, another matter entirely to argue
that the consequences of those same discretionary acts impose collat-
eral duties on the victims of the Department's judgments, duties suffi-
cient to trigger what the court itself has recognized to be the
"individual hardships" that arise from the application of ignorantia
juris neminem excusat.
This brings us to Wakeley and the court's use of the doctrines ar-
ticulated in that case. The specific question posed in Wakeley was
whether the legislature, by passing Senate File Number 269,136 could
authorize the county commissioners of Douglas County to reimburse
any "state or county officer" for the loss of private property as a result
of mob violence. The plaintiff, Arthur C. Wakeley, acting on the basis
of the authority apparently conferred by the measure, sued Douglas
County, "alleging that a riotous mob had taken possession of the
courthouse and burned his library therein kept and used in his work
as a judge of the district court." 3 7 The court rejected the claim, find-
ing that the measure was impermissible "retroactive" legislation, with
the primary focus in the opinion falling on the normal bar against ret-
133. 165 Neb. 468, 86 N.W.2d 177 (1957).
134. In re Preisendorf Transp., Inc., 169 Neb. 693, 703, 100 N.W.2d 865, 872 (1960). I
should note that Preisendorf Transport was not hard to find, even for someone
who prepared this article without the benefit of a copy of the Nebraska Digest. It
took at most ten minutes, Lexis search to hard copy.
135. See supra note 22.
136. 1921 Neb. Laws 514.
137. Wakeley v. Douglas County, 109 Neb. 396, 397, 191 N.W. 337, 338 (1922).
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roactive measures. Conceding that "retroactive operation is not al-
ways fatal to legislative enactments," the court stressed that there is
nevertheless "a clear distinction between that which is harmless or
merely curative and that which imposes new obligations or takes away
vested rights."'138 Citing Justice Story's opinion in Society for the
Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler,13 9 the court indicated that
"[t]he latter class has always been condemned, and should be."140 It
then rejected Judge Wakeley's claim, stressing that:
[FIrom the beginning of jurisprudence, and in practically all the jurisdictions
of the United States, it has been generally regarded that the governmental
agency is under no duty to make good to the citizen the damage done by the
mob, even if the same be due to the omission of such agency to properly
govern. 1 4 1
Perhaps in recognition of this, Judge Wakeley argued that the
county was nevertheless under a moral obligation to him, a position
the court refused to embrace. In her brief, the plaintiff in Haman
characterized this result as one in which the court laid down a rule
that "the moral obligation attaches only when 'a law is passed notify-
ing and warning the taxpayer and the citizen generally that the state
or municipality will under take [sic] the burden of such damages.' "142
The unknown author of Haman accepted this description, stating (as
indicated) that no law provided the appropriate "warning" to either
depositor or taxpayer. Unfortunately, as the brief filed on behalf of
the Intervenor indicated in no uncertain terms, the phrasing offered
by the plaintiff and accepted by the court reads into Wakeley a limita-
tion that simply was not present.143
138. Id at 399, 191 N.W. at 338.
139. 22 F. Cas. 756 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814)(No. 13,156).
140. Wakeley v. Douglas County, 109 Neb. 396, 399, 191 N.W. 337, 338 (1922). It is
possible to draw a distinction between legislative acts that are "purely" retroac-
tive and those that are "curative," with the latter being viewed more favorably.
Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroac-
tive Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REv. 692, 703-06 (1960). The debate about the pro-
priety of such acts, and the circumstances within which they might be sustained,
is both longstanding and of special importance when appropriations are being
questioned. See, e.g., Frederick A. Ballard, Retroactive Federal Taxation, 48
HARV. L. REV. 592 (1935); Frank E. Horack, Jr. & Ben C. Dutton, Statutory Vali-
dation of Public Bonds, 7 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (1940); Elmer E. Smead, The Rule
Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 MNN. L.
REV. 775 (1936); Bryant Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 5 TEX. L.
REV. 231 (1927); Edward S. Stimson, Retroactive Application of Law-A Problem
in Constitutional Law, 38 MICH. L. REV. 30 (1939); Kate Stith, Congress' Power of
the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343 (1988).
141. Wakeley v. Douglas County, 109 Neb. 396, 399-400, 191 N.W. 337, 339 (1922)(citing
Butte Miners' Union v. City of Butte, 194 P. 149 (1920)).
142. Brief of Plaintiff at 12, Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836 (1991)(No.
90-474)(quoting Wakeley v. Douglas County, 109 Neb. 396, 400, 191 N.W. 337, 339
(1922))(emphasis added).
143. See Brief of Intervenor-Defendant Security Investment Company at 22-24, Ha-
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Careful examination of Walceley makes it quite clear that the lan-
guage quoted in Haman related, using the plaintiff and court's own
analytic technique, "only" to the specific question of liability for mob
violence. Directly prior to the passage quoted in Haman, the Wakeley
court discussed the common law precept that "it has been generally
regarded that the governmental agency is under no duty to make good
to the citizen the damages done by the mob. . . ."14 The language
employed in Haman then followed, addressing directly-and exclu-
sively-whether a moral obligation might arise for "such damages."145
It is then improper to separate the statement the plaintiff relied on
from the specific context in which it was employed, mob violence.
Moreover, that contextual reality bore directly on the true underpin-
nings of the actual result in Wakeley-the court's determination that
a sense of moral obligation could not possibly have motivated a legisla-
ture that allowed reimbursement of only the "state or county officers"
harmed:
Looking at it from another point of view, why, if a moral duty rested upon
Douglas county to make good the ravages of the mob, did not the Legislature
consider the losses of others in the court house, the burned clothing and im-
plements of the janitors, the destroyed private property of clerks who could ill
afford to lose? It is quite clear that the Legislature did not legislate upon the
ground of existing moral obligation.146
As a general matter then, the Wakeley court rejected moral obliga-
tion as an animating force in the legislation before it, rather than as a
doctrine the court would recognize. The reimbursement authorized
by Senate File 269 ran only to "state and county offwer[s]," rather
than to all state and county employees, a limitation that conjured up
powerful images of the "haves" protecting the "haves," to the exclu-
sion of "have nots" whose moral claims would be at least equal to if
not more compelling than those of their superiors. More importantly,
the court made it quite clear that the language regarding the need for
a prior "notification" or "warning" provided only a portion of the
calculus. For, contrary to the position espoused by the plaintiff and
embraced by the court in Haman, a proper reading of Wakeley on the
general question of whether moral obligation can justify retroactive
legislation actually begins much earlier in the opinion, where the
court observed that "[e]xception to the rule [against retroactive legis-
lation] has been recognized in cases where the retroactive law is based
upon the moral right of the class benefitted to the remedy given, or
man v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836 (1991)(No. 90-474). The discussion of
the issue in this article tracks that used in the brief. The point, of course, is to
establish that (even assuming that such ignorance could constitute an excuse) the
court was aware of what Wakeley actually said.
144. Wakeley v. Douglas County, 109 Neb. 396, 399-400, 191 N.W. 337, 339 (1922).
145. Id at 400, 191 N.W. at 339 (emphasis added).
146. Id
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where.., there is an existing moral obligation to do or perform the act
or duty prescribed thereby."'147
The rendition of Wakeley that appears in Haman therefore reads
out of Wakeley the disjunctive "or," a term recognizing that moral
obligations may arise in a variety of circumstances, "only" one of
which is the "preexisting notice" context of liability for mob violence
damages. That reality renders the court's discussion of "ignorance of
the law," which bears only on the second option articulated in
Wakeley, beside the point; L.B. 272A is quite clearly an example of the
other permissible legislative predicate, a "retroactive law [that] is
based upon the moral right of the class benefitted to the remedy
given." More tellingly, the reality of what Wakeley actually states
flows from an appreciation of the importance of the word "or," a term
the Haman court apparently believed to be of the utmost consequence
just a few paragraphs earlier in its opinion.
Wakeley was, interestingly enough, the second decision of the
court dealing with mob violence in Omaha and the legislative response
to its consequences. In an earlier case, Cunningham v. Douglas
County,148 the court considered the constitutionality of Senate File
Number 1,149 a measure passed in special session that authorized
Douglas County to issue bonds to rebuild and refurbish the courthouse
and restore its records and other property. Three constitutional viola-
tions were alleged, each of which was rejected. The most interesting
of these (for our purposes) was the claim that the measure was "spe-
cial" legislation, that is a special law where a general measure could
have been enacted. The court characterized the measure as "a classifi-
cation, based on population and the kind of emergency described" and
the issue as "difficult."150 It then stated, in language that displayed a
judicial restraint not evident in Haman, that:
[This] is, in the first instance, a question of legislative discretion. The courts
will not interfere with the discretion lodged in the Legislature unless it is ap-
parent that the classification is artificial and baseless, showing an attempt
upon the part of the Legislature to violate the provision of the Constitution
prohibiting local and special legislation. With much doubtand hesitation, we
have concluded that we ought not to hold the enactment void for this
reason.
1 5 1
Judge Letton dissented, stressing that "I realize the conditions in
Douglas county, but I believe the majority opinion clearly exemplifies
147. I& at 399, 191 N.W. at 338 (emphasis added, citation omitted). The omitted lan-
guage reads "as in the case of Commissioners of Sedgwick County v. Bunker, 16
Kan. 498 [1876]," which I discuss infra at text accompanying notes 361-67.
148. 104 Neb. 405, 177 N.W. 742 (1920).
149. 1921 Neb. Laws 45.
150. Cunningham v. Douglas County, 104 Neb. 405, 408, 177 N.W. 742, 743 (1920).
151. Id
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the old adage that 'hard cases make poor law.' " 52 The majority of the
court disagreed, deferring to the legislative judgment that this was a
reasonable response to a unique situation. The court did not, given the
nature of the measure at issue, speak in terms of moral obligation.
This was, rather, an arguably simpler question of governmental
power. Nevertheless, the willingness of the court to accede to this par-
ticular expression of that power, albeit with "much doubt and hesita-
tion," is telling given the subsequent reluctance in Wakeley to approve
legislation whose form belied its theoretical motivations.
The Haman court's seeming obsession with grammatical precision,
evidenced through its exploitation of a lapse that is not a lapse (and
that is, as I will argue later in this article, ultimately of little substan-
tive importance 53), is accordingly deeply distressing. The court itself,
on the central issue in the case, commits the very same sin that sup-
posedly cripples the state's position in defense of the act. The "ex-
cuse" of "ignorance" is clearly not available, even assuming that it
might somehow be proper for the court to allege that it is not obli-
gated to know the true parameters of the precedents it relies on. The
brief for the Intervenor disputed, in detail, the plaintiff's characteriza-
tion of Wakeley, pointing out the earlier passage and the word "or."
The plaintiff, in her reply brief, never addressed this point, choosing
instead to simply repeat her original and highly selective quotation of
what she purported to be the applicable standard.5 4 The state then
made the very same point as an intrinsic part of its petition for rehear-
ing, stating that "[t]his court in its opinion has impliedly changed the
disjunctive 'or,' which recognizes that moral obligations may arise in a
variety of circumstances, only one of which is the preexisting notice
context, to a conjunctive 'and.' "'15
It would accordingly seem that in the court's version of Moral Obli-
gation Land the need for precision of expression is very much a ques-
tion of whose ox is being gored. It also appears that while ignorance of
the law may not constitute an acceptable excuse for some parties
before the court, a deliberate refusal to acknowledge what one in fact
152. Id at 409, 177 N.W. at 743 (Letton, J., dissenting). In 1927, perhaps spurred by
Wakeley and Cunningham, the legislature enacted a limited mob violence mea-
sure imposing liability where a death occurs when "a person taken from officers
of justice by a mob and assaulted with whips, clubs, missiles, or in any other man-
ner. . . ." House Roll No. 401, § 2, 1927 Neb. Laws 397, 397. This "lynching law,"
which was initially codified at NEB. CoMp STAT. §§ 26-601 to 610 (1929), remained
on the books, as NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 23-1001 to 1009 (1962), until the passage of the
State Tort Claims Act in 1969. See NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 81-8,209 to 81-8239.06
(1987).
153. See infra text accompanying notes 299-337.
154. Reply Brief of Plaintiff at 2, Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836
(1991)(No. 90-474).
155. Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion for Rehearing at 12, Haman v. Marsh, 237
Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836 (1991)(No. 90-474).
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knows will excuse both the court and the side it wishes to support.
This is indeed a very curious state of affairs, one that becomes, as we
shall see, even more curious the deeper we venture into this particular
wonderland.
V. CHANGING THE RULES: CLASSIFICATIONS IN A
POST-HAMAN WORLD
At this moment the Court, which had been for some time
busily writing in its notebook, called out, "Silence!" and read
out from its book, "Rule Forty-two. All classifications that are
not based on a substantial difference to leave the code."
Everybody looked at the Bill.
"I'm based on a substantial difference," said the Bill.
"No substantial difference here," added the Plaintiff.
"You aren't," said the Court.
"Well, the moral obligation won't go away, at any rate,"
said the Bill; "besides, that's not a regular rule; you invented it
just now."
"It's the oldest rule in the book," said the Court.
"Then it ought to be Number One," said the Bill.
The Court turned pale, and shut its notebook hastily. "Con-
sider your verdict," it said to the jury, in a low, trembling
voice. 156
There is, perhaps thankfully, more to the court's discussion of the
appropriate standard of review than its struggle with the vagaries of
"and" versus "or." For having explored that matter, the court moves
on to argue that "[t]he second flaw in the defendants' presentation is
that it relies upon an erroneous test."157 The court's objective, obvi-
ously, is to heighten the standard of review. There is, after all, a sig-
nificant difference between the rather uncritical rational basis test
that guides an equal protection claim and what the court assures us is
the "narrower special legislation prohibition [that] supplements the
equal protection theory."1 58 The distinction, we are told, "is more
than semantical because it affects the burden of persuasion placed
upon the plaintiff."159 That is, as we shall see, both precisely the point
and not exactly the point, for the court is not telling us that it becomes
more difficult for the plaintiff to carry her "burden of persuasion."
Rather, the calculus imposes additional obligations on the legislature
in enacting the measure and the state in defending it. It also frees the
156. ALICE, supra note 1, at 156 (Ch. XII: Alice's Evidence).
157. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 712, 467 N.W.2d 836, 846 (1991).
158. I& at 713, 467 N.W.2d at 846 (citing McRoberts v. Adams, 328 N.E.2d 321 (Ill.
1975)).
159. Id. at 713, 467 N.W.2d at 847.
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court itself to speculate in ways denied it under a rational basis rubric.
The process by which the court reaches the result it fashions, and the
implications of the result itself, are interesting. The process is impor-
tant because close examination reveals that the court employs pre-
cisely the same sort of sloppy and imprecise drafting it has just
finished excoriating. The result, in turn, is even more significant be-
cause of the substantial implications it has for special legislation
claims in Nebraska in the wake of Haman.
A. Classifications and Haman: Fashioning a New Rule
The court begins by indicating that there has been a consistent line
of Nebraska cases affirming that economic and social legislation, chal-
lenged on an equal protection basis and not implicating a fundamental
right, will be tested by'the rational basis standard. That is, all that is
required is that "there be a rational relationship between a legitimate
state interest and the statutory means selected by the Legislature to
accomplish that purpose."'160 That means, as the court observed in an
earlier decision, that "a statute may discriminate in favor of a certain
class if the discrimination is founded upon a reasonable distinction, or
difference in state policy, or if any state of facts can reasonably be
conceived which would sustain the classification."l 61
The court then initiates a transition from equal protection to spe-
cial legislation, asserting that the test is "narrower" and citing an Illi-
nois decision, McRoberts v. Adams,162 for the initial proposition that
this "narrower" test "supplements the equal protection theory."
Three Nebraska cases are then mentioned, supposedly establishing
that the test is different, that is that "[c]lassifications must be based on
some substantial difference of situation or circumstances that would
naturally suggest the justice or expediency of diverse legislation with
respect to the objects classified."163 The court concedes, coyly citing
then Judge now Justice Souter, that there has been "a judicial ten-
dency to blur the difference between the two tests, leading to the pres-
ent confusion."164 It then ends this section of the opinion with a
statement of the "correct" test, borrowed from a Virginia case, that
the statute must have "'a reasonable and substantial relation to the
160. Id at 712, 467 N.W.2d at 846.
161. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Luebbe, 218 Neb. 694, 700-01, 358 N.W.2d 754, 759
(1984).
162. 328 N.E.2d 321 (Ill. 1975).
163. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 713, 467 N.W.2d 836, 847 (1991)(citing State ex reL
Douglas v. Marsh, 207 Neb. 598, 300 N.W.2d 181 (1980), Prendergast v. Nelson, 199
Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977), and Dwyer v. Omaha-Douglas Public Bldg.
Comm'n, 188 Neb. 30, 195 N.W.2d 236 (1972)).
164. Id (citing Dover v. Imperial Casualty & Indem. Co., 575 A.2d 1280, 1287 (N.H.
1990)(Souter, J., dissenting)).
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object sought to be accomplished by the legislation.' '165
The first thing that jumps out at someone reading this section of
the opinion is that the court seems to find it necessary to draw on the
decisions of other jurisdictions to establish its point. The court relies,
as indicated, on an Illinois decision for the notion that special legisla-
tion "supplements" equal protection and derives the "applicable" and
arguably "narrower" test from a Virginia case. There is nothing par-
ticularly wrong with this, at least in one sense, since it is the court's
responsibility to establish the analytic standards that guide constitu-
tional inquiries. If, using Justice Souter's terms, the court wishes to
allow "[m]iddle-tier equal protection scrutiny" to enter "the jurispru-
dence of the State Constitution,"166 that is for the court to decide and
us to accept. It is also quite appropriate for the court to draw on the
wisdom of other courts of last resort where, as it would seem to be the
case given the manner in which the Haman court proceeds, there are
either no applicable Nebraska cases or those that do bear on the issue
stand for propositions different than those the court now seeks to em-
brace. Of course, the court seemed to be implying that the stricter
standard had in fact been the rule in Nebraska all along, which, if
true, makes the need to turn to Illinois and Virginia somewhat puz-
zling. More importantly if, as I will argue, the court is in fact massag-
ing, if not changing the rules, it ought to at least let us know that this
is what is afoot. However, the court does not make the concession;
indeed, the court goes to rather intriguing lengths to avoid it. There
are, however, very good reasons why none of this happens: the Ne-
braska cases simply do not support the court's inferences, and the de-
cisions borrowed from Illinois and Virginia do not provide an
especially sound basis for this particular application of this new-found
test.
The court's attempt to establish that a distinction between equal
protection and special legislation analysis had in fact been recognized
in Nebraska is singularly unconvincing. The court begins this process
by stating the general rule and citing three cases that supposedly es-
tablish the parameters and purity of the equal protection rubric.
In the first of these, Distinctive Printing & Packaging Co. v.
Cox,16 7 the court sustained a provision in the parental liability statute
that limited the liability of parents whose children inflict intentional
personal injury but not that of parents whose children inflict inten-
tional property damage.168 The measure was challenged on both spe-
cial legislation and equal protection grounds, and it is difficult, if not
165. Id (quoting Benderson Dev. Co. v. Sciortino, 372 S.E.2d 751, 757 (Va. 1988)).
166. Dover v. Imperial Casualty & Indem. Co., 575 A.2d 1280, 1287 (N.H. 1990)(Souter,
J., dissenting).
167. 232 Neb. 846, 443 N.W.2d 566 (1989).
168. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-801 (1987).
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impossible, to see any differences in the manner in which the court
handled the two issues. The court began by stressing that "article III,
§ 18, concerns itself with disparate treatment in much the same man-
ner as does the language of U.S. Const. amend. XIV .... 1)169 It then
stated that "[t]he Legislature is permitted to classify persons as long
as, absent implication of a fundamental right or suspect classification,
the legislative categorization has a rational basis."170 That test, in
turn, imposed on the court the obligation to "look to see if any state of
facts can be conceived to reasonably justify the disparate treatment
which results."171 The analysis in Distinctive Printing does not, ac-
cordingly, distinguish between the equal protection and special legisla-
tion approach, much less impose a "narrower" inquiry in the latter
instance.
The same is true of the other two "equal protection, rational basis"
cases cited by the court, Snyder v. IBP, Inc.172 and Drennen v. Dren-
nen,173 which were, interestingly enough, decided on the same day. In
Snyder, the equal protection standard was "whether the distinction is
'founded upon a reasonable distinction, or difference in state policy, or
if any state of facts can reasonably be conceived which would sustain
the classification.' "174 The special legislation test, in turn, is whether
there is "some reason of public policy, some substantial difference of
situation or circumstance that would naturally suggest the justice or
expediency of diverse legislation with respect to the objects to be clas-
sified."' 7 The latter approach, admittedly, seems to add a new ele-
ment to the inquiry, the need for a "substantial" difference in
situation or circumstances. In this instance, however, the legislation
was struck simply because the court was "unable to discern any rea-
sonable basis for denying injured workers the right to a modification
of an award of compensation merely because the award is payable pe-
riodically over a period of less than 6 months."7 6
Drennen focused on the constitutionality of the state's use of a ref-
eree system in child support cases. The court found that the system
impermissibly denied the state constitutional right of access to a state
district court and that it also deprived the parties due process of
law.177 The court also explored an equal protection claim since the
169. Distinctive Printing & Packaging Co. v. Cox, 232 Neb. 846, 849, 443 N.W.2d 566,
570 (1989).
170. Id
171. Id at 852, 443 N.W.2d at 571 (citation omitted).
172. 229 Neb. 224, 426 N.W.2d 261 (1988).
173. 229 Neb. 204, 426 N.W.2d 252 (1988).
174. Snyder v. IBP, Inc., 229 Neb. 224,226-27,426 N.W2d 261,264 (1988)(quoting Farm
Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Luebbe, 218 Neb. 694, 700-01, 358 N.W.2d 754, 759 (1984)).
175. Id at 227, 426 N.W.2d at 264.
176. Id
177. Drennen v. Drennen, 229 Neb. 204, 216, 426 N.W.2d 252, 259 (1988).
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system distinguished between two classes of potential cases, those fall-
ing within the "IV-D" provisions of the federal Child Support Enforce-
ment Program and those that did not.178 The court stressed that
Nebraska has no "specific" equal protection clause, but that the special
legislation prohibition contained in article III, section 18 operated as
its functional equivalent. 179 It then articulated the test as a quest for a
" 'real differences of situation and circumstances surrounding the
members of the class relative to the subject of the legislation which
render appropriate its enactment.' "180 That is, there must be a "ra-
tional basis" for treating the two classes of cases differently. Finding
none, it held that "the Referee Act is unconstitutional as violating the
equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution and Neb. Const. art I,
§ 13, and art. III, § 18."181
It is of course possible to argue that, for analytic purposes, the
court went only as far as it had to in Snyder and Drennen. Legislation
that cannot survive even a rational basis review would obviously fail,
even more miserably, if subjected to heightened scrutiny. That would
not, however, explain how the measure at issue in Distinctive Print-
ing survived, if in fact there is a real difference in approach. Nor does
it explain why a court that is supposedly reaching a result within an
analytic matrix that invokes various tests never actually describes the
options available. There is, actually, nothing in any of the three opin-
ions to indicate that the court was drawing such distinctions, and even
the most careful reading of these three cases supports the impression
that the applicable tests are one and the same.
The three cases that supposedly do make this distinction do not
appreciably change the analysis. The first of these, State ex rel. Doug-
las v. Marsh,8 2 focused on the constitutionality of L.B. 882 of 1980,
which created the Local Government Revenue Fund.183 The court
held that certain provisions of the act violated the ban on special legis-
lation because it "created a frozen classification into which no other
county may enter even though it may subsequently acquire the very
same characteristics which afforded the first county the benefits it re-
ceives."184 There is no mention of equal protection; the sole issue is
special legislation, and the test is characterized as the need for "some
178. Id at 217-18, 426 N.W.2d at 260. The court outlines, in some detail, the provisions
and mechanics of the federal program in its opinion.
179. Id. at 216-17, 426 N.W.2d at 259.
180. Id. at 217, 426 N.W.2d at 260 (quoting Taylor v. Karrer, 196 Neb. 581, 585, 244
N.W.2d 201, 204 (1976)).
181. Id. at 218, 426 N.W.2d at 260.
182. 207 Neb. 598, 300 N.W,2d 181 (1980).
183. L.B. 882, 1980 Neb. Laws 962, 963. Sections 2,3,4 and 5 of L.B. 882 were ruled
unconstitutional in State ex reL Douglas v. Marsh, 207 Neb. 598, 300 N.W.2d 181
(1980).
184. State ex reL Douglas v. Marsh, 207 Neb. 598, 606, 300 N.W.2d 181, 186 (1980).
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rational basis for the classification." 8 5 The court, quoting from City
of Scottsbluff v. Tiemann,186 did indicate that there must in fact be
"'some reason of public policy, some substantial difference of situa-
tion or circumstances, that would naturally suggest the justice or ex-
pediency of diverse legislation with respect to the objects to be
classified.' "187 The legislation failed, however, because the classifica-
tion was not "reasonable." Rather, it was "based upon happenstance
events in a given year and therefore remains forever, regardless of the
changes in circumstances .... "188 The same phenomenon is evident in
a second case discussed, Dwyer v. Omaha-Douglas Public Building
Commission.189 The court could "not say the classification used by the
Legislature here is clearly arbitrary and without any substantial basis
founded upon real differences."'19 0 The court speaks in terms of "rea-
sonable classifications," however, and there is nothing in the opinion
to indicate that the level of scrutiny employed is somehow different,
much less more intense, than the traditional quest for a "reasonable"
explanation. In particular, the court stressed that the legislature "can
certainly take cognizance of [certain population] fact[s],"19' an ap-
proach that seems well within the search for simply some "state of
facts [that] can reasonably be conceived which would sustain the
classification."192
The third case cited, Prendergast v. Nelson,193 is perhaps the most
interesting, for it supplies a direct link to the non-Nebraska authori-
ties cited in Haman. Prendergast dealt with the constitutionality of
the Hospital-Medical Liability Act.194 In his opinion for the court,
Judge Spencer indicated that the defendant had argued that "the act
operates to single out a class of people for special treatment, but bears
no rational relationship to the legitimate purposes of the legisla-
tion."195 He then stated "[w]e do not agree," 96 and in the course of his
explanation quoted from Taylor v. Karrer to the effect that the classi-
fication must rest on "'some substantial difference of situation or cir-
185. Id. at 607, 300 N.W.2d at 186 (1980)(citation omitted).
186. 185 Neb. 256, 175 N.W.2d 74 (1970).
187. State ex reL Douglas v. Marsh, 207 Neb. 598, 609, 300 N.W.2d 181, 187 (1980)(quot-
ing City of Scottsbluff v. Tiemann, 185 Neb. 256, 266, 175 N.W.2d 79, 81
(1970))(emphasis added).
188. I&
189. 188 Neb. 30, 195 N.W.2d 236 (1972).
190. Id. at 50, 195 N.W.2d at 248.
191. Id.
192. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Luebbe, 218 Neb. 694, 700-01, 358 N.W.2d 754, 759
(1984).
193. 199 Neb. 30, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977).
194. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 44-2801 to 2855 (1978)(amended 1984).
195. Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 112, 256 N.W.2d 657, 667 (1977).
196. Id
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cumstance.' "197 He then concluded the analysis by simply stating that
"[t]he classification does have a reasonable basis." 9 8 In their various
dissenting opinions, however, four members of the court made it clear
that this portion of the opinion did not command their vote. Judge
White, the only one to discuss the issue in detail, stated that the hold-
ing of the court was limited to the finding that the act "does not pro-
vide an unconstitutional grant of state credit."'199 Judge White did not
directly address the question of which standard or review applies. He
did, however, quote extensively from an Illinois case dealing with sim-
ilar legislation, and indicated that the Illinois special legislation provi-
sion is "strikingly similar" to article III, section 18.200
Illinois is, as indicated, the jurisdiction that gave us McRoberts v.
Adams, the case cited in Haman for the proposition that the special
legislation prohibition "supplements" equal protection. Illinois is also
the state within which one finds case law "contra" to the Benderson
Development "reasonable and substantial relation" rule the Haman
court adopts.201 This conclusion is expressed in the case cited in Ha-
man, Bilyk v. Chicago Transit Authority, where the Illinois court
stated that "[w]hether a law is challenged as special legislation or as
violative of equal protection, the controlling question is the same: Is
the statutory classification rationally related to a legitimate State in-
terest?"2 02 The question is implied in McRoberts, where the court
speculated at length about the various justifications that the legisla-
ture "may" have had in mind when it passed the measure under attack
in that case.203
Prendergast seems accordingly to stand for quite a different propo-
sition than the one it is marshalled to support. This dislocation be-
tween the principle articulated by the Haman court and the reality
that prevails is even more startling when we examine the court's ap-
peal to the wisdom of Justice Souter. Justice Souter, while still on the
New Hampshire Supreme Court, discussed so-called "middle-tier scru-
tiny," indicating that "[a]n understanding of that intermediate charac-
ter and the limits of such review can prove elusive.... and it is well to
acknowledge that Carson's test suffers from a proven susceptibility to
confusion with other standards of equal protection review .... "204
197. Id. at 112, 256 N.W.2d at 667-68 (quoting Taylor v. Karrer, 196 Neb. 581, 244
N.W.2d 201 (1976)).
198. Id. at 113, 256 N.W.2d at 668.
199. Id. at 132, 256 N.W.2d at 677 (White, J., dissenting in part).
200. Id- at 131, 256 N.W.2d at 676 (White, J., dissenting in part).
201. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 713, 467 N.W.2d 836, 847 (1991)(citing Bilyk v.
Chicago Transit Auth., 531 N.E. 2d 1 (Ill. 1988)).
202. 531 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ill. 1988).
203. McRoberts v. Adams, 328 N.E.2d 321, 324 (Ill. 1975).
204. Dover v. Imperial Casualty & Indem. Co., 575 A.2d 1280, 1287 (N.H. 1990)(Souter,
J., dissenting). The irony of all of this is that there was at least one good reason to
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That is clearly the case, as the Nebraska court's rather loose and inter-
changeable use of "reasonable" and "substantial" within the same
"tests" in, for example, City of Scottsbluff, indicates. It is also a factor
that "blurred" the lines in other decisions where the court explored
whether a classification was "arbitrary and unreasonable" in circum-
stances where the court was looking for "some substantial difference
of situation or circumstance."20 5
Nevertheless, the clear impression created at this point in Haman
is that Justice Souter is wading into the debate on the specific issue at
hand, the distinction between equal protection, rational basis review,
and the "narrower" special legislation standard. As structured, the ar-
gument the court seems to be making is that the distinction exists,
that it is important, that it has been recognized in Nebraska, and that
it has been characterized as "blurred" by no less a luminary than Jus-
tice Souter. It would nevertheless be a mistake to read into Justice
Souter's discussion anything at all regarding the supposedly distinc-
tive nature of the inquiry when "special legislation" is the focus, since
New Hampshire is one of the ten states that "have not adopted exten-
sive and detailed restraints applicable to such practices."2 06 Thus, the
constitutional provisions at issue in Dover v. Imperial Casualty & In-
demnification Co., (and for that matter in Carson v. Maurer,20 7 the
case that Justice Souter mentions as allowing middle-tier scrutiny to
"enter" the arena), are equal protection measures and equal protec-
tion measures only.
More importantly, heightened scrutiny was triggered in Dover and
Carson, as is usually the case, because of the nature of the right at
issue, rather than the express requirements of the constitutional pro-
visions under which it is examined. In both cases the focus is on "the
right to recover for personal injuries," characterized as "an important
substantive right."208 The Nebraska court, interestingly enough, had
seemed to recognize the need to draw such distinctions in the very
same cases that do not, as we have seen, articulate different tests for
equal protection as opposed to special legislation purposes. In Distinc-
tive Printing, for example, the court stated that "[t]he Legislature is
invoke the New Hampshire court's decisions, since New Hampshire is the only
jurisdiction to ever cite the Wakeley decision. That rather minor victory for
Wakeley was, however, a qualified one. See infra text accompanying notes 463-
79.
205. See, eg., Gas'n Shop, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n, 229 Neb. 530, 427
N.W.2d 784 (1988); Casey's Gen. Stores, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n,
220 Neb. 242, 369 N.W.2d 85 (1985).
206. 2 SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCOION § 40.01 & n.4 (Norman,
Singer ed. 4th Ed. 1986 Rev.)(emphasis added).
207. 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980).
208. Dover v. Imperial Casualty & Indem. Co., 575 A.2d 1280, 1284 (N.H. 1990); Carson
v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 830 (N.H. 1980).
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permitted to classify persons as long as, absent implication of afunda-
mental right or suspect classification, the legislative categorization
has a rational basis."2 09 Thus, where no fundamental right is at issue
and the class is not suspect, the task, in a case that examines equal
protection and special legislation claims in the same manner, "is one of
determining whether a rational basis exists for the classification."2 10
This tendency to restrict equal protection review to either strict or
rational basis scrutiny is apparent in almost every prior Nebraska case
that discusses the subject. In a decision issued less than a year before
Haman, for example, the court indicated that "[t]he standard of re-
view used by courts when reviewing statutes challenged on equal pro-
tection grounds depends upon the nature of the classification and the
rights affected." 211 It listed two tests, strict scrutiny when "the classi-
fication involves either a suspect class or fundamental rights," rational
basis when it does not.2 12 And it crafted this discussion in a case
where the predicate was recognition that the equal protection guaran-
tee flows from article III, section 18, which "deals with disparate treat-
ment by special legislation."2 13 The same approach is evident in
numerous other cases, none of which expressly embrace intermediate
level scrutiny in any equal protection context.21 4 That silence occurs,
moreover, even though the court has occasionally listed both gender
and illegitimacy as distinctive classes and cited, with apparent ap-
proval, decisions of the United States Supreme Court articulating an
intermediate test for classifications affecting those groups.2 15 It may
be, as seemed to have been the case in New Hampshire, that there are
situations in which the distinctions between rational basis and inter-
mediate-tier scrutiny are blurred, either for equal protection or special
legislation purposes. In Nebraska, however, any softening of these ju-
risprudential edges would, it seems to me, have had to wait for the
new test to be created, a turn of events that did not, as best I can deter-
mine, materialize until Haman.
This brings us to the final non-Nebraska case, Benderson, from
which the court extracts the specific rule applied in Haman, that clas-
209. Distinctive Printing & Packaging Co. v. Cox, 232 Neb. 846, 849, 443 N.W.2d 566,
570 (1989)(emphasis added).
210. 1&
211. State v. Kubik, 235 Neb. 612, 615, 456 N.W.2d 487, 490-91 (1990).
212. I& at 615, 456 N.W.2d at 491.
213. Id. at 614, 456 N.W.2d at 490.
214. See, e.g., School Dist. No. 46 v. City of Bellevue, 224 Neb. 543, 551, 400 N.W.2d 229,
235 (1987); State v. Michalski, 221 Neb. 380, 385, 377 N.W.2d 510, 515 (1985); Farm
Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Luebbe, 218 Neb. 694, 700, 358 N.W.2d 754, 759 (1984);
Thompson v. Board of Regents, 187 Neb. 252, 255, 188 N.W.2d 840, 842-43 (1971).
215. See, e.g., Landon v. Pettijohn, 231 Neb. 837, 842-43, 438 N.W.2d 757, 761 (1989)(cit-
ing, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)(gender), and Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S.
259 (1978) (illegitimacy)).
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sifications bear a "'reasonable and substantial relation to the object
sought to be accomplished by the legislation.' "216 Benderson does, as
the court indicates, state that there is a difference between equal pro-
tection and special legislation analysis in Virginia. The absolute force
of that observation is substantially undermined, as an _initial matter,
by the Haman court's immediate concession that other states do not
recognize the distinction. Thus, while the court quotes from Bender-
son to give us the "correct" rule, it does to its credit indicate that rea-
sonable minds may and do disagree on this matter; "[c]ontra,
Bilyk.'217
Even if that were not the case, the value of what the court offers us
is seriously eroded when one looks closely at Benderson itself, a deci-
sion in which the Virginia court was considering the continuing consti-
tutionality of a Sunday closing measure that had, with the passage of
time, been amended to the point that it had become a special law "as
applied" to the few businesses still subject to its strictures. The Vir-
ginia court did, as Haman indicates, state that there is at least a verbal
difference between equal protection and special legislation scrutiny.
State laws "which make economic classifications," the court observed,
will survive equal protection scrutiny "'unless the classification rests
on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objec-
tives' . . . or unless the law 'is so unrelated to the achievement of a
legitimate purpose that it appears irrational.' "218 Special legislation,
"[o]n the other hand, ... must bear 'a reasonable and substantial rela-
tion to the object sought to be accomplished by the legislation.' "219
Whether the distinction actually means much of anything is an en-
tirely different matter altogether. In the case that articulated the test
quoted in Benderson the Virginia court stated that "[t]he necessity for
and the reasonableness of the classification are primarily questions for
the legislature. If any state of facts can reasonably be conceived that
would support it, that state of facts at the time the law enacted must
be assumed."220 It may be that the ultimate objective is a "reasonable
and substantial" relationship; the analytic touchstones, however, are
strikingly similar-mirror images, actually-to the traditional rational
basis test. Indeed, it is precisely the sort of inquiry conducted in Illi-
216. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699,713,467 N.W.2d 836, 847 (1991)(quoting Benderson
Dev. Co. v. Sciortino, 372 S.E.2d 751, 757 (Va. 1988)).
217. Id. (citing Bilyk v. Chicago Transit Auth., 531 N.E.2d 1 (11M. 1988)).
218. Benderson Dev. Co. v. Sciortino, 372 S.E.2d 751,757 (Va. 1988)(quoting McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961), and Ballard v. Commonwealth, 321 S.E.2d
284, 286 (Va. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1085 (1985)).
219. I. (quoting Mandell v. Haddon, 121 S.E.2d 516, 525 (Va. 1961)).
220. Mandell v. Haddon, 121 S.E.2d 516,524 (Va. 1961)(emphasis added). The Virginia
court has also held that "it is settled law that a valid appropriation may be made
to discharge a purely moral obligation." Commonwealth v. Ferries Co., 92 S.E.
804, 805 (Va. 1917)(refunding illegally assessed taxes).
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nois pursuant to McRoberts and Bilyk, cases that are supposedly "con-
trary" to the "proper" approach spelled out by the Virginia court.
More tellingly, that analytic approach had been specifically employed
in Nebraska, not as a matter of intermediate scrutiny, but rather as
the hallmark of a garden-variety rational basis test.
It is accordingly difficult, if not impossible, to discern how the
Benderson test is in any manner more exacting, or for that matter
more helpful, than the standards employed in every other Nebraska
case prior to Haman or, for that matter, in other states. As a technical
matter these realities do not necessarily vitiate the validity of Justice
Souter's statements. One reading of the applicable passage in Haman
is that the court is simply indicating that there is an inherent lack of
precision in a middle-tier test that, without more, tends to blur its pa-
rameters, especially vis-a-vis the more tolerant rational basis inquiry.
That is not, however, the context within which Dover is cited nor, I
suspect, the impression conveyed to those reading Haman without the
benefit of the New Hampshire reports at their elbow.
More importantly, the court at this juncture in Haman is lecturing
the state for relying on an "erroneous" test, specifically for injecting
equal protection inquiries into a realm where they do not belong, spe-
cial legislation. The court speaks expressly of a "narrower special leg-
islation prohibition." It attempts to discern support for this
proposition in a series of Nebraska cases that do not in fact draw this
distinction, and it then cites decisions from other jurisdictions that do
not, it seems, embrace a "narrower" regimen with the same degree of
fervor and fine distinction that the unnamed Haman author does.
This is a rather loose approach to what is arguably an extraordinarily
important distinction. It is moreover an approach taken by a court
that has just castigated the state for using "or" where it should have
used "and." To paraphrase Barry Goldwater, it seems that impreci-
sion in the defense of L.B. 272A is no virtue, while imprecision in pur-
suit of its demise is no vice.
B. Classifications and Haman: Applying the Rule
The full implications of this are driven home by a second aspect of
the classification debate, the question of whether L.B. 272A creates a
"permanently closed class." The "classic" formulation of this doctrine
appears in a 1912 decision, State ex rel. Conkling v. Kelso, in which the
court stated:
The rule appears to be settled by an almost unbroken line of decisions that a
classification which limits the application of the law to present condition and
leaves no room or opportunity for an increase in the numbers of the class by
future growth or development is special and a violation of the clause of the
constitution above quoted.2 2 1
221. 92 Neb. 628, 632, 139 N.W. 226, 227-28 (1912)
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The plaintiff in Haman contended that "the group of recipients under
the act is identified and fixed by historical circumstances to include
only the depositors of Commonwealth, State Securities Savings, and
American Savings."2 2 2 Her argument-which, quite frankly, is in
many respects difficult to dispute-was that the motivating force for
L.B. 272A was a desire to reimburse the depositors in those three insti-
tutions, and that the legislature never contemplated, indeed, would
have been horrified to be asked to even consider, reimbursement of
anyone for future losses.
The various parties supporting the act responded that the measure,
on its face at a minimum and quite possibly in actual contemplation,
was open. They also pointed out that the plaintiff made her allega-
tions without ever quoting any of the actual language of L.B. 272A,
which made it clear, for example, that the class of depositors consisted
of any "owners of deposits,"223 with "deposits" defined to include any
"certificate of indebtedness or any other evidence of an industrial
company's indebtedness which was unpaid when a protected company
filed bankruptcy pursuant to Chapter 11... or when a company in
receivership entered receivership."224 An "industrial company," in
turn, was "any industrial loan and investment company,"225 and a
"protected company" any "industrial company that filed bankruptcy
... after November 1, 1983."226 As the Intervenor noted:
Plaintiff does not allege that there are currently no industrial loan and
investment companies in the state or that she could not-if she chose to do
so-deposit funds within one or more of them. Plaintiff does not because the
statutes authorizing creation of such companies remain in force, see Neb. Rev.
Stat. §§ 8-401 et seq. (Reissue 1987); and two industrials continue to operate
subject to the same oversight and inspection by the Department of Banking.
(First Stipulation at 7). Plaintiff also concedes that the Nebraska Depository
Insurance Guaranty Act remains in effect and that the Nebraska Depository
Insurance Guaranty Corporation ("NDIGC") still exists. (First Stipulation,
8 and 6). The operative statutes now require either affiliation with the Fed-
eral Depository Insurance Corporation, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 8-407.03(2) (Reissue
1987), or a warning, both posted at the institution and in all advertisements,
that deposits are not insured. Id. at § 8-407.03(3). It is, accordingly, entirely
possible that deposits within an industrial, regardless of its affiliation with the
hollow shell that is the NDIGC, could in fact be uninsured.
2 2 7
Finally, they pointed to the statewide support for the measure, both
editorially and in terms of the diversity of the senators that voted in
222. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 716, 467 N.W.2d 836, 848 (1991).
223. L.B. 272A § 1(5).
224. Id. § 1(3).
225. I& § 1(5).
226. I § 1(7).
227. Brief of Intervenor-Defendant Security Investment Company at 14-15, Haman v.
Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836 (1991)(No. 90-474).
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favor of it.228
The court, wisely, did not chose to quibble with or deny these char-
acterizations of the statute. Clearly, many of the findings within L.B.
272A were concerned solely with the problems associated with the
failure of Commonwealth and reorganization of American Savings
and State Securities. It was equally clear, however, that reimburse-
ment comprised only one of the stated objectives of the act. The legis-
lature, in sections of the act that I will examine in greater detail later
in this Article,229 made it clear that there were in fact multiple goals
and that the reimbursement elements of the measure were a means
toward their attainment, rather than simply an end in themselves.
That, it appeared, brought L.B. 272A squarely within both the first
Wakeley exception, "where the retroactive law is based upon the
moral right of the class benefitted to the remedy given," and the terms
of the release signed by the Commonwealth receiver, which recog-
nized that "public policy" and "moral obligations" would justify the
allocation of additional state funds to the depositors.
Rather than dispute this the court elected to emphasize the plain-
tiff's argument that the open class created by L.B. 272A was more the-
ory than fact:
For this to happen, a series of highly unlikely (if not impossible) events would
have to occur. First, new industrials would have to be chartered. Second, they
would have to become members of the NDIGC (or the only two industrials
which presently exist would have to renounce their FDIC coverage and be-
come members of the NDIGC), and the deposits of these industrials would
have to be guaranteed by the NDIGC. Third, those industrials would have to
go into receivership or bankruptcy. And, fourth, the depositors of those insti-
tutions would have to suffer deposit losses.
2 3 0
The court stressed that "[i]n determining whether a class is closed,
this court is not limited to the face of the legislation, but may consider
the act's application."2 3' - It then stated that "[i]f the prospect is merely
theoretical, and not probable, the act is special legislation. The condi-
tions of entry into the class must not only be possible, but reasonably
probable of attainment."232 To hold otherwise, the court concluded,
"would be to accept artful draftsmanship over reality."233
The court's analysis is compelling, if (as always) the cases cited by
the court support the propositions for which they are employed, and if
the assumption is that the ban on special or local legislation is, or
should be, strictly construed. Alas, neither proves to be the case.
228. Brief of Defendants at 36-39, Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836
(1991)(No. 90-474).
229. See infra text accompanying notes 581-91.
230. Reply Brief of Plaintiff at 14, Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836
(1991)(No. 90-474).
231. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 717, 467 N.W.2d 836, 849 (1991).
232. Id, at 717-18, 467 N.W.2d at 849.
233. Id at 718, 467 N.W.2d at 849.
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City of Scottsbluff, which the court employs to establish the need
for "future growth or development," provided the classic example of a
classification closed in both theory and fact. The operative legislation,
L.B. 1293, keyed its division on the number of inhabitants that the
cities in question had "according to the 1960 federal census."23 4 The
court, citing prior case law regarding the "freezing of the class," stated
that "[t]he law is unmistakably clear that a statute classifying cities for
legislative purposes in such a way that no other city may ever be added
to the class violates the constitutional provision forbidding special
laws where general laws can be applicable."= That is, the "evil" in
question was the use of a date to define the absolute limits of the class.
That, of course, was not the situation created by L.B. 272A. That mea-
sure was prospective, in the sense that the date was selected as a start-
ing point for entry into the class, rather than an outer limit of
eligibility. The court, perhaps sensing this, argued that it was entitled
to look beyond the actual terms of the act and consider its "applica-
tion."2 36 Two Nebraska cases were cited as "primary" support for this
approach, Axberg v. City of Lincoln 237 and Gossman v. State Employ-
ees Retirement System,238 with a third, State ex rel. Wheeler v.
Stuht,239 included in a supporting "string cite" that also directed one
to decisions in New Jersey and Oregon.240
The underlying issue in Axberg tracked that in City of Scottsbluff;
the classification dealt with cities of the first class and limited its oper-
ation to those that had "heretofore" adopted a home rule charter.241
As the court observed:
[i]t is apparent on the face of it that its operation is not uniform upon the
designated class. Under its terms the city of Lincoln is not obliged to pay fire-
men's pensions while the city of Grand Island is required to do so, even though
they are both cities of the first class.242
That, the court concluded, violated the constitutional ban on special
legislation because "[tihere is no sufficient reason advanced why one
city of the first class should be exempted from the special obligations
and burdens of the firemen's pension law, while others in the same
234. L.B. 1293, §§ 3 to 7, 1969 Neb. Laws 74.
235. City of Scottsbluff v. Tiemann, 185 Neb. 256, 261, 175 N.W.2d 74, 79 (1970)(citing
Axberg v. City of Lincoln, 141 Neb. 55, 2 N.W.2d 613 (1942)).
236. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 717, 467 N.W.2d 836, 849 (1991).
237. 141 Neb. 55, 2 N.W.2d 613 (1942).
238. 177 Neb. 326, 129 N.W.2d 97 (1964).
239. 52 Neb. 209, 71 N.W. 941 (1897).
240. These were, respectively- In re Freygang, 133 A.2d 672 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1957), aff'd, 136 A.2d 625 (N.J. 1957), Mason v. City of Patterson, 293 A.2d 460
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972), aff'd, 303 A.2d 84 (N.J. 1973), and Wrenn v. Port-
land Loan Co., 64 P.2d 520 (Or. 1937).
241. House Roll No. 616, 1923 Neb. Laws 367.
242. Axberg v. City of Lincoln, 141 Neb. 55, 62, 2 N.W.2d 613, 616 (1942).
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class are required to submit to such obligations and burdens."4 3
The "application" problem in Axberg then was not that the class
was "permanently closed" so much as it was that it was closed to other
cities of the same type for no good reason. This was consistent with a
number of prior decisions within which the court balanced the nature
and scope of the classification with its articulated purposes. In Gallo-
way v. Wolfe,244 for example, the court struck a measure that treated
various cities differently for the purposes of promoting or banning
public dancing on Sundays. The court stressed that the measure did
"not relate to the government of municipalities, and makes no attempt
to classify them as such; it has to do only with the conduct of individu-
als and divides them into two classes: First, those who live in metro-
politan cities and, second, those who live outside such cities."24 5 The
classification failed because "[t]he same vices and immoralities may be
present at a barn dance in the country as in a gilded palace in a metro-
politan city."2 4 6
That did not mean, however, that an otherwise "closed" class must
fail. Less than a month after it decided Galloway the court examined
a legislative scheme treating western counties differently from those
in the east. The question posed in the case, McFadden v. Denter,24 7
was whether the legislature could authorize individuals in the west to
erect automobile crossings across public highways. The court sus-
tained the measure, stressing that "[l]egislation applicable alone to the
western area of the state is not forbidden by the Constitution."24 8
There were, the court stressed, substantial differences between the
two regions. The classification was clearly closed, and permanently so;
as one individual observed, "it is difficult to conceive of eastern Ne-
braska becoming a part of western Nebraska."249 Nevertheless, the
distinction was a valid one, precisely because there are and should be
limits to the extent to which it is appropriate to condemn "perma-
nency" and look beyond the facts of the classification to see if the pos-
sibilities for expansion are immediate or remote.
This becomes even clearer in Gossman, which dealt with various
challenges to the then newly enacted State Employees Retirement
Act.2 50 The court examined, and rejected, a variety of special legisla-
tion challenges to the act in a discussion emphasizing repeatedly that
243. Id at 64, 2 N.W.2d at 617.
244. 117 Neb. 824, 223 N.W. 1 (1929).
245. Md at 827, 223 N.W. at 2.
246. IH at 829, 223 N.W. at 3.
247. 118 Neb. 38, 223 N.W. 462 (1929).
248. Id at 41, 223 N.W. at 463.
249. Charles B. Nutting, Special Legislation in Nebraska, 17 NEB. L. BULL. 332, 339
n.56 (1938).
250. L.B. 512, 1963 Neb. Laws 532 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-1301 to 84-1331
(1963)).
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"[a]ll that is required is that the classifications and the requirements
thereunder must have some reasonable relation to the purposes and
objectives of the Act."251 The court conceded that "[ilt is obvious that
any retirement act is 'special' legislation in the sense that it is designed
for a particular group of people and for a special purpose."252 That
was so, however, not because such acts created "permanently closed
classes," but because their "purposes cannot be accomplished by a gen-
eral law applying to all people." 253 In particular, the court rejected
the challenge to one section of the act, a fund "earmarked for the pay-
ment to a closed class of which [plaintiff] is not a member" and, pre-
sumably, of which he and others could never become a member, a
"prior service benefits" fund earmarked for all employees who met
three conditions: continuous service since December 1, 1958; birth
prior to December 1, 1923; and not having attained the age of sixty
when their continuous employment began.254
It was at this juncture that the court addressed "substance" over
"form," but in a manner entirely at odds with the proposition articu-
lated in Haman. The court stressed that "[w]ide discretion is vested in
the Legislature as to the conditions of public employment and as to
the requirements, classifications[,J contributions to, and benefits con-
ferred by a retirement act."255 The one percent assessment to which
the plaintiff objected, while levied against all employees, was to be
paid to one particular class that the plaintiff, and others like him,
could never enter. Nevertheless, as the court stressed:
Plaintiff's argument, if carried to its logical conclusion, would result in the
declaration of the invalidity of any retirement act unless the benefits as to all
members were exactly proportionate to the contributions. Such a position
does not recognize the reasonable purposes and objectives of a retirement act.
It does not recognize that the State here is acting in its capacity to set the
required conditions of employment. Plaintiff's contention would render the
accomplishment of the legitimate purposes of a retirement act impossible and
completely impractical. The recognition and payment of prior service benefits
under all retirement acts goes to the core of the economic and employment
policy purposes of a retirement act, the inducement to remain in employment,
the retention of trained personnel, and an inducement for the older employ-
ees to make way for younger employees. 25 6
The final Nebraska case in the sequence involved a challenge to
the constitutionality of an 1897 act that changed the terms and condi-
tions under which a city of the "metropolitan" class operated and, in
251. Gossman v. State Employees Retirement Sys., 177 Neb. 326, 334, 129 N.W.2d 97,
103 (1964).
252. Id at 336, 129 N.W.2d at 104.
253. 1&
254. L.B. 512 § 12, 1963 Neb. Laws 532.
255. Gossman v. State Employees Retirement Sys., 177 Neb. 326, 388, 129 N.W.2d 97,
105 (1964).
256. rd. at 337-38, 129 N.W.2d at 104-05.
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particular, the election of members of the city council. The act was
questioned by individuals who contended that an 1887 measure on the
same subject controlled, and that as a result of an election held pursu-
ant to the 1897 act "their offices were being and had been unlawfully
invaded and usurped, the powers and duties performed, and the emol-
uments and privileges thereof enjoyed, by the respondents."2 5 7 The
court held that a portion of the act, which would have shortened the
term of an already elected police judge, was invalid. The court then
indicated, as a threshold to its discussion of the special legislation chal-
lenge, that the following approach applied:
In an examination into the character of an act of the legislature, to ascer-
tain whether it is general or otherwise, the determination of the question
must depend on the substance of the act, not its form. That the act contains
expressions which might stamp it as general will not give it such character.
Nor will expressions or terms which might lead to a belief that it is special
make it so. The substance alone must give character to the act.2 5 8
The court rejected the claim that the measure was designed and
did in effect operate only on the city of Omaha, stressing what has
become the core rule regarding classification of cities:
[ilf, by a consideration of a law classifying cities on a basis of population, it be
determined that another city or other cities may at a future time, without the
aid of additional legislation, enter and become a member or members of this
particular class, the classification is a general one and so is the law establish-
ing it.2 5 9
The full implications of this become even more evident when one
examines Republic Investment Fund I v. Town of Surprise,260 an Ari-
zona case cited in support of the proposition that "[t]he conditions of
entry into the class must not only be possible, but reasonably probable
of attainment."261 Republic Investment Fund seems, in many re-
spects, to be a perfect case for the Haman court. The Arizona court
began its discussion by making it clear that "[a] statute may withstand
equal protection review, yet still be found unconstitutional under the
special/local law provision." 26 2 The special legislation standard is "dif-
ferent and heightened... because the two provisions were promul-
gated to address different evils."263 Equal protection bans
discrimination against a person or class; special legislation bans unrea-
sonable discrimination that favors "'a person or class by granting
257. State ex reL Wheeler v. Stuht, 52 Neb. 209, 214, 71 N.W. 941, 942 (1897).
258. Id at 222, 71 N.W. at 945.
259. Id at 223, 71 N.W. at 945.
260. 800 P.2d 1251 (Ariz. 1990).
261. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 718, 467 N.W.2d 836, 849 (1991)(citing Republic
Inv. Fund I v. Town of Surprise, 800 P.2d 1251 (Ariz. 1990)).
262. Republic Inv. Fund I v. Town of Surprise, 800 P.2d 1251, 1257 (Ariz. 1990).
263. I& at 1257.
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them a special or exclusive immunity, privilege, or franchise.' , 264 Re-
public Investment Fund, accordingly, offers both a heightened scru-
tiny standard and a compelling rationale for that choice, the need to
combat the propensity of a legislature to favor a chosen few.
Significantly, it is the "elasticity" element that provides the
"heightened" scrutiny in a two-step inquiry that first asks "'whether
the law has a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative objec-
tive.' "265 Under this initial step, the court employs the traditional ap-
proach: a statutory classification will be reasonable, and upheld, "if it
has any conceivable rational basis to further a legitimate governmen-
tal interest."266 That is, the court "will uphold [the measure] if we
perceive any set of facts which rationally justify it."267 These state-
ments, admittedly, appear in the portion of this opinion discussing an
equal protection claim, but the court makes it clear when it turns to
the special legislation issue, "[a]s discussed earlier, the classifications
in the statute have a rational basis in furthering the legitimate state
objective of encouraging continued investment in the operation of rac-
ing meetings."26 8
The second step, the court explains, is to see "whether the class is
elastic, allowing members to move into and out of the class."2 69 The
court indicates that "[a] statute is special or local if it is worded such
that its scope is limited to a particular case and it 'looks to no broader
application in the future.' "27o In deciding if the act is special the court
will, as Haman indicates, consider actual probabilities; "[w]here the
prospect is only theoretical, and not probable, we will find the act spe-
cial or local in nature."2 71 The requirement that the prospect for ex-
pansion be "probable" rather than merely "theoretical" is not,
however, absolute. The court made it clear that "[a] law may be gen-
eral and still apply to only one entity, if that entity is the only member
of a legitimate class." 272 Elasticity, then, means only that a class must
be "open" in the sense that it "admit[s] entry of additional persons,
places, or things attaining the requisite characteristics, [and] also...
enable[s] others to exit the statute's coverage when they no longer
264. Id. at 1256 (quoting Arizona Downs v. Arizona Horsemen's Found., 637 P.2d 1053,
1060 (Ariz. 1981)).
265. Id. at 1257 (quoting Petitioners for Deannexation v. City of Goodyear, 773 P.2d
1026, 1031 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989)).
266. Arizona Downs v. Arizona Horsemen's Found., 637 P.2d 1053, 1058 (Ariz. 1981).
267. Id. at 1059 (emphasis in original).
268. Id. at 1061.
269. Republic Inv. Fund I v. Town of Surprise, 800 P.2d 1251, 1257 (Ariz. 1990).
270. Id. at 1258 (quoting Arizona Downs v. Arizona Horsemen's Found., 637 P.2d 1053,
1061 (Ariz. 1981)).
271. Id. at 1259.
272. Id. at 1258. As the court observes, the logical corollary to this is that "a law may
be special even if it applies to more than one entity when it applies to less than
the entire class." Id. at 1258 n.4.
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have those characteristics."273 The emphasis, quite clearly, is on the
characteristics and the extent to which they provide a valid basis for
drawing the distinction.
The fact that a given class is "permanently closed" does not, prop-
erly understood, render the classification void if in reality the class
consists of all individuals or entities sharing a characteristic that the
legislature can properly recognize. This becomes extraordinarily clear
when one examines the manner in which the Arizona court has ap-
plied the rule. The elasticity requirement, for example, originated in a
case in which the court stressed that the threshold question was in fact
whether classification of cities could be accomplished by use of popula-
tion figures.274 The court held they could, provided that "other cities
may, as they attain the requisite conditions, come within the classifica-
tion and within the operation of the statute."275 The issue is often one
of focus. In one case the court could have characterized the classifica-
tion as either horse racing in general or access to particular dates for
the purposes of holding racing meets. It chose to define the class as
horse racing, and sustained the statute even though it allowed the
state racing commission to "permanently close" certain dates to other
members of the wider class; "[t]he terms of the statute apply equally
to all types of racing and to all members of each class."276
The same sort of calculus is undertaken in New Jersey, a state that
supplied two additional cases cited by the Haman court, Mason v. City
of Paterson2 77 and In re Freygang.278 Mason involved a population
classification scheme that had been consistently manipulated by the
legislature so that only the City of Paterson would qualify for the
"benefits" conferred. The court stressed that "[iun form the statutes
under consideration are general in nature; however, the effect of the
various amendments has demonstrated that the legislative purpose
was to create a special form of government for the City of Pater-
son."279 The court did not, however, invalidate the measure because
Paterson was the only city that qualified. It struck the classification,
rather, because "satisfactory reasons must be found to exclude it from
the prohibition against local laws."280 The court found no "logical rea-
sons" for the mechanics of the act or "any explanations" as to why
other cities of the same size should not fall within its operation, ren-
dering the classification "illusory."
273. Id
274. Bravin v. Mayor of Tombstone, 33 P. 589 (Ariz. 1893).
275. Id at 590.
276. Arizona Downs v. Arizona Horsemen's Found., 637 P.2d 1053, 1061 (Ariz. 1981).
277. 293 A.2d 460 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972), aff'd, 303 A.2d 84 (N.J. 1973).
278. 133 A.2d 672 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), aff'd, 136 A.2d 625 (N.J. 1957).
279. Mason v. City of Paterson, 293 A.2d 460, 463 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972).
280. Id-
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In Freygang the focus was on a classification that limited its opera-
tion to certain cities where rent control had "heretofore" been in ef-
fect.28' This, using the logic of Axberg and City of ScottsblZuff, should
have rendered the class constitutionally infirm; the use of the limiting
term "heretofore" made the class "permanently" closed. The New
Jersey court did not agree, however, even as it stressed that it would
"look to [the statute's] substance and necessary operation, as well as to
its form and phraseology." 282 The court stressed that "[t]here have
been a number of cases upholding the constitutional validity of stat-
utes dealing with particular localities or particular classes of munici-
palities, even though they did not deal universally with all possible
objects."2 83 Drawing on a recent decision of its own supreme court on
the same general subject, Addiss v. Logan Corp.,2s4 the court found
that "[t]he selection of the municipalities in which the statute was in-
tended to have applicability was not arbitrary or illusory; in our view,
it was an entirely reasonable classification embracing all and exclud-
ing none which appropriately comprised the class."2 5
The same result was reached fourteen years later in a case in which
the court sustained certain special treatment afforded Atlantic City
because of a nexus between casino gambling and transportation: "[t]he
mere fact that a class embraces but one entity which is distinct from
all others does not in and of itself render the legislation a special, pri-
vate or local law."2 86 Nor, for that matter, did the possibility that
other cities might experience similar problems in the future mean
that the present legislative classification must be "open"; "[t]he mere
fact that similar exigencies may confront other counties at some point
in the future does not limit the ability of the Legislature to address the
problems presently confronting Atlantic County."28 7 This is possible
in New Jersey, interestingly enough, because of both a more realistic
reading of the nature of the special legislation prohibition and the
court's determination that it will employ the same standard in equal
protection and special legislation inquiries. The analysis is "similar"
to that "used to determine whether a person is afforded equal protec-
tion under the U.S. Constitution," with the court looking for "any rea-
281. In re Freygang, 133 A.2d 672, 678 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957).
282. AL at 677.
283. Id at 678.
284. 128 A.2d 462 (N.J. 1957).
285. In re Freygang, 133 A.2d 672, 678 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957). Freygang and
Addiss are discussed in Sidney Weiss, Note, "Closed Class"Legislation No Longer
Per Se Violation of Constitutional Restriction on Special Laws, 12 RUTGERS L.
REV. 617 (1958).
286. Parking Auth. of Atlantic City v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 434 A.2d 676, 682
(N.J. Super Ct. Law Div. 1981).
287. Id. at 683.
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son to justify the classification."2 8 This produces, accordingly, a
willingness to look beyond the "face" of the legislation that assumes
quite a different judicial gloss than the one put on in Haman. That is,
rather than creating a reason to strike the measure, a court "searching
for a conceivable rational basis for the enactment of legislation... is
not limited to the stated purpose of the legislation, but should seek
any conceivable rational basis."289
These decisions, drawn from jurisdictions that the Haman court
consulted on this very issue, are not isolated phenomena. Classifica-
tions are generally upheld where "some substantial difference" is
identified;290 in particular "[a]cts relating to persons and corporations
are usually sustained when attacked as special legislation."29 1 The
fact that one individual or entity might benefit to the exclusion of an-
other is not dispositive: "'[a] law relating to particular persons or
things as a class is said to be general; while a law relating to particular
persons or things of a class is deemed special and private."292 This will
be true even if the party excluded is treated in what might be termed
an unfair manner, since "[1l]egislation which creates classifications
with inequitable results is not unconstitutional if the distinctions have
a .rational basis."293 Moreover, while it is true as a general rule that
"[a] legislative act that applies only to particular individuals or things
of a class is special legislation," 294 that does not necessarily mean that
288. Newark Superior Officers Ass'n v. City of Newark, 486 A.2d 305, 311, 313 (N.J.
1985).
289. Township of Mahwah v. Bergen County Bd. of Taxation, 486 A.2d 818, 827 (N.J.
1985).
290. 2 SUTHERLAND supra note 206, at § 40.04. The cases are listed at id. n.11.
291. Id. § 40.18. The author notes that "[a]mong one hundred and thirty cases read,
the courts sustained one hundred and six acts and declared invalid twenty-four
acts." Id. n.11.
292. Madison Metro. Sewerage Dist. v. Stein, 177 N.W. 2d 131, 137 (Wis. 1970)(quoting
Johnson v. Milwaukee, 60 N.W. 270,271 (Wis. 1894)). The Madison case is cited in
Haman to support the proposition that legislation applying to "particular individ-
uals" is "special." The reliance is clearly misplaced since the dispositive issue is
not whether the classification is closed, in the sense that the Haman court dwells
on, but rather whether it is "arbitrary." Id. at 137 (quoting John M. Winters,
Classification of Municipalities, 57 NW. U. L. REv. 279, 279 (1962)). As the John-
son court stressed, "[a]ll cannot use with benefit powers which would be of great
advantage to some. A law which should provide for one case only, in a proper
case, should be held to be a general law." Johnson v. City of Milwaukee, 60 N.W.
270, 271 (Wis. 1894). It should be noted that the court articulated this position
even as it recognized that one of the general rules regarding classification is "[t]he
classification must not be based on existing circumstances only" and "must not be
so constituted as to preclude addition to the numbers included within a class." Id.
at 272.
293. Jackson County v. Jackson Educ. Serv. Dist., 752 P.2d 1224, 1230, (Or. Ct. App.
1988), review denied, 758 P.2d 346 (Or. 1988)(citing Huckaba v. Johnson, 573 P.2d
305, 307 (Or. 1978)).
294. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 709, 467 N.W.2d 836, 844-45 (1991)(citing Jackson
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the legislation is unconstitutional. Thus, while the Jackson County v.
Jackson Education Service District court does state the rule for which
the Haman court cites that case, the classification at issue, which was
"comprised of the counties and taxing districts which entered into
agreements before the effective date of the act,"295 was valid. "The
test does not depend upon the number of people or things within the
scope of the law or whether it is equally applicable to all parts of the
state. Rather, the test is whether the classification bears a rational
relationship to the purpose of the act."296 Indeed, the argument in
favor of an otherwise "closed" class becomes even more compelling
when the predicate for the act is discharge of a moral obligation:
There is at least one fundamental and controlling reason why the act in
question should not be condemned as unconstitutional, though special. The
Legislature has the right, as we have stated, to recognize a moral claim. It is
not, however, compelled to do so. And if it acknowledges any one particular
claim as just and equitable, we do not think that the court has the right to say
it must also recognize all other claims of a similar nature, and do so by passing
a general law. The Legislature might deem one claim as just and equitable
because of the particular, peculiar incidents connected therewith, while an-
other similar claim, but somewhat different in its aspects, might not be consid-
ered such as would, in its judgment, demand compensation.297
The inescapable conclusion is that most jurisdictions that have con-
sidered the question have sustained the power of a legislature to class-
ify even where that classification is either closed or consists of an
extraordinarily narrow universe of persons, places, or things. The
true significance of all of this becomes apparent when one considers
both the origins of the "permanent closed class" standard in Nebraska
and the implications of what the court states in Haman for all future
special legislation litigation in this state. Neither the propriety nor
County v. Jackson Educ. Serv. Dist., 752 P.2d 1224 (Or. Ct. App. 1988), review
denied, 758 P.2d 346 (Or. 1988)).
295. 752 P.2d 1224, 1231 (Or. Ct. App. 1988).
296. I- (emphasis added). The same rule was articulated in a Virginia case cited for
the proposition that "'[w]hether a classification is arbitrary "depend[s] upon the
purpose and subject of the particular act and the circumstances and conditions
surrounding its passage."' " Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 715, 467 N.W.2d 836,
848 (1991)(quoting Etheridge v. Medical Center Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525, 533 (Va.
1989)). Prior to the quoted passage the Etheridge court emphasized that "[l]ong
ago, we held that '[1]aws may be made to apply to a class only, and that class may
be in point of fact a small one, provided the classification itself be a reasonable
and not an arbitrary one, and the law be made to apply to all of the persons
belonging to the class without distinction."' Etheridge v. Medical Center Hosps.,
376 S.E.2d 525, 533 (Va. 1989)(quoting Exparte Settle, 77 S.E. 496, 497 (Va. 1913)).
It then rejected the notion that the court should "'second guess' the General As-
sembly's judgment and... determine the necessity for and reasonableness of the
classification." Id. at 533 n.4.
297. Heuschel v. Wagner, 215 P. 476, 483-84 (Colo. 1923). The same approach is taken
in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Fairfield v. Huntington, 205 P. 814, 818 (Ariz.
1922); Woodall v. Darst, 77 S.E. 264, 268 (W. Va. 1913).
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the applicability of the "permanency" standard was questioned by any
of the parties in Haman. Most of the case law seemed to imply that
the permanency inquiry reflected settled understandings of the pa-
rameters of article III, section 18, as applied to all possible classifica-
tions. That section of the Constitution, which has been parsed as a
general prohibition against "special legislation," is, however, more
complex than the general treatment (in Haman and elsewhere) would
lead one to believe. More importantly, the manner in which the doc-
trines used to apply article III, section 18 have evolved seems, on care-
ful examination, to belie the actual scope of the prohibition and the
original, contemporaneous understanding of its reach. This is espe-
cially true in the case of the permanency requirement, which seems to
have evolved beyond the parameters for which it was designed and
within which it could reasonably be expected to operate.298
C. "Permanently Closed Classes": Myths and Realities
Article III, section 18 states that "[t]he Legislature shall not pass
local or special laws in any of the following cases," listing twenty-one
specific prohibitions. It then provides that "[i]n all other cases where a
general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted."
A reasonable reading of this section would seem to be that in certain,
named instances "local" or "special" laws may never be passed. Thus,
for example, the section states expressly that the legislature may not
pass a "local" or "special" law for "[t]he protection of game or fish."
This, on its face, would seem to indicate that a purely local, that is to
say, geographically limited, game or fish measure could not withstand
scrutiny.
The court recognized at an early juncture, however, that a strict
reading of this provision would prevent the state from attaining many
laudable objectives. Accordingly, in Bauer v. Game, Forestation &
Parks Commission,299 it allowed the legislature to set up a game ref-
uge in a specified area along the Platte River. The court conceded that
"[t]he purpose of the law is simple, and clearly provides for a perma-
nent closed season in this restricted area along the Platte river."300
The court decided, however, that the proper focus was not--as the
298. The secondary literature on article III, section 18 is sparse, consisting principally
of A.C. Breckendridge, The Mockery of Classification, 36 NAT'L MUN. REV. 571
(1947), Charles B. Nutting, Special Legislation in Nebraska, 17 NEB. L. BULL. 332
(1938), Ray Simmons, Local Legislation in Nebraska, 29 NEB. L. REv. 139 (1949),
and Note, Class Legislation, 8 NEB. L. BULL. 174 (1929). Generalized treatments,
other than sections on the subject in specialized treatises, are equally infrequent.
See, e.g., 2 McQUILLIN MUN. CoRp. §§ 4.30 - 4.76 (3d ed. 1988); Lyman H. Cloe &
Sumner Marcus, Special and Local Legislation, 24 Ky. L.J. 351 (1936); Frank E.
Horack, Special Legislation.: Another Twilight Zone, 12 IND. L.J. 109 (1936).
299. 138 Neb. 436, 293 N.W. 282 (1940).
300. Id. at 440, 293 N.W. at 284.
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constitutional language would seem to dictate--on the locality, or even
perhaps on the types of game or fish to be found there. It was, rather,
on the citizens who might wish to avail themselves of the "sporting"
opportunities presented by the particular parcel of land. It indicated,
accordingly, that "[a] statute is not special or local merely because it
prohibits doing a thing in a certain locality. It is, notwithstanding this
fact, a general law if it applies to all citizens of the state, and deals
with a matter of general concern." 3 01
This is, of course, precisely the same sort of perspective-shifting
process embraced by other jurisdictions, notably Arizona, which sup-
plied one of the decisions on which the Haman author relied. Inter-
estingly, the Haman court translated the Bauer holding into the
general proposition that "[b]y definition, a legislative act is general,
and not special, if it operates alike on all persons of a class or on per-
sons who are brought within the relations and circumstances provided
for and if the classification so adopted by the Legislature has a basis in
reason and is not purely arbitrary."302 So far, so good; there is no par-
ticular reason to believe that L.B. 272A runs afoul of this standard.
The "relations and circumstances provided for" were, in the words of
that measure, those that meant that "holders of certificates of indebt-
edness which later became protected companies were paid in full if
their certificates of indebtedness matured before the industrial com-
pany filed bankruptcy, but those whose certificates of indebtedness
happened to mature afterwards received only partial payment."303
That is, by virtue of the actions taken by the state, certain individuals
were harmed, a harm the state had no legal obligation to redress but
believed itself morally obligated to correct. That, it seemed, was
neither unreasonable nor purely arbitrary.
Unfortunately, the court has also in recent years consistently
seemed to imply that any legislative act creating a "permanently
closed class" offends this provision. In Haman the court cited City of
Scottsbluff for this proposition, quoting the earlier holding in State ex
rel. Conkling v. Kelso.3 04 The interesting issue is posed by close exam-
ination of the "almost unbroken line of decisions," since it appears
that the extension of the doctrine beyond the particular type of classi-
301. Id. at 442, 293 N.W. at 285.
302. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 709, 467 N.W.2d 836, 844 (1991)(citing Bauer v.
State Game, Forestation and Parks Comn'n, 138 Neb. 436, 293 N.W. 282 (1940)).
The actual language employed in Bauer was somewhat different: "An act is gen-
eral, and not special or local, if it operates alike on all persons or localities of a
class, or who are brought within the relations and circumstances provided for, if
the classification so adopted by the legislature has a basis in reason, and is not
purely arbitrary." Bauer v. Game, Forestation & Parks Comm'n, 138 Neb. 436,
441, 293 N.W. 282, 285 (1940).
303. L.B. 272A, § 2 4.
304. 92 Neb. 628, 139 N.W. 226 (1912).
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fication involved, cities (or at least the use of a population figure as a
surrogate for the characteristic of a given "class" of cities), is unwar-
ranted. Moreover, there is a second "line of cases," of which Bauer is a
part, that points toward a different set of analytic considerations when
the focus is not on political subdivisions and population.
Both City of Scottsbluff and Kelso dealt with the same problem,
and a careful examination of Kelso makes it clear that the aspect of
the classification rules developed in those cases was intended to be
narrow and situation specific. The passage from Kelso quoted in City
of Scottsbluff, for example, actually begins somewhat earlier:
There can be no just objection to the classification of county seats if such clas-
sification is general and could be applied to all counties in the state, should the
county seat remain unchanged for a specific number of years. This principle is
recognized in [numerous cases].... But in State v. Scott... a different rule is
applied where the limitation closes the door to any further admission to the
class, and the act is held to be the equivalent of naming the county seats to
which the proviso is to be applied, and can never apply to others, and to that
extent it is both local and special legislation.3 0 5
Two things are striking here. One is all of the "ands," which seem
to impose a "conjunctive" rather than "disjunctive" inquiry in order
for the measure to offend the constitutional mandate. The second is
the reality presented by State v. Scott,306 the case that provides the
impetus for the doctrine articulated in Kelso. Scott is a decision
presenting a fact pattern strikingly similar to that in City of Scotts-
bluff. The legislation was limited in operation to "counties having
over 50,000 inhabitants according to the census of 1900." The court
took "judicial notice" of the fact that as a result of this limitation only
two counties qualified, Douglas and Lancaster. This meant that "the
act might as well have stated in express terms" what it "plainly and
inevitably" implied.307 The court, even as it acknowledged that the
legislation made sense, then identified the constitutional flaw:
The object of the law may be wise, and the reform sought to be accomplished
may be salutary. It may be that the heavier burden placed upon the roads and
bridges of the counties named by reason of the greater density of population
and consequently increased amount of travel and intercourse carried on upon
the public highways renders it necessary that a skilled officer shall have the
general charge and supervision of road work and of the selection for, and the
construction and repair of, bridges. But this end is as necessary to be attained
in all counties which may in the future reach the population prescribed by this
act as in those which are now in the class.3 0 8
The various cases relied upon by the court in Kelso and Scott con-
firm this sense of what the true "evil" of "permanency" is. In one
early classification case, for example, the court observed that:
305. Id at 631-32, 139 N.W. at 227 (1912)(emphasis added)(citations omitted).
306. 70 Neb. 685, 100 N.W. 812 (1904).
307. Id at 686, 100 N.W. at 813.
308. I& at 686-87, 100 N.W. at 813.
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[ilf an act is to be deemed inimical to the provisions of the constitution above
referred to, simply because, in point of fact, its operation is confined to only
one city, then it would follow that our only city of the first class is utterly
without legal corporate existence,-a state of things which could not have
been intended by the framers of the constitution, prominent among whom
were several representatives of that city.3 0 9
The court subsequently observed, in a case where the party challeng-
ing the measure stressed that "it was not within the range of human
possibilities that during his term of office there would be anybody else
to whom [the act] would apply" that "[t]here is nothing in the bill to
indicate that the legislature singled out Douglas county specially."31 0
It "so happen[ed]" that the measure applied in only one county, and
the principle articulated in State ex reL Wheeler v. Stuht did not apply;
"[w]hile it is true that the probabilities are against any other county
reaching this class during the term of office now being served by re-
spondent, it is not impossible, and there is nothing whatsoever in the
bill to prevent such a county from entering this class."3 11
The true meaning and implication of this line of cases becomes ap-
parent when it is compared to a second series of cases which recognize
that "if a law is general and uniform throughout the state, operating
alike on all persons and localities of a class, or who are brought within
the relations and circumstances provided for, it is not objectionable as
wanting uniformity of operation."31 2 Bauer and McFadden, which I
have already discussed, are cases decided within this line, which recog-
nizes that "while it is competent for the legislature to classify, the clas-
sification, to be valid, must rest on some reason of public policy, some
substantial difference of situation or circumstances, that would natu-
rally suggest the justice or expediency of diverse legislation with re-
spect to the objects classified."3'3 That rule, which tracks virtually
verbatim the one invoked in Haman, was articulated in a decision in
which the court explored whether the legislature could exempt irriga-
tion companies from a duty to keep and repair public bridges across
their ditches. The court invalidated the measure, but not because it
was beyond the power of the legislature to enact such legislation in
appropriate circumstances. The inquiry was, rather, "[u]pon what
ground can this classification be justified?"314 The court stressed that
irrigation company "ditches are not, by the section in question, segre-
309. State ex reL Jones v. Graham, 16 Neb. 74, 77, 19 N.W. 470, 472 (1884).
310. State ex reL Douglas County v. Frank, 61 Neb. 679, 687, 85 N.W. 956, 958 (1901).
311. I& at 687, 85 N.W. at 958-59. This opinion was issued on rehearing and reversed
the original decision of the court that, with no discussion, invalidated the act on
the authority of Stuht. State ex. rel Douglas County v. Frank, 60 Neb. 327,336,83
N.W. 74, 76 (1900).
312. State v. Berka, 20 Neb. 375, 379, 30 N.W. 267, 269 (1886).
313. State ex re Dawson County v. Farmers' & Merchants' Irrigation Co., 59 Neb. 1, 3-
4, 80 N.W. 52, 53 (1899).
314. Id at 5, 80 N.W. at 53.
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gated from other private ditches on account of any peculiar character-
istics which they possess."3 15 The flaw, then, was that the "substantial
difference" had not been identified, not that such a difference could
not justify special treatment.
That was not, however, the situation in two other cases, one de-
cided before and one after Dawson County. In the first, Livingston
Loan & Building Ass'n v. Drummond, 16 the focus was on a claim that
a ten percent rate of interest was usurious. The special legislation as-
pect of the case was the contention that the statutes authorizing the
creation of building and loan associations gave that particular group of
corporations special treatment by authorizing interest up to a rate of
twelve percent. The court recognized that "[tihe legislature may not
arbitrarily, and without any possible reason, create a class to be af-
fected by legislation, where the result would be an infringement upon
the constitutional prohibition."317 It also conceded that "[t]his statute
does, in terms, to a certain extent, exempt such cases from the opera-
tion of the general laws relating to interest."31 8 But it was not special
legislation:
We must take notice of the fact that, rightly or wrongly, for many years, many
states, and England as well, have pursued a policy of encouraging the opera-
tion of such associations, as facilitating the building of homes for the people;
and the public policy thereby involved would justify the legislature, in its wis-
dom, in classifying loans for such purpose, and made in such ways, as a group
by themselves, and subject to different restrictions and privileges than those
applying to loans generally.
3 19
Twenty-six years later the question was whether the legislature
could authorize the Board of Regents to manufacture hog cholera se-
rum and deliver it to the state veterinarian and to farmers and swine-
growers.320 The act was challenged in Fisher v. Board of Regents as
special legislation, under the theory that "licensed veterinarians, for
instance, who buy, sell and use hog-cholera serum for profit are denied
the benefits and privileges inuring under the act to the special class
limited to 'farmers and swine-growers.' "321 The court, in no uncer-
tain terms, rejected the challenge, stressing that the legislation had
been enacted at a time of "public calamity" and that "[t]hese produ-
cers were named in the act because they were at the source of the
animal food supply, where the remedy for hog-cholera could be ap-
plied."3 22 The class was, from the perspective of "farmers and swine-
315. Id-
316. 49 Neb. 200, 202, 68 N.W. 375, 376 (1896).
317. Id at 205, 68 N.W. at 377.
318. Id- at 206, 68 N.W. at 377.
319. Id at 205-06, 68 N.W. at 377.
320. House Roll No. 58 § 2, 1911 Neb. Laws 452, 452.
321. 108 Neb. 666, 669-70, 189 N.W. 161, 163 (1922).
322. I& at 670, 189 N.W. at 163.
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growers," open; all individuals who shared those characteristics could
enter. It was, however, in a very real sense "permanently closed" to
all others, many of whom, like veterinarians, had an arguably legiti-
mate right to enter. Nevertheless, "[t]here is no convincing reason for
condemning 'farmers and swine-growers' as a classification for the
purposes of legislation to protect the food supply of pork .... ,,323
More tellingly, in light of the dispute that emerged in Haman about
the propriety of using public funds for the benefit of private actors,
this was within the "taxation powers of the state."3 24 That, the court
stressed, had been settled by State ex rel Hall County Farm Bureau v.
Miller, a case that recognized the power of the legislature to compel a
county board to appropriate funds to the county farm bureau, a per-
missible expenditure of "[a] small portion of the public funds raised by
taxation in the ordinary manner... devoted to a branch of education
affecting the chief industry of the state."325
The doctrinal origins of the "permanently closed class" rule are
therefore more complicated than either Haman or City of Scottsbluff
might lead one to believe. The problem is not, in the narrow sense,
that the class is limited to an identifiable set of cities, in most of the
cases, or individuals, as in Haman. It is, rather, that the presumed
justifications for the classification are of precisely the sort that reveal
an intent to invidiously discriminate, rather than to allow all who
share the characteristic to benefit. The constitutional language does
not, after all, prohibit all classifications, only those either expressly
listed or those that are created by "special" laws when a "general"
measure would attain the same objective. Indeed, the very fact that so
many specific bans are listed bolsters the impression that the evil the
framers had in mind is not posed by the simple act of classifying, with-
out more.
In short, the evil is not "permanency." It is, rather, the articulation
of a class whose justifications are belied by its realities. The constitu-
tion provides, and the court has acknowledged, that the legislature
may enact "local" or "special" measures when a general law may not
be made applicable. The class created must be reasonable, may not be
arbitrary, and should bear a "substantial" relationship to the purposes
for which it was created. In the specific context of cities, the issue
becomes the extent to which population, and population alone, can
properly serve as a surrogate for articulation by the legislature of the
specific conditions that justify disparate treatment. A permanently
closed class is suspect, and such a doctrine is needed, accordingly, pre-
cisely because it identifies instances in which the legislature has arbi-
trarily selected its beneficiaries, rather than because it does not allow
323. Id
324. Id
325. 104 Neb. 838, 841, 178 N.W. 846, 847 (1920).
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some future individual or entity to enter. Such distinctions are
proper, in turn, because they are founded upon "reasonable differ-
ences" and a "substantial relationship" to the objectives sought.
It therefore seems appropriate for the state to, for example, create
a series of special programs or entitlements for discreet "classes" of
individuals. Measures of that sort are "closed classes" in the sense
that not all citizens may enter them, as was the case in Fisher, or in
the narrower sense that a disability may exist but not be serious
enough to warrant inclusion. A class could in turn be "permanently"
closed in the sense that the legislation authorizes a one-time only ben-
efit for the select few who qualify. No one, I suspect, would seriously
argue that such classifications violate article III, section 18. They
serve a public purpose, and the characteristics identified are both real
and realistic.
This is all the more intriguing since the deference granted to legis-
lative classification decisions is, at least in theory, substantial. For ex-
ample, a classification will not fail even if it simply reflects an exercise
of pure discretion. Thus, in Otto v. Hahn,s26 the court rejected a con-
stitutional challenge to the exclusion of farm laborers from the Work-
men's Compensation Act, observing that "[ilt becomes apparent that
farm laborers were excluded from the act not because farming is non-
hazardous but because the Legislature chose not to extend the cover-
age of the act to that class for a possibly political or social reason."32 7
The choice was "rational." The same type of distinction arose in Ex
parte Caldwell,328 which recognized the power to classify barbers as
common laborers, and in State v. Murray,329 which recognized the au-
thority of the legislature to impose greater penalties on barbers for
conducting their business on Sundays than those placed on other com-
mon laborers. In Caldwell the "wisdom" of the classification was not a
matter for the court, provided there was a "sensible distinction."33 0 In
Murray, the statute applied evenly to all members of the class and was
"reasonable," even though it singled out that class for a heavier
penalty.3 31
The court has also stressed that a classification will not be deemed
suspect even though it offers substantial benefits to private
individuals:
Statutes which are reasonably designed to protect the health, morals, and
general welfare do not violate the Constitution where they operate uniformly
on all within a class which is reasonable. This is so even if a statute grants
special or exclusive privileges where the primary purpose of the grant is not
326. 209 Neb. 114, 306 N.W.2d 587 (1981).
327. Id at 118, 306 N.W.2d at 590.
328. 82 Neb. 544, 118 N.W. 133 (1908).
329. 104 Neb. 51, 175 N.W. 666 (1919).
330. Ex parte Caldwell, 82 Neb. 544, 546, 118 N.W. 133, 134 (1908).
331. State v. Murray, 104 Neb. 51, 54, 175 N.W. 666, 667 (1910).
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the private benefit of the grantees but the promotion of the public interest.332
This is of considerable importance, since the evil that supposedly obvi-
ated any need to discuss the wider public purpose articulated in L.B.
272A was the fact that public funds were given to private individuals.
That was the animating force of the court's decision in Weaver, the
decision quoted for the proposition that L.B. 272A was an impermissi-
ble charitable act, and it was clearly a significant factor in the court's
mind. If, however, incidental private benefits are permissible, it be-
comes quite clear that the heart of the matter in Haman is the refusal
of the court to credit the wider purposes articulated for L.B. 272A, a
refusal that requires heightened scrutiny since at the rational basis
level any public policy rationale, no matter how ephemeral, tends to
be accepted.
The legislature clearly articulated "some reason of public policy"
in L.B. 272A. It was also clear that the act's identification of deposi-
tors protected, and the certificates of indebtedness to be redeemed,
were predicated on a "substantial difference of situation or circum-
stances," differences that would "naturally suggest the justice" of
what the legislature sought to accomplish. The fact that the authors
of L.B. 272A drafted that measure as they did suggests the need to ask
why, and there are only two possible answers. The first is that the
legislature was establishing a general principle with a particular appli-
cation: promises, either made on behalf of the people of this state or
impelled by them, are to be kept, and the failure to do so constitutes
precisely the sort of grave public harm toward which appropriate ap-
plications of the state police power must be directed. The second an-
swer is that the authors of L.B. 272A were well aware of the legal
principles the Haman court eventually explored, and deliberately
crafted a measure that, while limited in its immediate intent to the
compensation of specific depositors, nevertheless created open classifi-
cations consistent with the command of article III, section 18.
The express and incontrovertible terms of L.B. 272A suggest that
these are the only possible explanations. The first characterization
clearly ascribes to the legislature a greater nobility of purpose than
the second, which attributes to the drafters the narrow objective of
crafting a measure that would withstand judicial scrutiny. The court
seemed to concede much of this when it expressed its reluctance to
"accept artful draftsmanship over reality."3 3 3 If the court truly means
this, however, and if "reasonable probability of attainment" is now the
standard by which classifications will be tested, the special legislation
landscape in Nebraska has changed dramatically since the guiding
principle to date had in fact been "artful" draftsmanship. For exam-
332. State ex reL Douglas v. Nebraska Mortgage Fin. Fund, 204 Neb. 445, 466, 283
N.W.2d 12, 25 (1979).
333. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 718, 467 N.W.2d 836, 848 (1991).
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ple, the simple articulation of a number as a predicate for treating cit-
ies differently will no longer suffice. Ogallala may have the
theoretical potential to reach the population level required for pri-
mary or metropolitan city status, but it is doubtful that anyone could
argue, or would even be willing to suggest with a straight face, that
this is more than "merely theoretical." That means that every special
benefit predicated on a specific population figure must be justified by
the detailed articulation of a "reasonable and substantial" basis.
It also means that the validity of the classification must be continu-
ously tested, given the legislature's propensity to adjust population
thresholds on a routine basis, a practice the court apparently con-
dones. If, for example, the conditions recognized and benefits con-
ferred by the label "metropolitan" inhere to a specific population
level, then there is no constitutionally sound reason to deny that the
conditions exist and benefits are appropriate when a city eventually
reaches that level. Yet that is precisely what happens each time, for
example, that Lincoln has reached or is in danger of attaining that
status. In 1947, for example, it appeared that Lincoln had reached the
magic threshold and was on the brink of entering the metropolitan
class. The legislature, at the instigation of the Lancaster County dele-
gation, passed L.B. 138, a measure that raised the population levels
required to "go metropolitan." The motivation, apparently, was the
belief "that Lincoln would have been adversely affected by certain
'general laws' controlling a metropolitan utilities district, a system of
municipal courts, a municipal university and special sewage and drain-
age districts."334 That action, as the same observer stressed, ran
counter to the growth principle articulated in Stuht and was an ex-
press rejection of the "opportunity to prove the validity of such exten-
sive and arbitrary classification."33 5
In theory, and perhaps in fact, L.B. 138 violated the constitution.
Certainly there is little doubt that the prior decisions of the court, cou-
pled with Haman, would dictate just such a result. In Galloway, for
example, the court stated "[t]rue, it may be that in 50 or 100 years one
or more cities may have a population sufficient to qualify them as met-
ropolitan, but the possibility, except perhaps the city of Lincoln, is so
remote as to exclude it from consideration." 336 The Haman holding
and rationale, while in theory compatible with prior decisions, actually
call into question the results consistently reached in them. As a re-
sult, the validity of the entire scheme of classifying by population, and
population alone, is questionable, as is the legitimacy of allowing the
legislature to periodically adjust the thresholds upward. Of course,
whether this was what the Haman court intended, and more to the
334. A.C. Breckenridge, supra note 298, at 573.
335. Id. at 572.
336. Galloway v. Wolfe, 117 Neb. 824, 830, 223 N.W. 1, 3 (1929).
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point, whether the court will flinch or retreat if the argument is ad-
vanced in any context other than that of L.B. 272A, are quite different
and potentially fascinating matters altogether.
Finally, if, as we are led to believe, words have important and spe-
cific meanings, it is not readily apparent what those meanings might
be in the wake of Haman when one invokes the "narrower" special
legislation test. Just what does it mean to state that the test is now
one of a "reasonable and substantial relationship"? Does it, for exam-
ple, mean that the legislative purpose must be "reasonable" and that
the relationship between purpose expressed and means employed be
"substantial"? Or must both the purpose and the relationship be "sub-
stantial"? These are not idle questions, given the manner in which
other states handle such inquiries. As indicated, Virginia and Arizona
test the objective at the lowest level of scrutiny, looking simply for
"any" possible justification. They are also far from inconsequential
inquiries given traditional understandings of intermediate scrutiny, a
test that postulates the need for an "important" interest and "substan-
tial" relationship.
Then again, should we care? This is, after all, the same court, al-
beit not (with one exception) the same cast of judges, that once
observed:
Refined analysis and simplistic logic when applied to the practical impact
of a particular classification produces many times an appearance of inequality
and discrimination. This is especially true close to the borderlines. But the
sharpness of the lines drawn does not create an irrationality of classification
or an invidious discrimination. This is particularly true when the sword of
legislative policy deals with broad problems of economics and social
welfare.3 3 7
Haman, read strictly, would inevitably tend to blunt the legislative
sword, rendering any hope of sustaining anything other than the
sharpest classifications illusory. That approach may well comport
with an ultra-strict reading of the applicable constitutional provisions
and a refined sense of the court's own obligations as the ultimate arbi-
ter of social change. Whether, in this imperfect world, either the read-
ing or role are constitutionally proper, much less realistic or workable,
is another matter entirely.
VI. STATING THE RULES: MORAL OBLIGATIONS AND THE
MORAL SOCIETY
"Did you say moral or legal?" said the Chesire Precedent.
'T said moral," replied the Unicameral; "and I wish you
wouldn't keep appearing and vanishing so suddenly; you
make one quite giddy."
337. Thompson v. Board of Regents, 187 Neb. 252, 256, 188 N.W.2d 840, 843 (1971).
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"All right," said the Precedent; and this time it vanished
quite slowly, beginning with the end of the tail, and ending
with the grin, which remained some time after the rest of it
had gone.
"Well! I've often seen a precedent without a rationale,"
thought the Unicameral; "but a rationale without a precedent!
It's the most curious thing I ever saw in all my life!"338
Much of Haman seems, like the Chesire Cat, to be an exercise in
now you see him, now you don't, and you never quite know if he's all
there. This is a rather interesting device if the objective is to amuse or
confuse. It is less helpful if, as one would suppose to be the case with
the court, the goal is to offer a full, carefully reasoned justification for
and explanation of the result that is reached.
It is difficult to escape the eerie feeling that something is missing in
Haman, that like the Chesire Cat the decision is often at best a disem-
bodied judicial grin. This is especially evident in the passage that con-
cludes the court's discussion of moral obligation, a place where "[w]e
reiterate the words of this court from 60 years ago: 'Clearly it has not
yet come to pass that the state, in its supervision of the banking busi-
ness, has become an eleemosynary institution.' "339 Weaver v. Koehn,
the case from which the court quotes, was in fact one of the four deci-
sions used by the plaintiff to bolster her contention that "[o]n every
occasion when the issue has been presented to it, this Court has held
that retroactive legislation intended to compensate private individuals
is unconstitutional. The rationale has varied from case to case, but the
result has always been the same."340
The parties in Haman waged a mighty struggle over the actual
meaning and current validity of Weaver, an opinion that, as the court
concedes, constituted:
[a] holding that the appropriation of money by the state to reimburse deposi-
tors for losses sustained by them in failed banks clearly appears to be the tak-
ing of money belonging to one class to pay the claims of another class, and that
is a violation of the due process provisions of the federal and state
Constitutions. 34 1
The Haman opinion, viewed dispassionately, seemed to indicate that
any arguments about Weaver, and the due process aspects of the case,
were beside the point. Nevertheless, as we have already seen, appear-
ance and reality are often two different things in Haman. The "state
credit" element of the decision, for example, did not in fact comprise
one of the plaintiff's original claims, in spite of the court's characteri-
338. ALICE, supra note 1, at 90 (Ch. VI: Pig and Pepper).
339. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 715, 467 N.W.2d 836, 848 (1991)(quoting Weaver v.
Koehn, 120 Neb. 114, 117, 231 N.W. 703, 704 (1930)).
340. Brief of Plaintiff at 12, Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836 (1991)(No.
90-474)(emphasis added).
341. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 714-16, 467 N.W.2d 836, 848 (1991).
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zation of it as such. The court's elevation of the credit discussion to an
independent ground for its decision reflected its agenda rather than
that of the parties before it.342 In turn, the court's recounting of the
plaintiff's first argument demonstrates that the due process elements
of her position before the court were of considerable importance, in-
forming and animating much of the discussion of why she believed
L.B. 272A was special legislation.343
To those reading the briefs, Weaver, substantive due process, and
the corollary issue of who determines Nebraska's public policies
seemed to be of the utmost importance. The truth of this proposition
is bolstered, rather than weakened, by the court's resort to Weaver.
If, as the court asserts, L.B. 272A was enacted only for the benefit of
the depositors in the three institutions, a constitutionally impermissi-
ble "permanently closed class," legislative motive is beside the point.
A class that is "permanently closed" is constitutionally infirm regard-
less of whether it in fact bears a "reasonable and substantial relation-
ship" to the objectives the legislature sought to achieve. Of what
possible consequence is it, then, that sixty years ago the state was not
an eleemosynary institution, vis-a-vis the supervision of banking?
Moreover, if, as the court would also have us believe, "no further dis-
cussion of either the plaintiff's or the defendant's position on constitu-
tionality is necessary,"344 how is it that the court deems it either
necessary or appropriate to quote from the case that forms the center-
piece of those positions? The court's recourse to Weaver, and its par-
enthetical explanation of this sixty year old precedent, only whet our
appetite.
The explanation, I suspect, lies in a fuller examination of the man-
ner in which the court had treated moral obligation and retroactive
legislation in the past. That process, as we will now see, both expo-
nentially expands the analytic universe and sheds important light on
the actual meaning of the Weaver decision. It also provides us with an
important key to the mindset that animates the result in Haman, con-
juring up images of an era and a judicial philosophy that we had, ap-
parently erroneously, previously consigned to the dusty pages of
history.
A. Wakeley: When Is a "Rule" Really a Rule?
The analysis begins with a return to Wakeley, a decision that, as we
have already seen in Section IV-B of this Article, is both an extraordi-
narily important link in the Haman court's analytic chain and one
342. See supra text accompanying notes 96-98.
343. The court's summary of the plaintiff's first argument expressly mentions due
process, and its summary of her fourth implies it. See Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb.
699, 705-06, 467 N.W.2d 836, 844 (1991).
344. IL at 723, 467 N.W.2d at 852.
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whose reality is quite different from the impression conveyed by the
court. This becomes even more evident when one examines the cases
cited on the issue of moral obligation in Wakeley itself. In Butte Min-
ers' Union v. City of Butte,345 the court recognized the ability of a state
to subject its political subdivisions to liability for mob violence. In that
instance the operative state statute specified that "[e]very city or town
is responsible for injuries to real or personal property within its corpo-
rate limits done or caused by mobs or riots."346 The purpose of the
measure, the court noted, was "to create municipal liability and tend
to instill in the mind of every person liable to contribute to the public
expense a will to discourage violence and to stimulate effort to pre-
serve the public safety."3 47 That, the court stressed, was a valid legis-
lative recognition of the traditional rule that "'a civil subdivision,
intrusted with the duty of protecting property in its midst and with
police power to discharge the function, may be made answerable not
only for negligence affirmatively shown, but absolutely as not having
afforded a protection adequate to the obligation.' "348
It is possible, I imagine, to treat the phrase "instill in the mind of
every person" as a reflection of the Wakeley court's reference to laws
"notifying and warning the taxpayer and the citizen generally that the
state or municipality will undertake the burden of such damages." 34 9
It is important, nevertheless, to understand that the Montana court
never discussed the concept of "moral obligation" in Butte Miners'
Union. The decision dealt, rather, exclusively with the power of the
legislature to impose municipal liability for mob violence and the ne-
cessity for a court, confronted with a suit arising from such violence, to
not "write exceptions into a law the Legislature has not seen fit to
345. 194 P. 149 (Mont. 1920).
346. MONT. CODE ANN. § 3485, quoted in Butte Miners' Union v. City of Butte, 194 P.
149, 150 (Mont. 1920).
347. Butte Miners' Union v. City of Butte, 194 P. 149, 150 (Mont. 1920).
348. Id. (quoting City of Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313, 323 (1911)). It is worth not-
ing that the Court, in City of Chicago, recognized a classification power that is
consistent with that in place in many jurisdictions, but arguably conflicts with the
approach embraced in Haman:
The power of the state to impose liability for damage and injury to
property from riots and mobs includes the power to make a classification
of the subordinate municipalities upon which the responsibility may be
imposed. It is a matter for the exercise of legislative discretion, and the
equal protection of the law is not denied where the classification is not so
unreasonable and extravagant as to be a mere arbitrary mandate.
City of Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313, 324 (1911). The Court observed that "[a]
city is presumptively the more populous and better organized community. As
such it may well be singled out and made exclusively responsible for the conse-
quences of riots and mobs to property therein." Id. This is arguably at odds with
the position taken by the Nebraska Supreme Court on the subject of public danc-
ing on Sundays. See supra text accompanying notes 244-46.
349. Wakeley v. Douglas County, 109 Neb. 396, 400, 191 N.W. 337, 339 (1922).
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place there."350
That does not mean that the Montana court has been silent on the
subject. In 1923, slightly less than three years after Butte Miners'
Union, the court rejected the argument that moral obligation provided
a valid foundation for a measure authorizing the issuance of bonds to
pay bonuses to individuals who had served in the armed forces during
World War I. The court, in language that tracks the spirit of the posi-
tion embraced in Haman, if not its letter, stated that "it is well-settled
law that the public money cannot be used to pay a gratuity to an indi-
vidual when he is without legal claim to the money, and when it can-
not be fairly said the public good will be served by such payment."3 51
In this instance, the court argued, no valid public purpose was served
when a state paid a bonus to veterans, as opposed to one that might be
paid by the federal government under whose authority they served.
The court acknowledged that fulfilling the moral obligation might be
desirable. It stressed, however, that "our jurisprudence has not at-
tained that end. It knows only the obligation whose discharge may be
compelled by legal action."35 2
This approach had, however, an exceedingly short life span. In
1926 the court considered whether the legislature could authorize a
Mr. George Rietz, a student at the state university, to present a claim,
to the state board of examiners for injuries he had sustained.3 53 It
seems that Mr. Rietz, who on the first day of his enrollment was, un-
derstandably, "not familiar with the surroundings," was assigned to a
dormitory where "on the same floor and near his room were two doors
about two feet apart, one of which led to the bathroom and the other
into the elevator shaft."354 As a result:
[W]hen he undertook to go to the bathroom, through mistake he opened the
door leading to the elevator shaft, and, the shaft being unguarded and the
elevator above that floor at the time, he fell down the shaft to the bottom of
the pit and sustained serious, permanent injuries, on account of which he in-
curred large expenses, only a part of which has been repaid to him .... 355
Relying on the "gratuity" principle articulated three years earlier,
the secretary of state argued that the measure authorized a "gift" to
Rietz and did not, accordingly, serve a valid public purpose. This
350. Butte Miners' Union v. City of Butte, 194 P. 149, 151 (Mont. 1920).
351. State ex reL Mills v. Dixon, 213 P. 227, 233 (Mont. 1923).
352. I& Bonus legislation was common in the wake of the war, and provided the impe-
tus for a number of other cases whose results and doctrines are important for our
purposes. See infra text accompanying notes 358, 382-88, 669-72 and 702.
353. Mills v. Stewart, 247 P. 332, 333 (Mont. 1926).
354. Id.
355. Id. The decision does not indicate what sort of student Mr. Rietz was. The image
of a law student, deeply immersed in the nuances of a case and oblivious to his
surroundings, comes readily to mind.
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prompted the court to reexamine what constituted a "legal claim." It
indicated that:
[I]f, in advance of the injury, the state had, by general law, assumed liability
for the negligence of its agents in charge of the university buildings, there
would not be any dissent in the authorities from the conclusion that an appro-
priation to discharge such liability would be for a public purpose.
3 5 6
It rejected, however, the notion a preexisting declaration was re-
quired, expressly overruling that portion of previous decision:
We do not discover any provision of our Constitution which forbids the
Legislature to assume liability for injury resulting from the negligence of the
state's agent, whether the liability is assumed before or after the injury occurs,
and to say that the state may assume such liability but may not discharge it is
simply to make the law ridiculous.... Common sense is the essence of the
law, and that which is not good sense is not good law.3
5 7
This, as the Montana court subsequently noted, laid to rest any notion
"that a moral obligation was not sufficient to support an appropriation
of public money,"3 5 8 an observation included in a case that also made
clear that there could no longer be any dispute that state bonuses to
veterans also served a valid public purpose.
Two other cases central to Wakeley, Commissioners of Sedgwick
County v. Bunker359 and Bennett v. Fisher,36 0 are equally revealing.
Bunker, a Kansas case, was cited in the passage in which the Wakeley
court indicated that a moral obligation could arise in either of two situ-
ations, with the court quoting Bunker to the effect that "'the Legisla-
ture may in many cases pass retrospective laws to enforce previously
existing moral obligations.' "361 Bunker accordingly provided the
predicate for the court's observation that a moral obligation could
arise where there is an existing "obligation to do or perform the act or
duty prescribed thereby."36 2 The Bunker decision itself focused on
whether the residents of a strip of territory "detached" from one
county and incorporated into a second county should be relieved from
paying their proportionate share of bonded indebtedness incurred
while still part of the first county. Because of certain technical
problems with the applicable legislation, "[s]aid strip of territory was
therefore left by the legislature under a supposed moral obligation...
but without any legal means of enforcing such moral obligation."36 3
356. Id at 335.
357. I& The omitted portion of this quotation is a citation to United States v. United
States Realty, 163 U.S. 427 (1896), a case I discuss in some detail infra at text
accompanying notes 679-83.
358. State ex reL Graham v. Board of Examiners, 239 P.2d 283, 294 (Mont. 1952).
359. 16 Kan. 498 (1876).
360. 26 Iowa 497 (1868).
361. Wakeley v. Douglas County, 109 Neb. 396, 399, 191 N.W. 337, 338 (1922)(quoting
Commissoners of Sedgwick County v. Bunker, 16 Kan. 498, 504 (1876)).
362. Id-
363. Commissioners of Sedgwick County v. Bunker, 16 Kan. 498, 500 (1876).
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The court recognized, as indicated, that "the legislature may in many
cases pass retrospective laws to enforce previously existing moral obli-
gations."364 It also stated, seemingly in line with Haman, that "courts
cannot enforce merely moral obligations where no legal obligations
exist."s65 But it did so, within the contexts of the case before it, in a
manner that made Bunker strikingly similar to Wakeley:
[Ilf there was any such moral obligation the legislature should have known it,
and should by unmistakable language have made the act of 1873 broad enough
to provide for enforcing it. That is, they should have converted the moral
obligation into a legal obligation. But as they did not do so, although they had
the subject under consideration, it would seem that they did not intend that
such moral obligation should be enforced.3 6 6
The problem, then, was not the inability of the legislature to recognize
a moral obligation, but its failure to do so expressly, a defect that can-
not be attributed to the Unicameral in its drafting and passage of L.B.
272A.367
The only Kansas case to cite the major United States Supreme
Court case on moral obligation, United States v. Realty Co.,368 does not
change the analysis. In Winters v. Myers,36 9 the Kansas court held
that a legislative transfer of certain land was invalid since it "has the
effect of thus transferring the property of all the people, without com-
pensation or public advantage, to a few .... "370 Moral obligation, and
Realty Co., were cited by the dissenting justice as a basis for sustaining
the act.37 1 The majority opinion did not, however, discuss the issue.
The court's decision rested instead on the total lack of a public pur-
pose, a factor not present in the case of L.B. 272A. Indeed, the major-
ity seems to state that it would not have rejected a moral obligation
rationale, f there had been the slightest possibility that a public pur-
pose was at issue: "These considerations, however, relate only to the
wisdom of the law, and the question is simply one of legislative power.
364. Id at 504.
365. Id at 503.
366. Id at 503-04.
367. In her reply brief the plaintiff in Haman argued that Bunker did not "speak[] to
the present situation where the Legislature in LB 272A seeks to discharge a
moral obligation to a particular group of citizens." Reply Brief of Plaintiff at 2
n.3, Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836 (1991)(No. 90-474). That may
be true in the strictest possible sense, since the Kansas court held that the mea-
sure in question did not state that it sought to fulfill a moral obligation. It would
not be accurate, however, to characterize Bunker as a case in which the Kansas
court did not in fact recognize an inherent lower to do exactly what L.B. 272A
sought to do.
368. 163 U.S. 427 (1896). I discuss Realty Co. and the state cases interpreting and ap-
plying that decision in considerable detail. See infra text accompanying notes
679-728.
369. 140 P. 1033 (Kan. 1914).
370. Id. at 1038.
371. Id. at 1039 (Mason, J., dissenting).
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If the act is within the power of the Legislature, it must be obeyed."372
Bennett, in turn, was simply cited in Wakeley as part of the court's
discussion of Bunker. In Bennett the Iowa Supreme Court sustained a
"curative" act involving the creation of a road where initial approval
was given by the county board of supervisors "[b]ut the commissioner
to view the same, was appointed by the clerk in vacation, and not by
the board."373 The court sustained the act, stressing that "[t]he recit-
als of the act in question are undoubtedly true, and its alleged motive,
to wit, the prevention of trouble and litigation, was unquestionably its
real motive."3 74 It also indicated that "such legislation is sustainable,
although it may injuriously affect particular cases."37 5
The court's discussion is troubling when transposed into the L.B.
272A dialogue from at least one point of view, the dispute about what
the "real motive" of the legislature was when it approved that mea-
sure. However, that debate, which I pursue elsewhere in this article,
has no bearing on the proposition for which Bennett is cited in
Wakeley: the circumstances within which a legislature may recognize
a moral obligation, provided that is in fact what it is doing. In this
regard it is worth noting that the Iowa Court's discussion of retroac-
tive legislation did not even hint at, much less expressly speak in
terms of, an absolute need for a preexisting obligation:
There is nothing in our Constitution prohibiting, in terms, the enactment
of retrospective laws, and such laws are valid unless they violate some of the
provisions of the National or State Constitution. To deny the legislature the
power in any case to pass a retrospective law would be attended with very
serious mischief.
The interests of justice and the general good of the community frequently
require and sanction such legislation, although it should be borne in mind by
the legislator that such exercises of power can only be defended upon princi-
ple and sustained in law when they are not directed against the vested rights
of particular individuals or classes, but have their origin in a just regard for
the public welfare.3
7 6
Arguably, L.B. 272A offered a perfect example of a retroactive
measure enacted in "[t]he interests of justice and [for] the general
good of the community." Moreover, it is quite apparent that the Iowa
Court would not have viewed its version of article III, section 18, as the
sort of constitutional provision to which it was referring, and that it
would have rejected an assertion that the extraction of taxes raises the
specter of an impairment of "vested rights." Six years after Bennett,
the Iowa Court was asked to determine if the Iowa General Assembly
could retroactively authorize various public corporations to levy spe-
372. Id- at 1036.
373. Bennett v. Fisher, 26 Iowa 497, 499 (1868).
374. Id at 501.
375. Id.
376. Id at 500-01.
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cial taxes in excess of statutory limits to pay judgments that had been
entered against them. Applying the principles articulated in Bennett,
the court rejected both an attempt to characterize the act as a "local or
special law" and the contention that vested rights were impaired. Cit-
ing prior case law, the court disposed of the special law challenge by
observing that "the true construction of the act [is] that it operate[s]
upon a particular condition, and attache[s] to it certain consequences,
and that, whenever that condition exist[s], the consequences fol-
low." 3 77 The same situation, of course, prevailed regarding L.B. 272A:
it was triggered by a particular condition, a "deposit," and attached to
that condition certain consequences, redemption if and when the
N.D.I.G.C. could cover the indebtedness. On the issue of a vested
right, the court bluntly rejected the claim: "the legalizing of a tax,
which but for the legalizing act was invalid and not capable of being
enforced, does not interfere with any vested right of the tax-payer."37 8
The court stressed that the plaintiff would have had a right to request
recovery of the taxes before the retroactive measure was passed. But
the court emphasized that:
[ULpon the regular levy of taxes in pursuance of a legislative enactment, his
rights in this respect are changed. His right to resist the payment of the taxes
is gone. The statute has created a liability to pay where none existed before its
passage, and this is so whether the act authorizing the tax levies be passed
prior thereto or is an act legalizing a tax previously levied. In either case the
power of the General Assembly to pass the law is the same. If it has no power
to legalize a tax already levied without authority, it has no power to confer the
authority in the first instance.3 7 9
The Iowa court was actually considering the underlying question,
whether the taxes could be levied, for the first time; the legislation at
issue had been passed in response to a prior decision invalidating the
levies,38 0 a situation that paralleled that of L.B. 272A, which was itself
a legislative response to the court's holdings in Security Investment
Co. and Weimer. The Iowa decisions did not, admittedly, focus ex-
pressly on notions of moral obligation, but dealt instead with certain
dynamics of retroactive legislative acts, a distinction the plaintiff
pointed out in Haman.3 81 Any doubts about the willingness of the
Iowa court to recognize such obligations were, however, emphatically
laid to rest one year after Wakeley was decided in Grout v. Kendall.382
Moreover, the court's reasoning in Grout established that the "pre-
377. Iowa R.R. Land v. Soper, 39 Iowa 112, 115 (1874).
378. 1& at 121.
379. Id
380. Iowa R.R. Land v. County of Sac, 39 Iowa 124 (1873).
381. Reply Brief of Plaintiff at 2 n.3, Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836
(1991)(No. 90-474)("The [Bennett] case was strictly one of retroactivity and did
not involve any discussion of moral obligations.").
382. 192 N.W. 529 (Iowa 1923).
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existing obligation" precept alluded to in Bennett was, as I have al-
ready stressed, a guide rather than a command.
The specific issue in Grout was whether the Iowa legislature could
enact "bonus" legislation for the benefit of state residents who served
in the armed forces during World War I. The funds in question were
to be provided through the issuance and sale of $22 million in bonds.
Ten constitutional challenges were lodged, the majority of which
arose from the provision of the constitution dealing with state debts.
In language strikingly similar to that employed in Haman, the court
characterized the case before it as one in which "[t]he construction
which appellant puts upon this section is that it prohibits the creation
of any indebtedness regardless of its public purpose or moral obliga-
tion, if it operates 'in aid of any individual, association, or corpora-
tion.' "383 The court stressed that the prohibition regarding "giving or
loaning" credit to individuals, associations, or corporations was only
one section of a comprehensive state debts article. It held, accord-
ingly, that the bonds were a "primary" indebtedness and had been ap-
propriately passed by the legislature and ratified by the electorate as
required by the operative constitutional provisions.
It is the court's discussion of moral obligation, however, that is of
primary interest. The court summarized the position against the act
as follows: "[t]hat the legislation makes appropriation for the benefit
only of individuals and not for a public purpose; that the state is under
no legal or moral obligation to make such appropriation; that, there-
fore, the appropriation is a mere gratuity."38 4 The court conceded the
truth of the first two propositions, and then rejected them, stressing
that "[t]he analogies of private law in respect to valuable consideration
are not particularly helpful in defining the legislative power to appro-
priate moneys for specified purposes."38 5 It then stated that "[t]he
great body of the obligations of a state are moral rather than legal,"386
and that "[i]t has been quite uniformly held by the courts that the
determination of such questions inheres largely in the legislative
power."38 7 It also soundly rejected any notion that any "pre-existing"
obligations are required: "Now, if there can be, in such cases, no legal
obligation without legislative enactment, and no legislative enactment
without pre-existing legal obligation, our reasoning is lost in the vi-
cious circle."388
It seems, accordingly, that not only is there more to Wakeley than
383. Id. (quoting IowA CONST. art. VII, § 1).
384. Id. at 533.
385. Id. This observation is also of interest in light of the Haman court's analysis of
the "credit of the state" issue. See infra text accompanying notes 633-59.
386. Grout v. Kendall, 192 N.W. 529, 533 (Iowa 1923).
387. Id.
388. Id. at 535.
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the Haman court would have us believe, but there is also a different
world view extant on the subject of moral obligation. That vision of
government action and court acceptance of those decisions is obviously
at odds with the one articulated in Haman. The fact that a more toler-
ant approach prevails in Montana, Kansas, and Iowa, jurisdictions
whose decisions provided important underpinnings for Wakeley, does
not mean, however, that this same perspective prevailed in Nebraska
in the wake of Wakeley, even assuming, as I certainly do, that there is
more to that decision than the Haman court would like us to know.
There were in fact a large number of other cases decided by the court
that bear, either directly or indirectly on this issue, only two of which
the Haman court discusses and only then, as we shall see, incom-
pletely. Moreover, to the extent those cases offer support for Ha-
man-and many of them clearly do-the rationales on which they are
predicated provide important insights into just why Weaver and its
particular approach to substantive due process are ultimately indis-
pensable elements in any proper explanation of Haman.
B. Moral Obligation in Nebraska: The Pre-Haman View
One of the decisions the Haman court does discuss is Cox v.
State,38 9 a case the court characterizes as one "wherein the factual sit-
uation parallels the case at bar."390 That assessment is at best tenu-
ous, and the reasons why it is specious play a direct role in the ability
of the court to cite Cox for the proposition that "[w]hile the Legisla-
ture may make classifications, it cannot do so arbitrarily and unrea-
sonably. A reasonable classification must operate on all within the
class." 391
The focus in Cox was on L.B. 20, an act "permitting Thomas Bailey
et al to sue the state."392 The court characterized L.B. 20 as a measure
that "created a liability in favor of this plaintiff for the tort of the
state's agents and servants, resulting in an injury to her while she was
traveling on a highway under the control of the state."393 The court
found that L.B. 20 violated the ban on special legislation; "[t]he legisla-
ture is without force to pass a special law creating a liability in behalf
of an individual and authorizing such individual to institute suit, in the
absence of a general statute providing liability on the part of the state
for the negligence of its agents and servants." 94
The court stressed that the measure suffered from two flaws, both
of which seem at first blush to bear directly on the issues posed in
389. 134 Neb. 751, 279 N.W. 482 (1938).
390. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 710, 467 N.W.2d 836, 845 (1991).
391. Id.
392. L.B. 20, 1937 Neb. Laws 455.
393. Cox v. State, 134 Neb. 751, 758, 279 N.W. 482, 486 (1938).
394. Id. at 755, 279 N.W. at 485.
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Haman. The first problem, dealing with the general question of a
state's liability for the torts of its agents, arose from the retroactive
nature of the act. As the court stressed, the constitution indicates that
"[t]he state may sue and be sued, and the Legislature shall provide by
law in what manner and in what courts suits shall be brought."395 The
measure at issue in Cox was enacted "under this provision," rendering
it "passed and intended as... a special law in substance and form,"396
permitting Cox alone to initiate a suit to recover for her damages.
This posed problems, since "in order to impose a liability on the state,
a law must be passed which imposes such liability equally and uni-
formly in favor of all persons, for future acts of negligence ... ."397 A
second difficulty arose, in turn, because of the particular limitations of
article III, section 18, given that the act constituted a "special law"
where an otherwise "general law can be made applicable." As the
court stressed, "[t]o uphold this legislation would require individuals,
similarly situated, to knock at the door of the legislature and ask that
an exception be made in their particular cases, while others, less fortu-
nate, may not be able to obtain the relief sought."398
It would be a mistake, however, to read this as a general admoni-
tion that the state could not enact, and that the court would not sus-
tain, legislation that compensated a named individual or class of
individuals for specified injuries the state believed it had either a legal
or moral obligation to redress. The court intimated in Cox that there
could in fact be circumstances within which a "classification" that
might otherwise run afoul of article III, section 18 would be sustained:
If any basis for the classification can be said to exist, it must be found in the
peculiar facts and circumstances of the injuries sustained by this plaintiff.
Legislative Bill No. 20 discloses nothing unique or peculiar in the circum-
stances of the alleged injury which would serve to distinguish it, either in a
legal or moral sense, from any other wrongful act or commission of the agents
or servants of the state. The act provides a special exemption in favor of this
plaintiff-the right to recover for damages-which it denies to all other per-
sons similarly situated.3 9 9
There is nothing in this discussion indicating that it would be im-
proper for the legislature to recognize distinctive personal needs or,
for that matter, to create a classification that is in effect closed. More-
over, this indication that "unique" or "peculiar" circumstances could
support legislative discharge of either a legal or a moral obligation re-
mains "intimation" rather than documented fact in Cox only because
the court did not there cite previous legislative acts or court decisions
illustrating the phenomenon. Those cases, some of which were
395. NEB. CONST. art V, § 22.
396. Cox v. State, 134 Neb. 751, 753, 279 N.W. 482, 484 (1938).
397. Id at 754, 279 N.W. at 485 (emphasis added).
398. Id- at 758, 279 N.W. at 486-87.
399. Id at 758-59, 279 N.W. at 487.
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brought to the Haman court's attention, did exist. In State ex rel.
Sayre v. Moore,400 for example, the court considered whether the leg-
islature could, retroactively, reimburse Scotts Bluff County for the
costs incurred for a completed criminal trial. The court stated:
True, there is no legal obligation resting on the state to pay such expenses, but
the power of the legislature to appropriate money is not limited by the legal
obligations of the state .... "Certain expenditures are not only absolutely
necessary to the existence of a government but, as a matter of policy, it may
sometimes be proper and wise to assume other burdens, which rest entirely
upon considerations of honor, gratitude, or charity."'4 0 1
The court made it clear that the functional effect of the appropria-
tion was to make the state an "eleemosynary" institution: "[t]he ap-
propriation of this money-a gift, in fact-was within the power of the
legislature .... ,,402 It also stressed, as it has in any number of cases,
that the wisdom of the action was not an issue: "This appropriation
may be unjust. In making it, the legislature may have acted unwisely.
But of these things the legislature itself is the sole judge. The courts
cannot inquire into either the motive or justness of the law. Their
only concern is with its legality."403 The court was not speaking here
of a moral obligation created "only" by virtue of a pre-existing state
promise to reimburse Scotts Bluff County for the costs of the trial. It
recognized, rather, the power of the legislature to "'assume other bur-
dens, which rest entirely upon considerations of honor, gratitude, or
charity' ... "404 The appropriation sustained in Sayre was then, using
the words of the Haman court, an eleemosynary act entirely within
the power of the legislature, a "gift" whose wisdom was not a proper
concern of the court.
The allocation of state funds to a city or county does not, of course,
stand in the same stead as an appropriation that will ultimately be
placed in private hands, a point the plaintiff made in her reply brief in
response to the discussion of Sayre by the Intervenor. 405 It is interest-
ing to note, however, that the court in Sayre discussed in dicta, with no
400. 40 Neb. 854, 59 N.W. 755 (1894).
401. Id- at 860, 59 N.W. at 757 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATiSE ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL LIMITATIONS 608-09 (4th ed. 1878)).
402. Id.
403. Id. at 859, 59 N.W. at 757. The notion that neither the "wisdom" nor the "justice"
of a legislative act matter if the legislature has the power to act has been a consis-
tent theme in the court's decisions. See, eg., State ex reL Douglas v. Nebraska
Mortgage Fin. Fund, 204 Neb. 445, 458, 283 N.W.2d 12, 21 (1979).
404. State ex reL Sayre v. Moore, 40 Neb. 854, 858, 59 N.W. 755, 757 (1894)(emphasis
added).
405. See Reply Brief of Plaintiff at 3-4, Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836
(1991)(No. 90-474)(Sayre "readily distinguishable" because "reimbursement of a
governmental subdivision... is a far different matter"). The Intervenor, who
brought Sayre to the court's attention, see Brief of Intervenor-Defendant Security
Investment Company at 20-21 and 24 n.7, had already conceded that. Id. at 20 n.6.
The point, as made here, was that the Sayre court apparently recognized the
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hint of disfavor, precisely such an act, whereby the legislature in 1893
paid a claim that included both lost time and expenses and a "legisla-
tive gift or donation... contain[ing] an allowance for physical suffer-
ing."406 The act in question, House Roll Number 85 of 1893,407 noted
that one George Maurer, an enlisted man in the Nebraska National
Guard, had been "ordered out" by the governor "to protect the lives
and property of the citizens of the State of Nebraska... against the
depredations of the Sioux Indians who at said time were actively en-
gaged in a war against the government of the United States."408 Dur-
ing his active duty Maurer "was exposed to the cold and freezing
weather... and without any fault on his part, contracted rheumatism
which soon became chronic, from which he suffered great physical
pain and incapacitated him from work and preventing him from fol-
lowing his vocation and earning a living .... "4o9
The Sayre court, drawing on the line of analysis developed with
regard to the reimbursement of Scotts Bluff County, made clear its
belief that it was well within the power of the legislature to make this
"gift or donation." That action obviously differed in material respects
from the waiver of liability condemned in Cox, since the legislation at
issue in that case did not make a "gift" by paying the claim, but
merely gave Reeta Cox an opportunity to litigate it. It also provided
more detail than the measure at issue in Cox, detail that established
the "peculiar facts and circumstances" that provided the "basis for the
classification." The device implicitly recognized in Sayre is, accord-
ingly, simultaneously more expansive than the sovereign immunity
waiver at issue in Cox and much more in line with the essence of
moral obligation, since it rested entirely on notions of gratitude and
compassion, as opposed to simply allowing a party to press, in the face
of active opposition by the state, a disputed claim.
Moreover, the approach embodied in Maurer's case represented a
common device during the period prior to the creation of the Sundry
Claims Board in 1943.410 Thus, for example, one finds specific, in-
dependent appropriations in 1939 for the "benefit" of Lillian Irene
Smoyer,41 1 Ina F. Wathen,412 Joe Murray,413 and Jerome J. Brazda.414
power of the legislature to honor a moral obligation toward a private actor, an
argument to which the plaintiff never responded.
406. State ex reL Sayre v. Moore, 40 Neb. 854, 862, 59 N.W. 755, 758 (1894).
407. 1893 Neb. Laws 460.
408. I&
409. Id.
410. L.B. 5, 1943 Neb. Laws 432 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-8,236 to 8239 (1987)).
Many aspects of the measure were subsequently rendered unnecessary by the
passage of the State Tort Claims Act in 1969. 1969 Neb. Laws 2845 (codified at
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-8209 to 8232 (1987)).
411. L.B. 18, 1939 Neb. Laws 285.
412. L.B. 19, 1939 Neb. Laws 287.
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In 1941, measures were passed appropriating funds for Lela Brock4'5
and Opal Bredehoft.416 The appropriation for Mr. Murray in particu-
lar reflected a discharge of moral obligation since, unlike most such
measures, his situation did not present a personal physical injury or a
need to provide compensation to a surviving widow or children.
Rather, Mr. Murray was given the sum of two hundred and fifty dol-
lars to make him whole after he had been convicted and incarcerated
for two months for a robbery two other men subsequently confessed to
having committed. The measure was, as the legislature stressed,
passed in recognition of the fact that the usual ten dollar payment on
release was insufficient:
Joe Murray has been incalculably injured in his good name, honor and reputa-
tion by the atrocious mistake made by the peace officers, the prosecutors and
the courts of this state and in equity and good conscience, should, in a mea-
sure, be recompensed for the great wrong, humiliation and suffering which
this unfortunate miscarriage of justice has brought to him... 417
Sayre is perhaps the best, but certainly not the only example of a
decision in which the court recognized and affirmed what were essen-
tially moral justifications for legislative enactments. Two years before
Sayre, for example, the court was asked to assess the constitutionality
of a measure authorizing counties to levy taxes in excess of the
amount then authorized.418 The measure had been prompted by "[a]
great calamity [that] fell upon a number of counties of this state last
year, by which a large part or all of the crops were destroyed, and the
people left in a suffering condition."419 The court indicated that "[w]e
have been unable to find any provision of the constitution which pre-
vents the legislature from authorizing the electors of a county from
voting bonds for the relief of the unfortunate within its borders."420
This was, in the court's estimation, both a proper public objective and
a valid "police regulation," for it:
enable[d] persons in straitened circumstances, who, without fault upon their
part, have met with misfortune, and are thereby greatly impoverished, to start
anew in the cultivation of their farms, with a reasonable prospect of success,-
413. L.B. 173, 1939 Neb. Laws 288.
414. L.B. 420, 1939 Neb. Laws 291.
415. L.B. 398, 1941 Neb. Laws 454.
416. L.B. 426, 1941 Neb. Laws 456.
417. L.B. 173, Preamble, 1939 Nb. Laws 288, 290.
418. House Roll No. 284, 1891 Neb. Laws 310.
419. In re House Roll No. 284, 31 Neb. 505, 511, 48 N.W. 275, 276 (1891).
420. fRE Under a strict reading of the theories originally advanced by the plaintiff in
Haman, and arguably embraced by the court in Weaver, due process would pro-
hibit this sort of relief. That rather parsimonious reading of the due process guar-
antee does not, however, seem to have been embraced, even by the court of the
1930's. For a general discussion, see David Fellman, Due Process of Law in Ne-
brask" History and Underlying Conceptions, 9 NEB. L. BuLL. 223 (1930). For a
discussion in the context of a specific issue, see Lester B. Orfield, Old Age Assist-
ance: With Special Reference to Nebraska, 17 NEB. L. BuLL. 287 (1938).
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in other words, from being dependent, to soon become able to provide for all
their own wants.421
Clearly, it did not offend the constitution for the legislature to author-
ize "gifts" to private actors.
In 1909 the legislature passed an act authorizing Sherman County
to pay a contractor for the materials he had furnished for the con-
struction of a bridge.422 The measure had been prompted by Gibson v.
Sherman County, a successful taxpayer suit that "reversed the order
of the county board allowing the claim because there were no funds
with which to pay the claim legally available at the time the plaintiff
entered into the contract with the county. . . ."423 That result was
dictated by a statute enacted in 1905, which barred any recovery:
for any article, public improvement, material, service or labor contracted for
or ordered in contravention of any statutory limitation, or when there are or
were no funds legally available at the time, with which to pay for the same, or
in the absence of a statute expressly authorizing such contract.4 -
The court rejected the argument that the legislative authorization of
the payment improperly tried to reverse the judgment of the district
court; "[t]he subsequent act of the Legislature was not a determination
that the district court was in error in so holding, but its purpose and
effect was to remove the bar to the remedy."425 The fact that the pay-
ment was for an act that was authorized but in fact technically illegal
was no problem, and the explanation provided by the court, while
lengthy, is worth repeating in light of what was argued and accepted
in Haman:
The county has received full value which, if the contract is invalid, still im-
poses a moral obligation to remunerate plaintiff, and there is no doubt under
the authorities that it was competent for the Legislature to remove the techni-
cal bar of the statute, and in doing so would not exercise any judicial function.
It is equally clear that this statute does not deprive the county of property
without due process of law. The county has not resisted the payment of this
claim. By its constituted authorities it has always recognized its moral obliga-
tion to pay the value of the goods received from the plaintiff and used by it for
the public benefit. The Legislature has removed the only legal impediment to
so doing, and it ought not to be prevented from doing what justice and equity
require. The right of a taxpayer to appeal from the allowance of claims by the
county board was not given by the Legislature for such purpose.4 2 6
Obviously, a claim predicated on a contractual relationship pro-
vides a different set of considerations than those presented by L.B.
272A. Whatever "contractual" rights might have existed in the con-
text of the guaranty fund were the result of relationships negotiated
421. In re House Roll No. 284, 31 Neb. 505, 511-12, 48 N.W. 275, 276-77 (1891).
422. House Roll No. 418, 1909 Neb. Laws 598.
423. 97 Neb. 79, 83, 149 N.W. 107, 108 (1914).
424. Senate File No. 13, 1905 Neb. Laws 301-02, (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 23-336-
38 (1987)).
425. Gibson v. Sherman County, 97 Neb. 79, 85, 149 N.W. 107, 109 (1914).
426. Id.
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and entered into by purely private parties. Gibson is nevertheless
compelling in the vision the court offers of an approach to legislative
acts within which "justice and equity" are of at least as much impor-
tance as "law." It is this wider perspective that animated the court in
cases like Sayre and Gibson and provided the impetus for legislative
approval of L.B. 272A. That image of a just and compassionate society,
as those cases and a proper reading of Wakeley and Cox indicate, rec-
ognized the propriety of a legislative response to individuals with a
"moral right to the remedy given." That perspective, however, eroded
over time in certain important respects in a series of decisions that,
while never expressly abandoning these principles, nevertheless quali-
fied them in ways that had a significant, albeit largely hidden impact
on the result in Haman. One element of Gibson, the notion of "con-
tract" and the role that a "contract" can play in discussions of public
policy, is especially important, since Cox was by no means the first
case to reach the court in which the propriety of a legislative act grant-
ing an individual the right to sue the state was at issue.
In 1903, for example, Lancaster County was given the authority to
sue the state to recover certain tax funds that had been on deposit
with a bank that failed and had been paid to the state by mistake. The
court recognized the authority of the legislature to waive the state's
immunity for "claims arising from contract or some direct legal obliga-
tion, and not claims arising from tort."427 On remand, however,
"through mistake and inadvertence and without the knowledge of
Lancaster county officials, the case was dismissed."428 A second legis-
lative authorization to sue followed, with the state responding that the
statute of limitations had run and that the legislative resolution did
not expressly waive that defense. The court rejected the theory,
stressing that the language of the measure imposed a "duty [on] the
court to brush aside technical defenses and to act in like manner as if
the parties were seeking to amicably settle their controversy, and 'as
upon the testimony right and justice may require.' "429 The court then
ruled on the merits, supporting the county's claim that "[i]n justice,
equity, and good conscience, which is all that the statute authorizing
this suit requires, that amount should be returned by the state to the
County ... ."430
In 1913 the legislature authorized a power company to bring suit
against the state to recover funds paid to the state "upon the belief and
upon the assurance of the secretary of the [state board of irrigation,
highways and drainage], that there was water in the streams subject to
427. Lancaster County v. State, 74 Neb. 211, 213, 104 N.W. 187, 188 (1905).
428. Lancaster County v. State, 97 Neb. 95, 97, 149 N.W. 331, 331 (1914).
429. Id. at 98, 149 N.W. at 332 (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. § 1180 (1913)).
430. Id. at 100, 149 N.W. at 333.
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appropriation." 43 ' The company had relied on the statements of the
board secretary in filing two applications subsequently determined to
be precluded by a prior application.432 The court recognized the au-
thority of the legislature to suspend "the ordinary rules of law which
prevail in controversies between individuals" and authorize a case to
"be determined upon equitable principles based upon justice and
right."433 Moreover, the court stressed that this was "a special pro-
ceeding by virtue of special statutory provisions, and the respective
rights of the parties are to be determined by the rules therein pre-
scribed."434 There was, nevertheless, no mention of the bar against
special legislation; the measure, which granted special privileges and
created a permanently closed class of one company, was sustained
"under all the circumstances [of] justice and right as well as equity and
good conscience, [which] would seem to dictate that the money be
refunded."435
Two years later the court invalidated an act authorizing a suit to
recover for the loss of cattle after a supply of water had been negli-
gently cut off by a state surveying party.43 6 The employees had com-
mitted a trespass and the actions that led to the loss were outside the
scope of their employment. The court stressed that "fj]ustice and
right do not require innocent taxpayers or the public at large to bear
such burdens, created solely, as they were, by private persons, but the
state has made provision for the punishment of trespassers and for the
redress of private wrongs."437 Commonwealth Power was distinguish-
able, since that case was predicated on "plain principles of equity lead-
ing to justice and right," whereas the measure at issue proposed the
"radical and alarming step" of subjecting the state "to a one-sided 'spe-
cial proceeding,' where the state, though committing no wrong nor vi-
olating any obligation nor neglecting any duty, is denied the protection
of both law and equity and held liable for damages caused by the
wrongful acts of individual trespassers ... ,"438 That rule did not ap-
ply in City of Chadron v. State, a case decided five years later, how-
ever, since "[tihe act of destruction arose in and because of the
performance of the work itself, and not aside from its scope." 43 9
431. Commonwealth Power Co. v. State, 104 Neb. 439, 442, 177 N.W. 745, 746 (1920).
432. Commonwealth Power Co. v. State Bd. Irrigation, Highways & Drainage, 94 Neb.
613, 143 N.W. 937 (1913). This reliance, and the court's tolerance of it, conjures up
images of the Haman court's misplaced invocation of the "ignorance of the law is
no excuse" doctrine and the more lenient approach embraced in Preisendorf
Transport. See supra text accompanying notes 122-35.
433. Commonwealth Power Co. v. State, 104 Neb. 439, 442, 177 N.W. 745, 746 (1920).
434. Id
435. Id at 443, 177 N.W. at 746.
436. Benda v. State, 109 Neb. 132, 190 N.W. 211 (1922).
437. I& at 136, 190 N.W. at 212.
438. Id- at 137, 190 N.W. at 212-13.
439. 115 Neb. 650, 655, 214 N.W. 297, 300 (1927).
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Moreover, since the city had been expressly given the authority to sue
the state the normal rule that interest would not be awarded "against
a sovereign government unless its consent to pay interest has been
manifested by an act of its Legislature or by a lawful contract of its
executive officers" did not apply.440 The circumstances "justly ...
call[ed] for payment of interest [and] the state should not be exempted
from such payment by reason of its sovereignty."44 1
The distinctions that provide the final foundations for Cox begin to
emerge in a series of cases decided just prior to Weaver. In Shear v.
State the court barred a suit in tort authorized by the senate "for the
purpose of ascertaining and adjudicating [the] claim and the liability of
the state for the payment thereof."442 The court stressed that "[t]he
resolution simply gave the right to bring the action, but did not create
a cause of action."44 3 It then articulated the principle recognized in
Cox, that "[t]he Legislature has not by law granted to anyone the right
to recover against the state damages for negligence of any of its of-
ficers, agents or employees, and, until such legislation is enacted, no
recovery against the state can be had for such negligence."444 That
rule subsequently controlled the result in Kent v. State,445 a case cited
in Cox.
In MclVeel v. State,446 however, the court indicated that a different
set of considerations arose when the suit sounded in contract rather
than tort. The court indicated that a statutory provision in place prior
to the resolution authorizing the McNeel suit provided an "exclusive"
remedy for a contract claim, as distinguished from tort: "a claim in the
first class must be presented to the auditor with the right of appeal
from his decision and the second must be presented to a district court
with legislative authority to sue the state."447 The landscape was ex-
panded even further in Gledhill v. State,448 a case that also began with
a legislative authorization to sue when "the state built [a] temporary
bridge in a negligent manner and ... as a result of the method of
construction, the damage resulted." 4 9 The theory of recovery in this
instance, however, was slightly different; a claim that the state' had
taken private property without just compensation. The court held
that "[ilt would be unconscionable for the state, which ought to set an
example of just and fair dealing, to save money by the erection of a
440. Id. at 658, 215 N.W. at 138.
441. Id.
442. 117 Neb. 865, 866, 223 N.W. 130, 130 (1929).
443. Id. at 868, 223 N.W. at 131.
444. Id. at 869, 223 N.W. at 131.
445. 118 Neb. 501, 225 N.W. 672 (1929).
446. 120 Neb. 674, 234 N.W. 786 (1931).
447. I1 at 678, 234 N.W. at 788.
448. 123 Neb. 726, 243 N.W. 909 (1932).
449. Ia at 731, 243 N.W. at 912.
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cheap, inadequate, and temporary bridge for the public use, thereby
causing great damage to the owners of private property without
compensation."450
The various threads that converged in Cox seem, accordingly, to
indicate that a suit in tort would be proper where the state's direct
involvement is clear and the facts of the situation, as documented by
the legislature, demonstrate the "equity and justice" of the claim.
Where property rights are at stake, both considerations of justice and
the nature of property rights combine to allow the action to proceed.
In Shear for example, the court drew a distinction between that case
and cases like Lancaster County and Commonwealth Power, stressing
that "in each of those cases plaintiff could recover the money so paid
to the state, under the facts shown."45 ' It also stressed the property
dimensions of Lancaster County and City of Chadron, cases "where
[the] state had taken or received property wrongfully" and "was liable
for the amount so taken and received." 45 2 Finally, contract actions are
recognized both in light of the different nature of the rights at stake
and the provisions in the statutes allowing such claims to be presented
to the auditor, with a right of appeal from his decision. The point is
not, of course, to establish that any of these cases, alone or in combina-
tion, should have controlled the result in Haman, although they do
establish a series of principles that support the validity of L.B. 272A.
It is, rather, to demonstrate that the analytic matrix is substantially
broader and more complex than Haman would lead us to believe.
More importantly, these cases also belie the truth of the plaintiff's
contention that the four decisions she chose to discuss establish that
on "every" occasion that the court has entertained the issue "retroac-
tive legislation to compensate private individuals" has been found
unconstitutional.
C. When Is a Guaranty Not a Guaranty: Weaver and Hubbell Bank
These themes, and the sometimes inconsistent results that emerge
from the various cases, provide important insights into what actually
transpired in the other two cases actively argued in the Haman briefs,
Weaver and Hubbell Bank v. Bryan.4 53 Those two decisions were,
from one very important perspective, potentially the most important
precedents available to the court, for they both dealt with attempts by
450. Id. at 732, 243 N.W. at 912.
451. Shear v. State, 117 Neb. 865, 867, 223 N.W. 130, 131 (1929).
452. Id, at 868, 223 N.W. at 131.
453. 124 Neb. 51, 245 N.W. 20 (1932). Hubbell Bank is criticized in Note, Constitutional
Law-Limits of Police Power-Change of Economic Conditions Affecting Valid-
ity of Police Regulation, 1 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 402 (1933), and Recent Decisions,
Constitutional Law, Validity of Final Settlement Fund Laws, 19 VA. L. REv. 295
(1932).
[Vol. 71:1
MORAL OBLIGATION
the legislature to fashion a means to reimburse depositors for losses
incurred when the banks in which they had placed their funds failed.
Perhaps even more importantly, both arose from the inability of the
modern guaranty fund's predecessor, the Guarantee Fund Commis-
sion, to honor its commitments.45 4
The legislative act examined in Weaver, generally referred to in
the cases as Chapter 33,455 was an attempt to appropriate funds to pay
certain claims that the depositors guarantee fund could not satisfy.
The plaintiff in Haman characterized the "situation" in Weaver as
"nearly identical to that presented by LB 272A" and Chapter 33 as
"remarkably similar in its essentials to LB 272A."456 There were cer-
tain superficial similarities. Chapter 33 represented an attempt by the
legislature to appropriate up to $260,111.34 from the General Fund to
repay depositors for losses sustained in excess of the balances in the
then existing bank deposit guaranty fund. The court invalidated the
measure, finding a due process violation when the state "tak[es] ...
money belonging to one class to pay the claims of those of another
class" and that "[c]learly it has not yet come to pass that the state, in
its supervision of the banking business, has become an eleemosynary
institution." 45 7 These statements would seem to offer compelling ar-
guments against L.B. 272A, and it seems curious that the court makes
so little use of them and of Weaver itself, other than the gibe about
the state as eleemosynary institution. But a careful examination of
both the actual terms of the act challenged, the guaranty funds provi-
sions upon which the legislative action was predicated, and the core
constitutional rationale in Weaver make it clear why the court de-
cided it was best to avoid a detailed explication of that case.
As a threshold matter, Chapter 33 was completely devoid of any
references to an overarching public purpose. It spoke only of
"claims," and made no attempt to provide the wider context and more
expansive purposes encapsulated in L.B. 272A. Given the intellectual
foundations of Weaver, the fact that the measure was silent regarding
a wider public purpose may not have mattered; the court was clearly
reluctant, as a basic philosophical matter, to accept the implicit moral
obligation. Nevertheless, the silence of the legislature on the general
issue of public purpose, and the differences between the prior guar-
454. The original guaranty mechanism was created in 1909. House Roll No. 423, 1909
Neb. Laws 66,87. The version at issue in Weaver and Hubbell Bank was passed in
1923. See House Roll No. 272, 1923 Neb. Laws 438 (repealed 1929).
455. House Roll No. 586, 1929 Neb. Laws 139.
456. Brief of Plaintiff at 14, Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836 (1991)(No.
90-474) (emphasis added).
457. Weaver v. Koehn, 120 Neb. 114, 117, 231 N.W. 703, 704 (1930). Cf. Graham v.
Worthington, 146 N.W.2d 626, 639 (Iowa 1966)(no denial of due process '%y the
enforced payment on [plaintiff's] part of any portion of the tax fund which may
be applied to payment of claims under the [Tort Claims] Act").
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anty fund and the N.D.G.I.C., are important in at least one respect
that bears directly on the notion that the moral obligation must some-
how be "preexisting."
The purpose of the N.D.G.I.C. is to "provide a mechanism whereby
the shareholdings, savings, and deposits of any member or depositor
... shall be protected or guaranteed up to amounts which are estab-
lished by the corporation. .".."458 The provisions of the earlier guar-
anty fund were, however, less sweeping: the guaranty fund
"protect[ed]" depositors, and the Guaranty Fund Commission simply
"assist[ed] in conserving and administering" the Fund.45 9 Admittedly,
it was implicit within the statutory scheme that the "protection" af-
forded would be complete. The earlier guaranty fund provided a
mechanism by which the initial and annual assessments levied could
be supplemented by special assessments.460 Nevertheless, the statutes
creating the N.D.G.I.C. imposed a positive obligation on the member
institutions to "display at each place of business maintained by it a
sign or signs indicating that its member or depositor accounts are pro-
tected by the corporation and shall include in all of its advertisements
a statement to the effect that its member or depositor accounts are
protected by the corporation." 46 1 There was no similar requirement in
the statutes creating the prior fund. Indeed, as the court itself recog-
nized, whatever public notoriety the 1923 amendments might have at-
tained was in large measure created by the banks themselves through
a massive, post-passage advertising campaign.462 This, as we shall see,
is a matter of no small importance to a court that will in Weaver stress
the extent to which government, at least in its estimation, is obligated
to leave people to the consequences of their own decisions and devices.
Moreover, the presence or absence of an express declaration of
public purpose is far from irrelevant. This factor was brought home
by the treatment afforded Wakeley in the only jurisdiction to cite that
case, other than Nebraska in Hubbell Bank. That state was, interest-
ingly enough, New Hampshire.4 63 In 1959 the New Hampshire
Supreme Court was asked to render an opinion on the constitutional-
ity of a measure "to reimburse innocent depositors of Valley Trust
Company, for losses suffered .... "464 The court responded by indicat-
ing that the measure would violate the constitutional ban on taxation
458. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-17,128 (1989)(emphasis added).
459. See, § 44, 1909 Neb. Laws 66, 87 (repealed 1930), and House Roll No. 272, § 1, 1923
Neb. Laws 438, 438 (repealed 1929).
460. House Roll No. 272, § 27, 1923 Neb. Laws 438, 452-53.
461. NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-17,144 (1989).
462. See Abie State Bank v. Weaver, 119 Neb. 153, 156-57, 227 N.W. 922, 923 (1929).
463. That is to say, the New Hampshire that was home to Justice Souter, whose opin-
ions the court embraced in Haman for no discernable purpose other than the
pleasure of quoting him.
464. Opinion of the Justices, 153 A.2d 407, 407 (N.H. 1959).
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to aid private parties. Citing a prior opinion, it stated that
"'[u]nconditional aid is not a proper charge of government to be met
by the taxpayers.' "465 It then declared, citing Weaver, that "[blanks,
like insurance companies and utilities, are regulated in the public in-
terest but their failure or financial losses do not create a state debt to
depositors, policyholders, and stockholders which can be met by the
appropriation of public funds."466 Two years later a different mea-
sure, also directed toward the relief of the Valley Trust Company de-
positors, came before the court.467  It posed two choices: an
assessment against other banks, or the use of tax funds. Citing its first
opinion on the matter, the court rejected the tax option. It then indi-
cated, in language that echoed Hubbell Bank, that the assessment
against the other institutions would "select an arbitrary class of tax-
payers to contribute to a single bank. This would place upon the con-
tributing banks the unequal burden of paying more than their just
share of governmental expense."468
These two decisions seem, at least on their face, to provide support
for the results in Weaver and Hubbell Bank and, by implication, Ha-
man. It would appear, however, that the flaw in the measures was not
so much its objective as the failure to articulate a credible public pur-
pose. In 1937, for example, the New Hampshire court was asked if it
would be constitutional to "pledge the full faith and credit of the state
to guarantee the payment of bonds . . .for the purpose of raising
money to construct a dam ... "469 The dam would allow a private
company to generate electric power, an objective that required the
court to answer whether "in reality [it] proposes to grant public aid to
private industry[,] [t]o the extent of such a purpose it would be inva-
lid."470 The court, in language that raises but does not directly pose
the specter of moral obligation, indicated that "[t]here is no power of
the Legislature to pass 'wholesome and reasonable' laws if they are
'repugnant or contrary to' the Constitution."471 The court then ex-
465. I& at 408 (quoting In re Opinion of the Justices, 190 A. 425, 428 (N.H. 1936)).
466. I& The mention of insurance companies by the court is interesting in light of
another, little discussed act that has been passed by the Nebraska legislature, the
Nebraska Property and Liability Insurance Guaranty Association Act. See L.B.
722, 1971 Neb. Laws 1 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-2402 - 2409 (1987)). L.B.
272A noted that the enactment of this measure "has allowed state funds by
means of premium tax credits to be used to protect policyholders in insolvent
insurance companies, and the same principle should be extended to depositors in
insolvent industrial companies." L.B. 272A, § 2 5. Time and space do not allow
me to explore the implications of this, either for the validity of Haman or the
continuing viability of the insurance association guaranty.
467. Opinion of the Justices, 170 A.2d 125 (N.H. 1961).
468. Id. at 126.
469. In re Opinion of the Justices, 190 A. 425, 427 (N.H. 1937).
470. Id
471. Id.
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amined various aspects of the measure, guided by the principles that
"indirect" aid to a private actor would not invalidate an otherwise
proper public purpose and that legislative declarations of purpose
would" 'be accepted as true unless incompatible with its meaning and
effect.' "472 The court recognized that its discussion of the issues
might induce the legislature to alter its approach: "You are not to un-
derstand that we think a finding of a purpose of private benefit to
which public benefit is incidental, in connection with the project,
ought to be made."473 It concluded the opinion, nevertheless, with
these observations:
Otherwise stated, if development of electric energy in the use of the water of
the river as promotive of the state's industrial and economic welfare is the
controlling element of consideration and is in mind as the inducement and
goal sought by the contracts, they may properly be entered into. If the partic-
ular utilities are in mind, to be aided in the improvement and increase of their
water power, which they are to pay for through the use of the state's credit,
the agency's power to contract therefor has not been granted.4 7
4
This theme-the need for and virtually conclusive effect of a decla-
ration of public purpose-subsequently played an important role in a
series of cases dealing with the issue of industrial development. Those
decisions established two things: that the determination as to whether
a particular project is "'of public use and benefit'" is an" 'inquiry not
of law, but of fact,' "475 and that "valid" findings on this question, ini-
tially by the legislature in authorizing the program and then by the
city implementing it, are entitled to great weight.476 Legislative find-
ings are not dispositive; they "have no magical quality to make valid
that which is invalid but they are entitled to weight in construing the
statute and in determining whether the statute promotes a public pur-
pose under the Constitution."477 The review is, nevertheless, deferen-
tial rather than searching: "[u]nless a court can clearly see that a law
purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health and
morals has no relation to those objects, it cannot set it aside as uncon-
stitutional and void."4 7 8 "Any fair reason" will sustain the act.479
Thus, the only state court to ever cite Wakeley in the manner that the
Haman court would have us view that decision embraces a view of its
obligations and enforces rules of constitutional construction that are
diametrically opposed to those the Haman court invokes.
A second factual distinction between Weaver and Haman was that
472. I& at 429 (quoting Lajoie v. Miliken, 136 N.E. 419, 423 (Mass. 1922)).
473. Id- at 431.
474. Id
475. Opinion of the Justices, 207 A.2d 574, 577 (N.H. 1965)(quoting Conway v. New
Hampshire Water Resources Bd., 199 A. 83, 90 (N.H. 1938)).
476. Opinion of the Justices, 288 A.2d 697, 699-700 (N.H. 1972).
477. Velishka v. Nashua, 106 A.2d 571, 573 (N.H. 1954).
478. State v. Roberts, 69 A. 722, 723 (N.H. 1908)(emphasis added).
479. Coming Glass Works v. Max Dichter Co., 161 A.2d 569, 573 (N.H. 1960).
[Vol. 71:1
MORAL OBLIGATION
Chapter 33 was designed to compensate depogitors for the loss of funds
placed in banks that had already failed and that the depositors, at the
time of their decision, knew had failed. The Weaver court began its
opinion with that observation, stressing that "their money... was de-
posited by them therein while the banks were closed and were being
operated by the guaranty fund commission."48 0 L.B. 272A, on the
other hand, was intended to provide compensation for funds entrusted
to a closely regulated institution prior to any public knowledge that
the institutions or the corporation that "insured" them were at risk.
Indeed, funds were deposited in many instances at a time when the
Department of Banking was actively concealing the suspect condition
of Commonwealth. Those deposits were made in the face of a statu-
tory mandate that the "insurance guaranty" be displayed and adver-
tised. And they were made during the course of a consistent pattern
of official state action and inaction that, while not perhaps meeting the
"legal" thresholds imposed by the State Tort Claims Act or N.D.I.G.C.,
was certainly consistent with what L.B. 272A argued was a preexisting
moral obligation to make good promises statutorily impelled.
The legislative actions examined in Hubbell Bank were, like those
construed in Weaver, also clearly distinguishable from those taken in
L.B. 272A. As a threshold matter, unlike either Weaver or L.B. 272A,
Hubbell Bank did not involve an allocation of state tax dollars. Chap-
ter 6, Laws 1930, did two things to set up the fund whose validity was
at issue:
[it] transfer[red] ... assets from the depositors' guaranty fund to the deposi-
tors' final settlement fund, including certain assessments against the banks
which had not been paid, accruing under the old law, and provided for an as-
sessment to be levied upon the state banks for a period of ten years based upon
their average daily deposits.4 8 1
The central problem in Hubbell Bank was, accordingly, not the end
that Chapter 6 sought, the redemption of claims, but the specific
means employed. As the Court stressed:
[Chapter 6, Laws 1930] provided that those who had claims as depositors in
banks which had failed prior to March 18,1930, under the old Guaranty Fund
Law should be paid from this new fund pro rata. It repealed the old Guaranty
Fund Law, not only by a specific repealing clause, but by also changing the
provisions by almost every section of the new law. Consequently, it marked
the end, from a legislative standpoint, of the depositors' guaranty fund.
4 8 2
Thus, unlike L.B. 272A, Chapter 6 both repealed the operative guar-
anty fund provisions and expressly included within its classification
only those individuals who had claims at a specific, identifiable, and
forever frozen point in time. It was because of these actions, actions
480. Weaver v. Koehn, 120 Neb, 114, 115, 231 N.W. 703, 703 (1930).
481. Hubbell Bank v. Bryan, 124 Neb. 51, 53, 245 N.W. 20, 22 (1932).
482. I& at 53-54, 245 N.W. at 22.
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that the Ninety-first Legislature did not take in L.B. 272A, that Chap-
ter 6 served no public purpose:
[Chapter 6] had for its sole and only purpose the payment of the claims of
depositors in banks which had failed prior to its enactment by levying assess-
ments upon solvent state banks whose depositors did not come within the pur-
view of the act. In practical effect, this new act destroyed the confidence in
state banks. It does not stabilize commerce but tends to disrupt it.4 8 3
The court contrasted this approach with that employed by other
states, stressing that "in no instance has a state Legislature attempted
to provide for future assessments to pay off the losses in other banks
in the past."48 4 It also tried to account for the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court sustaining deposit guaranty acts as a valid exer-
cise of the police power by arguing that the "precise" issue presented
in Hubbell Bank was not posed in those cases. That was true, as far as
it went, since those decisions involved different questions. It is inter-
esting to note, however, that the Oklahoma statute provided that re-
imbursements would be made from the fund to date "and from
additional assessments if required."485 The same phenomenon was ev-
ident in Abie State Bank v. Bryan, where the Court expressly recog-
nized that the amending legislation "provid[ed] for a limitation of
future assessments"48 6 and, in subsequent passages, discussed those
limitations in considerable detail.48 7 Future assessments of private
funds to be given to private parties are not then constitutionally sus-
pect in and of themselves. They fail, rather, when they are extracted
from individuals who themselves are excluded from any possible indi-
vidual benefit by the simple act of abolishing the guaranty mechanism.
All of this is arguably beside the point. If it is a violation of due
process to provide public funds to private actors, as the explanation of
Weaver offered by the Haman court leads us to believe, similarities
and/or differences between the old and new guaranty acts are irrele-
vant. This means that we should then look carefully at the due pro-
cess rationale set forth in Weaver, an approach to both federal and
state due process guaranties that denied that a public purpose could be
served by a state decision to honor bank deposit guarantees.
D. Moral Obligation in a Post-Haman World: The Rebirth of Liberty of
Contract and the Demise of Compassion
A careful reading of Weaver, and those aspects of Hubbell Bank
that depend on Weaver, reveals that the heart of the matter was in
fact a basic disagreement about whether a state appropriation to com-
483. Id- at 55, 245 N.W. at 22 (emphasis added).
484. Id at 56, 245 N.W. at 23.
485. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 109 (1911).
486. 282 U.S. 765, 777 (1931)(footnote omitted).
487. I at 780-81.
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pensate for private losses served a legitimate public purpose. In
Weaver the court stressed that the appropriation was "'not for a pub-
lic purpose,"' and as a result "'involves the taking of the property of
the public generally for the relief of private persons without obliga-
tion on the part of the state, either legal or moral.' ",488 In particular,
it emphasized that "[t]he deposits herein were merely business -trans-
actions between the bank and the depositor and the public should not
be made to pay for the losses that a depositor may have suffered in
such transactions."48 9 The same doctrine lay at the heart of Hubbell
State Bank: the "new act.., serves no public purpose which can jus-
tify the exercise of police power of the state."4 90 The court stressed, in
the context of due process, that the true infirmity was that Chapter 6,
by "excluding depositors whose claims accrued since March 18, 1930,
from participation and giving benefits to depositors in prior failed
banks ... deprive[d] plaintiffs of property without due process of
law."491
These decisions were, quite clearly, crafted by a court that adhered
to the notion that "liberty of contract" provided a judicial trump card
in the debate about what constituted a valid public purpose. Viewed in
this manner, a bank deposit is "merely" an individual "business trans-
action" between the bank and the depositor. That, as the court had
stressed in numerous past cases, presented a classic instance of "a con-
tract fairly entered into, and in compliance with which both parties
have acted to the full discharge of their obligations thereunder ... ."4 92
Accordingly, legislation affecting such relationships presented the
question of whether a voluntary, private agreement "must be deemed
modified by the existing provisions of the statute, irrespective of the
intention of the parties, as expressed in their contract."493 It could
not, the court answered, because "under the pretense of the exercise
of [the police power] the legislature cannot prohibit harmless acts,
which do not concern the health, safety, and welfare of society."494
Interestingly, it is entirely possible that an argument could have
been made that the court, by the time of Hubbell Bank, may well have
assumed a different perspective regarding the notion expressed in
Weaver that the depositors "assumed the risk." In State ex rel. Soren-
sen v. First State Bank, the court observed that:
[t]he state evidently desired to encourage its citizens to use a state bank and to
deposit their funds therein, and, to some extent at least, insure the safety of
488. Weaver v. Koehn, 120 Neb. 114, 116, 231 N.W. 703, 704 (1930)(quoting the district
court).
489. Id. at 117, 231 N.W. at 704.
490. Hubbell Bank v. Bryan, 124 Neb. 51, 55, 245 N.W. 20, 22-23 (1932).
491. Id. at 55-56, 245 N.W. at 23.
492. Low v. Rees Printing Co., 41 Neb. 127, 135, 59 N.W. 362, 363 (1894).
493. Id.
494. Id. at 147, 59 N.W. at 368.
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such deposits if made pursuant to the provisions of the law. It must be ob-
served that no depositor was required to deposit his funds in such a bank, but
if he voluntarily did so, in compliance with the law, he would be entitled to the
protection .... 495
Nevertheless, both as a matter of what Weaver articulated, and as a
general philosophical position, the world view of the Nebraska court
in 1930 was clearly that of a court that was not inclined to allow a
legislature to "tinker" with contractual relationships, formal or
otherwise.
As indicated, the due process flaw in Hubbell Bank was the direct
confiscation of private funds for a private purpose. In Weaver, on the
other hand, it was an attempt by the state to restructure, by means of
taxation, a relationship the parties had "voluntarily" entered with full
knowledge of its conditions and circumstances. The question for our
purposes is not whether liberty of contract, as a concept, is itself right
or wrong. It is, rather, whether it was appropriate for the court, in
response to a legislative act articulating a public objective and adjust-
ing the benefits and burdens of private life on the basis of that policy
decision, to determine for itself that "a law like the one before us in-
volves neither the safety, the morals, nor the welfare of the public,
and... the interest of the public is not in the slightest degree affected
by such an act."496
Liberty of contract, viewed in this light, becomes a shorthand for
accepting the ability of the Court in Lochner v. New York to reject, for
no reason other than the conflict with its own preconceived notions,
"the belief of the people of New York that, as a general rule, and in
the case of the average man, labor in excess of sixty hours during a
week in [bakeries and confectioneries] may endanger the health of
those who thus labor." 497 The standard of review was clearly a rigor-
ous one:
lThere is, of course, no such thing as absolute freedom of contract. It is sub-
ject to a great variety of restraints. But the freedom of contract is, neverthe-
less, the general rule and restraint the exception; and the exercise of
legislative authority to abridge it can be justified only by the existence of ex-
ceptional circumstances. 4 9 8
Where a court's preexisting beliefs coincided with those of the legisla-
ture, of course, the results were different. Thus, in Muller v. Oregon,
a restriction on the "liberty of contract" that limited the number of
hours a woman could work was sustained since, in the Court's words,
495. 122 Neb. 502, 508, 240 N.W. 747, 750 (1932).
496. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905). The Court begins the paragraph
within which this statement falls with the observation that "It]here is no reason-
able ground for interfering with the liberty of a person or the right of free con-
tract, by determining the hours of labor, in the occupation of a baker." Id.
497. Id. at 69 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
498. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 546 (1923)(emphasis added).
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"history discloses the fact that woman has always been dependent
upon man."4 99 In doing so, the Court took "judicial notice" of the gen-
eral belief that "woman's physical structure, and the functions she
performs in consequence thereof, justify special legislation restricting
or qualifying the conditions under which she shall be permitted to
toil."500
The same process of selective acceptance or rejection of legislative
pronouncements was apparent in the decisions of the Nebraska court.
In Wenham v. State, for example, the court declared:
All property in this state is held subject to rules regulating the common good
and general welfare of our people. This is the price of our advanced civiliza-
tion, and of the protection afforded by law to the right of ownership and the
use and enjoyment of property itself. Rights of property, like other social and
conventional rights, are subject to reasonable limitations in their enjoyment,
and to such reasonable restraints and regulations by law as the legislature,
under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution,
may think expedient.5 0 1
Taken at face value, this statement seems inconsistent with the no-
tions that would emerge in Lochner three years later. Indeed, the
court followed that passage with what appeared to be a rejection of
liberty of contract: "[t]his power, legitimately exercised, cannot be
limited by contract, nor bartered away by legislation." 02 The court
also made clear that it was, at least in theory, deferring to a valid legis-
lative judgment that it had no right to question:
[The legislature] determined that the law in question was necessary for the
public good, and the protection of the health and well-being of women en-
gaged in labor in the establishments mentioned in the act. That question was
one exclusively within their power and jurisdiction, and their action should
not be interfered with by the courts unless their power has been improperly
or oppressively exercised.5 03
That was clearly, however, not how the court would proceed if the
measure did not coincide with its own values. Thus, in Wenham, the
court went on to state that "[o]n the question of the right to contract,
we may well declare a law unconstitutional which interferes with or
abridges the right of adult males to contract with each other in any of
the business affairs or vocations of life."504 In the same manner, a
"Sunday law" that would otherwise have impinged on this same lib-
erty of contract was sustained six years later, one suspects, in large
measure because it comported with the Christian perspectives of
Christian judges:
[We doubt very much whether there were any disciples of Mahomet in Ne-
499. 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908).
500. Id. at 420.
501. 65 Neb. 394, 401-02, 91 N.W. 421, 428 (1902).
502. Id- at 402, 91 N.W. at 428.
503. Id- at 404-05, 91 N.W. at 424.
504. Id. at 405, 91 N.W. at 425 (emphasis added).
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braska in 1873, and those who have emigrated to Nebraska since that day came
here with full knowledge of the Sunday statute, and their appearance in our
commonwealth will hardly render unconstitutional and void an act of the Leg-
islature that theretofore was valid.5
0 5
This was precisely the same sort of approach that would allow the
court to focus, as it did in Weaver, on the "voluntary business transac-
tions" the depositors engaged in, rather than the right of the legisla-
ture to determine whether it was appropriate to use state funds to
compensate for losses incurred, at least in part, as a result of state
statutes and regulatory actions. This was, at least at the time that
Weaver and Hubbell Bank were decided, a widely accepted judicial
technique. It was also employed in that case in the face of an argu-
ment by Attorney General Sorensen that the appropriation served a
transcendent public purpose: the continuing operation of the banks,
which allowed the deposits to be made, "was not carried on primarily
for the benefit of their stockholders or owners but for the purpose of
conserving the bank guaranty fund which was obviously a public pur-
pose."50 6 He also stressed the complicity of state officials:
It is a matter of common knowledge that misleading statements (not neces-
sarily intentional) as to the security of deposits made in such banks continued
to be made by employees of the commission in charge of such banks and per-
haps in some cases by members of the commission itself long after it should
have been obvious to any one with such a knowledge of conditions as the
members of the commission should have had that such banks were not safe
places in which to deposit money. It was with a knowledge of these facts that
the legislature made the appropriation in question. 5 0 7
He then discussed at length the power of a legislature to act upon and
effect a moral obligation, stressing in conclusion that:
[I]t is to be borne in mind that none of the deposits under consideration would
have been made if there had not been special statutory provision authorizing a
state agency to carry on an insolvent bank as a going concern. Can there be
any doubt that a moral obligation exists that is sufficient to sustain the appro-
priation under consideration? 5 0 8
505. Ex parte Caldwell, 82 Neb. 544, 547, 118 N.W. 133, 135 (1908). See also Hall v.
State, 100 Neb. 84, 90,158 N.W. 362,364 (1916)("the right to labor or employ labor,
make contracts in respect thereto upon such terms as may be agreed upon by the
parties, and to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, and convey property of all kinds. The
enjoyment or deprivation of these rights and privileges constitutes the essential
difference between liberty and oppression."); Low v. Rees Printing Co., 41 Neb.
127, 59 N.W. 362 (1894)(striking a measure attempting to create an eight hour
workday).
506. Brief of Appellant at 6, Weaver v. Koehn, 120 Neb. 114, 231 N.W. 703 (1930)(No.
27424).
507. Id at 7.
508. Id. at 11. This theme was echoed in a student note critical of the Weaver decision,
which argued that "it seems clear that the state is under a moral obligation to
reimburse such depositors to the extent of these losses, and that therefore the
decision in declaring the act in question unconstitutional was erroneous." Note,
Constitutional Law-Taxation for Public Purpose-Appropriation to Reimburse
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The court clearly had "doubts," but it is equally evident that those
doubts were not predicated on the absence of an express public pur-
pose, but rather on the personal refusal of the members of the court to
give it credence. Whatever else might be said of this mind-set, it at
least appears not to have reflected mere hostility to individuals, for
the court subsequently made it clear that it would not allow the state
to benefit either.509 Nevertheless, the sheer force of this attitude, and
its implications for the state, becomes increasingly obvious when one
examines decisions of the court rendered even after the "judicial
revolution" that marked the demise of liberty of contract notions in
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
For example, while the Court employed cases such as Nebbia v.
New York 510 to announce its intention to reject this prior method of
adjudication, and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish 5 1 1 to signal the full
significance of this trend, the Nebraska court "soldiered on," arguably
abandoning the approach exemplified in Weaver only when forced, in
no uncertain terms, to do so. In 1936 it invalidated a "filled milk" stat-
ute, concluding that "the statute, under the guise of a police regula-
tion, does not tend to preserve the public health, safety or welfare,
[and is] unconstitutional as an invasion of the property rights of the
individual."512 The result, the court argued, was consistent with deci-
sions in other states and the measure was materially different from
the one sustained in Hebe Co. v. Shaw.513 One year later, with the
announcement of United States v. Carolene Products Co.,514 the
problems with those judgments became clear. The Court saw "no per-
suasive reason for departing" from Hebe, a decision that recognized
"ample scope for the legislative judgment that prohibition of the of-
fending article was an appropriate means of preventing injury to the
public."5 15 In a similar vein, the court in State ex rel. Western Refer-
ence & Bond Ass'n v. Kinney,5 1 6 sustained a challenge to a legislative
Depositors for Losses Sustained in Banks Operated by Guaranty Fund Commis-
sion, 9 NEB. L. BULL. 338, 341 (1931).
509. See Svoboda v. Snyder State Bank, 117 Neb. 431, 435, 220 N.W. 566, 567 (1928)(re-
garding banks under the supervision of the prior guaranty fund commission; that
"[i]f the bank finally succeeds and makes a profit, the state can claim no part
thereof; if it fails, there is no liability upon the state to pay any portion of its
losses").
510. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
511. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
512. Carolene Products Refining Co. v. Banning, 131 Neb. 429, 435, 268 N.W. 313, 316
(1936). The decision is criticized in B. Palmer King, Note, Constitutional Law-
Due Process of Law-Validity of Statute Prohibiting Sale of Filled Milk, 15 NEB.
L. BuLL. 192 (1936).
513. 248 U.S. 297 (1918).
514. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
515. Id. at 148.
516. 138 Neb. 574, 293 N.W. 393 (1940).
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measure that attempted to "fix[] the maximum compensation which
an employment agency may collect."5s7 Relying on what it deemed to
be the continuing force of Ribnik v. McBride,518 the court determined
that the agency was "not one 'affected with a public interest'... "519
Rather, it was "engaged in a beneficial business" that was imbued with
a "right of contract, common to all followers of legitimate vocations,
[that] constitutes an asset of the relator and is part of the property, in
the enjoyment of which relator is guaranteed protection by the
Constitution."520
That finding was summarily rejected in Olsen v. Nebraska.52'
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Douglas observed that the
same cases that the Nebraska Court had considered "represent more
than scattered examples of constitutionally permissible price-fixing
schemes. They represent in large measure a basic departure from the
philosophy and approach of the majority in the Ribnik case."s 22 He
then honed in on the core of the case under review and, as we have
seen, the central tenet of Weaver and Hubbell Bank:
We are not concerned, however, with the wisdom, need, or appropriateness
of the legislation. Differences of opinion on that score suggest a choice which
"should be left where.., it was left by the Constitlution-to the States and to
Congress." ... There is no necessity for the state to demonstrate before us
that evils persist despite the competition which attends the bargaining in this
field. In final analysis, the only constitutional prohibitions or restraints which
respondents have suggested for the invalidation of this legislation are those
notions of public policy embedded in earlier decisions of this Court but which,
as Mr. Justice Holmes long admonished, should not be read into the Constitu-
tion. ... Since they do not find expression in the Constitution, we cannot give
them continuing vitality as standards by which the constitutionality of the
economic and social programs of the states is to be determined.5 2 3
The Nebraska court was not, admittedly, uniformly intransigent.
In 1938, in the wake of Carolene Products, it sustained a measure regu-
lating ice cream, declaring simply that "[t]he right of the state, under
the police power, to enact laws which are designed to provide a mini-
mum amount of nutritional elements and prevent fraud and deception
in the sale of foodstuffs ... are not arbitrary, excessive, or unlawful
exercises of the police power... ,"524 But holdings of this sort were
the exception, rather than the rule, in a state where the President of
517. Id. at 575, 293 N.W. at 394.
518. 277 U.S. 350 (1928).
519. State ex reL W. Reference & Bond Ass'n v. Kinney, 138 Neb. 574, 577, 293 N.W.
393, 395 (1940)(quoting Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 352, (1928)).
520. I& at 584, 293 N.W. 393, 398 (1940). For criticisms of the decision, see Dee C.
Blythe, Recent Decision, 29 GEo. L.J. 110 (1940); Charles C. Spann, Note, 19 NEB.
L. BuLL. 307 (1940); Recent Decision, 27 VA. L. REV. 115 (1940).
521. 313 U.S. 236 (1941).
522. Id- at 245.
523. Id. at 246-47 (citations omitted).
524. State v. McCosh, 134 Neb. 780, 784-85, 279 N.W. 775, 777 (1938).
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the University of Iowa would be invited to deliver an honors convoca-
tion address at the University within which he espoused the notion
that the New Deal "zeal for the objective that no man shall starve
physically may well obscure the ethical and spiritual values without
which all life is meaningless. A full dinner pail, a chicken in every
pot, may be nothing more than the quintessence of the ignis fatuus of
a material communism."2 5 And it is hardly surprising in an era
within which the world view articulated in Weaver tracked closely
that of many prominent attorneys, who believed firmly that "[t]he
Government set up for us at Washington is not and was never in-
tended to be an eleemosynary institution or a foundation for miscella-
neous charities. It was not designed as a universal parent or an
earthly Providence." 26
It is not surprising, then, that the court as then composed seemed
firmly wed to a Lochner view of the world and only belatedly em-
braced the perspective adopted in Olsen, within which are set forth
rules of construction that have become the modern norm. The articu-
lation by the United States Supreme Court of a standard for the inter-
pretation of the federal constitution is, of course, suggestive rather
than dispositive when the focus is on what the Nebraska constitution
demands. The court has stressed, for example, that it will parse the
provisions of the Nebraska constitution and will treat federal decisions
construing "similar" constitutional provisions as suggestive rather
than dispositive.527 It is, nevertheless, interesting to note that the
court in Haman also made it clear that it will invoke the holdings of
the United States Supreme Court when it suits its purposes. In this
instance, the device was an appeal to the wisdom of Justice Cardozo at
the juncture in the decision where the court was asserting its right to
look beyond the professed motives of the legislature. At first reading
the court's approach seems to add compelling force to the result it
525. Eugene A. Gilmore, Constitutional IntegVrity--Changing Concepts, 14 NEB. L.
BuLL. 403, 405 (1936). Gilmore, who was characterized in the piece's biographical
note as "a distinguished lawyer," id. at 403 n.*, was an uncompromising disciple of
the liberty of contract school:
True, private rights have been restricted in the interest of public
health, morals, and safety. But restrictions based on an economic pro-
gram which is a virtual contradiction of the rights themselves have been
consistently resisted. A planned economy if it is really efficient and car-
ried to its logical conclusion is a contradiction of an individualistic re-
gime and a negation of natural rights.
Id. at 409.
526. John W. Davis, Fundamental Aspects of the New Deal from a Lawyer's Stand-
point, 13 TENN. L. REv. 158, 160-61 (1935). Davis has been characterized as "the
lawyer's lawyer," and the article was a reprint of a "radio address delivered under
the auspices of the American Bar Association on December 22, 1934." Id. at 158
n..
527. See, eg., McGraw Elec. Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 703, 68 N.W.2d
608 (1955).
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reaches. Surely, we say to ourselves, a principle of constitutional in-
terpretation espoused by one of the nation's preeminent jurists is wor-
thy of respect. Unfortunately, the court's use of Justice Cardozo's
words rings hollow on closer examination, a result that has little to do
with the value of Justice Cardozo's insights and a very great deal to do
with the legitimacy of the interpretive and argumentative techniques
that provide the foundations for the Haman opinion and result.
One of the critical junctures in Haman is, as indicated, the line of
analysis leading to the court's resurrection of Weaver. The author of
the opinion begins the process with this:
In the words of Justice Cardozo: "If the evil to be corrected can be seen to
be merely fanciful, the injustice or the wrong illusory, the courts may inter-
vene and strike the special statute down."... This applies precisely to the
classification in question. There is no reasonable and substantial relation be-
tween the classification and the stated objects of the legislation.5 2 8
The invocation of Justice Cardozo's reputation as one of the nation's
preeminent jurists was clearly deliberate: the passage from Williams
v. Mayor of Baltimore is the only citation to a decision of the United
States Supreme Court in the Haman opinion. That alone would ar-
guably be of no great consequence since there is little room for criti-
cism when a state court draws on the wisdom and reputation of the
Court or one of its preeminent members. In this instance, however,
resort to the Court and Cardozo for the particular principle espoused
was clearly unnecessary since, as indicated, the court had previously
stated that it would occasionally look beyond the terms of the statute
when necessary.529
The problem is that even the most cursory reading of Williams
indicates that the quoted language, like much of the opinion in Ha-
man, is divorced from the specific context within which it was uttered,
a process that distorts rather than reveals the thought processes of the
author and the holding of the Court. Justice Cardozo begins the seg-
ment in question with these observations:
Time with its tides brings new conditions which must be cared for by new
laws. Sometimes the new conditions affect the members of a class. If so, the
correcting statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes the new conditions af-
fect one only or a few. If so the correcting statute may be as narrow as the
mischief. The Constitution does not prohibit special laws inflexibly and al-
ways. It permits them when there are special evils with which the existing
general laws are incompetent to cope. The special public purpose will then
sustain the special form .... The problem in last analysis is one of legislative
policy, with a wide margin of discretion conceded to the lawmakers.5 3 0
As an initial matter, these comments quite clearly validate rather
528. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 715, 467 N.W.2d 836, 848 (1991)(citation omit-
ted)(quoting Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 46 (1933)).
529. See supra text accompanying notes 231-33.
530. Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 46 (1933)(citation omitted).
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than destroy the approach encapsulated in L.B. 272A. The "special
evil," the inability to satisfy depositor claims, is obviously a matter
with which "existing general laws," in this instance the normal pro-
cess of asserting a legal claim, "are incompetent to cope." The classifi-
cation employed, in turn, was both "as narrow as the mischief" and
consistent with an expression of legislative policy that should, in the
normal course of events, fall within the wide "margin of discretion
conceded to the lawmakers."
This alone indicates that the doctrine actually articulated by the
Court in Williams stands for propositions quite different from those
invoked in Haman. The difficulties posed by resort to Williams run,
nevertheless, even more deeply when one considers the precise con-
text within which the quoted passage falls, for the language noted by
the court constitutes the first portion of a dichotomy:
If the evil to be corrected can be seen to be merely fanciful, the injustice or the
wrong illusory, the courts may intervene and strike the special statute
down .... If special circumstances have developed, and circumstances of such
a nature as to call for a new rule, the special act will stand.5 3 1
Justice Cardozo then states that "[t]he distinction is neatly pointed
[out] by comparing two decisions." 532 Ironically, the first of these,
Mayor of Baltimore v. Minister & Trustees of Starr Methodist Protes-
tant Church,533 involved a tax exemption deemed discriminatory be-
cause "[t]he burden of taxation will not be distributed over every class
of property alike; but, on the contrary, one piece of a particular class of
property will be exempt, while all of the other properties of the same
class will be taxable." 34 Justice Cardozo, in language that echoes the
central complaint in Nebraska's own property taxation saga, indicated
that the "court condemned [this] special act as a merely arbitrary de-
parture from the rule of uniform taxation."5 35 He also stressed that
"no evil had arisen, no circumstances had developed, to give even col-
orable grounds of reason for the adoption of a special rule. '5 36
These sentiments form the heart of almost every one of the recent
tax decisions and it is quite possible that this was on the court's mind
as it crafted Haman. Indeed, a compelling case can be made that the
decision in Haman cannot be divorced from a wider sequence of
events within which the court was consistently forced to deal with leg-
islative enactments that elevate politics over constitutional command.
The court has stressed, for example, that the basic taxation rule is that
"[u]nder the Nebraska Constitution, art. III, section 18 and art. VIII,
531. Id (citation omitted).
532. d
533. 67 A. 261 (Md. 1907).
534. Id at 263-64.
535. Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 46 (1933).
536. Id
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section 1, classification of property or business for taxation, whether
the tax is a property tax or an excise tax, can be permitted only if the
classification is reasonable and the tax operates uniformly upon all
members of the class."537 This tendency to treat tax matters as an
amalgam of the special legislation and tax uniformity clauses became
especially evident in Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. State Board of Equal-
ization & Assessment, in which two of the judges caused major con-
cerns when they observed that:
[W]hen property, regardless of whether it is real or tangible personal prop-
erty, is classified so that it provides exemption from taxation to all but a small
amount of property, the classification and exemption may well be unreasona-
ble and arbitrary and may fall within the prohibition of Neb. Const. art. III,
§ 18, which is this state's 'equal protection clause.'5 38
The tax situation, it should be noted, was clearly on the court's mind
at precisely the point that Haman was argued and decided, and impli-
cated many of the same concerns and constitutional doctrines. More
tellingly, the tax cases presented the court with precisely the sort of
legislative defiance and/or intransigence that would impel stricter
scrutiny of legislative actions. In a series of decisions, the court had
stated, in increasingly blunt terms, that there were substantial
problems. The legislature, for purely political reasons, refused to lis-
ten. Haman, in this respect, becomes the political straw that broke
the judicial camel's back, a legislative act that invited the court to look
beyond its express language and directly at what were incontrovert-
ibly for many senators "special" motivations.
These realities do not, however, excuse a decisional technique
within which context is ignored and complete treatment eschewed in
favor of highly selective quotation. Moreover, the full implications of
the approach become tellingly clear when one examines the second
case discussed by Justice Cardozo in Williams, Board of Police Com-
missioners v. McClenehan,5 3 9 styled by the Court as The Police Pen-
sion Cases. As Justice Cardozo points out, the somewhat narrow core
of that decision was the court's finding that "here was a special case
not provided for or considered in an existing general law,"540 an obser-
vation predicated on the applicable constitutional prohibition that
"the General Assembly shall pass no special Law, for any case, for
which provision has been made, by an existing General Law."M1 That
language tracks, at least in theory, the terms of Nebraska's article III,
section 18 prohibition, although it is quite evident that this is not the
basis on which the invalidation in Haman is premised, nor could it be.
537. Thorin v. Burke, 146 Neb. 94, 102, 18 N.W.2d 664, 668 (1945).
538. 237 Neb. 357, 375, 466 N.W.2d 461, 472 (1991)(White & Fahrnbruch, JJ.,
concurring).
539. 101 A. 786 (Md. 1917).
540. Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 47 (1933).
541. MD. CONST. art. III, § 33.
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The general law, in this instance the state claims process, is clearly
inapplicable; no "legal" claims lie. Accordingly, the focus becomes
moral obligation, or in this instance the ability of a legislature to set
aside strict adherence to statutory requirements in a quest for simple
fairness.
That, as Justice Cardozo stresses, is precisely what the Maryland
legislature did in the case of Mrs. E. E. McClenehan, one of the plain-
tiffs in The Police Pension Cases. Mrs. McClenehan was a police ma-
tron, a class of employee that had been excluded from the pension
scheme until 1906, at which point it was amended to allow individuals
like her to enter:
so that they may enjoy the same rights and privileges and benefits, subject to
the same limitations and conditions, as those conferred for the retiring of
members of the police force, provided they pay to the special fund $10 per
annum for three years, in addition to the regular percentage required 'under
the special pension act.'542
Mrs. McClenehan, who had been hired in 1900, complied with the
terms of the new act from 1906 until her dismissal in 1912.543 The
legislature, in spite of the fact that she had not fulfilled the sixteen
year requirement, directed that she be paid a pension of $7.50 per
week for life from the special fund.544 A second amendment passed in
1912, which allowed discretionary payments, was also inapplicable,
since it was limited to "'any officer of police, policeman, detective,
clerk or turnkey,"' a litany that did not include matrons. The Mary-
land court nevertheless sustained her claim, a decision that Justice
Cardozo characterized as follows:
There were general laws upon the statute books providing for the grant of
pensions to members of the police force, not including matrons. A matron was
dismissed for physical disability after many years of service. The legislature,
impressed by the hardship of her position, passed a special act for her relief.
The court took the view that here was a special case not provided for or con-
sidered in an existing general law, and so upheld what had been done 5 45
Justice Cardozo's admonitions regarding legislative motives that
are "merely fanciful" may not then be properly viewed as a license for
wholesale substitution of judicial for legislative judgments. The Ha-
man court was arguably correct when it pierced the rather transpar-
ent fiction that L.B. 272A offered, or was ever likely to provide, a basis
for reimbursing anyone other than the depositors of the three named
institutions. The classification articulated in that measure was, as a
practical matter, open in name only. There is also some justification
for the position that depositors who knowingly placed themselves in
dire straits in fact deserved to realize the "benefits" of their bargain,
542. Board of Police Comm'rs v. McClenehan, 101 A. 786, 787 (Md. 1917).
543. Id. at 788.
544. Id.
545. Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 46-47 (1933).
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particularly when those circumstances are in fact the sort that a de-
positor knows or should have known, as was the case in Weaver.
It is less clear, however, that a chain of events replicating the Com-
monwealth fiasco could not in fact occur, that the Unicameral would
not become a willing partner in such developments, or that the State
Department of Banking would not again aid and abet a similar future
fiasco. One would, for example, have assumed that the legislature
would not have undertaken the risks posed by the N.D.I.G.C. in light
of the lessons that it should have learned from the demise of the 1909
guaranty fund and the court's holdings in Weaver and Hubbell Bank.
It would also have seemed likely, in light of those experiences, that
the Department of Banking would have been quite vigilant when the
N.D.I.G.C. appeared on the scene, striving mightily to avoid a repeti-
tion of past problems. Neither, as the Commonwealth fiasco demon-
strates, proved to be the case.
More tellingly, this is not an isolated phenomenon. In United
States Brewers'Ass'n v. State,546 for example, the court held unconsti-
tutional a measure requiring prior approval of a decision to "terminate
a distributorship or establish a new, replacement, or an additional dis-
tributorship in an existing sales territory."5 4 7 The court indicated that
"[t]he legislation in question has two declared purposes: The fostering
and promoting of temperance and obedience to the law, and the pro-
tection of distributors against termination of their franchises without
cause."548 The court found, as to the second objective, that the mea-
sure imposed unnecessary burdens and carried "little in the way of
standards to guide the commission."5 4 9 The more interesting matter,
for our purposes, was its discussion of the first objective, where the
court found that "[t]here is no reasonable relationship between the act
and the fostering or promoting of temperance and obedience to the
law, and it cannot be justified on that ground."550
That, it seemed, was a rather clear signal to the legislature that
those justifications would carry little weight when applied to regula-
tions of that sort. Nevertheless, when the court was asked to parse the
constitutionality of so-called "post and hold" laws ten years later the
resulting case became, as some might say, deja vu all over again. The
statute, which had been amended in 1979,551 still contained two ex-
press purposes: temperance and respect for and obedience to the law,
546. 192 Neb. 328, 220 N.W.2d 544 (1974).
547. Id at 330, 220 N.W.2d at 547.
548. Id at 334, 220 N.W.2d at 548. The legislative purposes were codified at NEB. REV.
STAT. § 53-168.01 (1974), and were apparently "distilled" from the language con-
tained in L.B. 751, § 1, 1971 Neb. Laws 1.
549. United States Brewers' Ass'n v. State, 192 Neb. 328, 335, 220 N.W.2d 544, 549
(1974).
550. Id at 334, 220 N.W.2d at 549.
551. L.B. 474, 1979 Neb. Laws 1243.
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and "promot[ing] an orderly marketing of alcoholic liquor."552 The
court again rejected temperance and respect for the law as valid objec-
tives, at least to the extent that they authorized the restrictions being
challenged.553 With regard to "orderly marketing," the court stated
that "[t]he state has not suggested and we cannot conceive of any rea-
son that price-fixing promotes the public health, safety, or welfare, or,
for that matter, orderly marketing of liquor."5 54 The legislature, get-
ting only a portion of the hint, amended the statutes to remove the
offending substantive provisions and to change the declared poli-
cies.555 The language regarding "orderly distribution" was eliminated;
the salutary, but constitutionally inconsequential desire to foster
"temperance in... consumption and respect for and obedience to the
law" remains on the books.556
Clearly, people do not always learn from their mistakes, and it
would itself be a mistake to assume that the sad events that prompted
the passage of L.B. 272A could not or would not repeat themselves, a
reality that says a great deal about the viability of the Haman court's
contention that the open class created by L.B. 272A was "merely theo-
retical." More tellingly, the intellectual underpinnings for much of
what the court held in Haman are, at best, suspect. Bold declarations
that the state is not to engage in acts of charity toward bank depositors
have a certain allure. Under normal circumstances it would, as was
clearly the intent in Weaver, be quite proper to leave those individuals
to reap the sad benefits of their tenuous bargain. That impulse was,
nevertheless, articulated by a court for reasons the Haman court
never discusses and would, presumably, disavow if pressed on the
point. The issue is not, as I have stressed, whether or not liberty of
contract notions recognized in the first third of this century have any
particular degree of validity. Indeed, overtones of that same sort of
approach still surface occasionally in the decisions of the court, albeit
in not quite the same form. Thus, for example, the court noted that
legislative acts at issue in United States Brewers' Ass'n "severely re-
stricted freedom of contract between the parties which existed prior to
the enactment of the legislation."557 The court did not, however, in-
voke the approach typified in Lochner, Low v. Rees Printing Co., and
Wenham, which looked for "exceptional circumstances" to justify
government intrusions. It stressed, rather, that the measures were
"unreasonable."
552. NEB. REV. STAT. § 53-168.01 (1987).
553. Louis Finocchiaro, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n, 217 Neb. 487, 351
N.W.2d 701 (1984).
554. Id at 491-92, 351 N.W.2d at 704.
555. L.B. 183, 1985 Neb. Laws 270.
556. NEB. REv. STAT. § 53-168.01 (1987).
557. United States Brewers' Ass'n v. State, 192 Neb. 328, 330, 220 N.W.2d 544, 546-47
(1974).
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The Haman court may or may not have said that the goals of L.B.
272A were "unreasonable." Its rejection of the avowed legislative pur-
pose arguably depended on the lack of a "substantial" relationship be-
tween the goal of public trust and the means selected. That, as I will
now explore, may itself represent a "reasonable" conclusion. To the
extent it does, however, it injects the court into the process of formu-
lating public policy more intimately, and more intrusively, than it has
heretofore been willing to acknowledge. The process by which the
court did so was, in my estimation, specious. The question now posed
is whether the objective, reached by whatever means, is itself proper.
VII. JUSTIFYING THE RULES: THE HAMAN COURT'S
VISION OF JUDICIAL REVEIW
"In that direction," the Unicameral said, waving its right
paw round, 'lives a Hatter: and in that direction, " waving the
other paw, 'lives a March Hare. Visit either you like: they're
both mad."
"But I don't want to go among mad people," the Court
remarked.
"Oh, you can't help that," said the Unicameral: "we're all
mad here. I'm mad. You're mad."
"How do you know I'm mad?" said the Court.
"You must be," said the Unicameral, "or you wouldn't
have come here."558
Judicial review is a necessary evil, tolerated but not necessarily
loved because we recognize the greater evils that lurk within us. Al-
exander Hamilton characterized the judiciary as the branch "least
dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be
least in a capacity to annoy or injure them."559 That statement, which
recognized that the judiciary "may truly be said to have neither force
nor will, but merely judgment,"560 presupposed the very institution
that most often usurps the otherwise legislative function to "pre-
scribe[] the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to
be regulated."561
We are told, in no uncertain terms, that "[n]o Legislative act, there-
fore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid,"56 2 that "[a] Constitu-
tion is, in fact, and must be regarded by the Judges as a fundamental
law,"563 and that it manifestly belongs to the judiciary "to ascertain its
558. ALICE, supra note 1, at 89 (Ch. VI: Pig and Pepper).
559. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 425 (Alexander Hamilton)(E. H. Scott ed., 1894).
560. Id.
561. Id.
562. Id. at 426.
563. Id. at 427.
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meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from
the Legislative body."' 64 We vest this powerful, quite often an-
timajoritarian function in the judiciary precisely because we recognize
that "trust" is an essential factor in the process of legitimization. We
tend to avoid, for example, the election of judges because "there would
be too great a disposition to consult popularity, to justify a reliance
that nothing would be consulted but the Constitution and the laws."5 65
We recognize, in turn, that there must be limits on the ability of the
people's representatives to structure our affairs for the same reason.
It may, for example, be "essential to liberty, that the Government in
general should have a common interest[,J ... an immediate depen-
dence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people."566 There must,
nevertheless, be restraints on the ability of a legislature "to aim at an
ambitious sacrifice of the many, to the aggrandizement of the few,"56 7
namely "the genius of the whole system" within which a judiciary
probes "the nature of just and constitutional laws," in conjunction
with "the vigilant and manly spirit which actuates the people of
America; a spirit which nourishes freedom and in return is nourished
by it."568
All of this should make us comfortable, confident that our affairs
are ordered by a delicate balance of "laws" and "justice" with which
dispassionate judges meddle, only occasionally, and with manifest re-
luctance. Unfortunately, as Justice Jackson reminded us, the courts
exercising the constitutional prerogative of judicial review "are not fi-
nal because [they] are infallible, but ... are infallible only because
[they] are final."569 The specific context of this observation, often
overlooked, was the Court's record of reversing a certain percentage of
state court decisions in habeas actions. Justice Jackson observed that
reversal "reflects a difference in outlook normally found between per-
sonnel comprising different courts" and warned that "reversal by a
higher court is not proof that justice is thereby better done."570 That
matrix, presumably, changes when the "reversal" is in fact judicial in-
validation of a legislative act on the grounds that it is "repugnant" to
the constitution. That, we have been lead to believe (not quite with
the infusion of our mother's milk, but it sometimes seems that way), is
the natural order of things. Legislatures craft laws, executives imple-
ment them, and the courts, and in particular the supreme courts, as-
sure that "constitutional justice" is done. It is also, we are constantly
564. Id.
565. Id. at 430.
566. THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 291 (Alexander Hamilton)(E. H. Scott ed., 1894).
567. THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 314 (Alexander Hamilton)(E. H. Scott ed., 1894).
568. Id. at 316.
569. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953)(Jackson, J., concurring).
570. Id.
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assured, a process within which all doubts are resolved in favor of the
legislative act and a measure is stricken only when its constitutional
infirmity is patently clear.
A. A Most Dangerous Branch: Public Policy and the Haman Court
Unfortunately, these solemn assurances offer scant immediate
comfort to those with the greatest stake in the actual adjudicating, the
parties before the court. Implicit within the general requirement that
a court hear only "cases and controversies" is the reality that judicial
pronouncements on constitutional matters affect the real lives and
real interests of real people. And the losing litigants, quite often, find
little solace in the notion that a court of final resort has resolved the
issues before it with an eye toward the "greater good." This is espe-
cially true where it seems, as is often the case, that "law" has tri-
umphed over "justice."
Haman is quite clearly one of the most telling recent examples of
this phenomenon. Predictably, the court's pronouncements reignited
rather than extinguished the passions that had inhered to the Com-
monwealth matter. Various parties pronounced the affair closed.5 71
Others, enraged by the denial of their claims, or embarrassed by the
inability of the state to honor what they remained convinced were its
just obligations, persevered. 572 What the ultimate outcome of these
actions will be remains to be seen, at least at this writing. A host of
options, some suggestive and some bizarre, have been proposed.5 73
571. See, e.g., High Court Was on the Money, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Mar. 31,1991, at
12B; Hennry J. Cordes, Commonwealth Funds Might Be in Demand, OMAHA
WoRLD-HERAmD, Mar. 30, 1991, at 2, (quoting Sen. Gerald Conway to the effect
that "I would find it very difficult for the Lincoln Senators to come up with 25
votes for another scheme."). An amendment to a 1991 appropriations measure
that would have provided $30 million for reimbursement was subsequently de-
feated on a vote of 25-23, against. See Jason Gertzen, Depositor Repayment De-
feated, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, April 30, 1991, at 9.
572. See, e.g., Jason Gertzen, Lawmaker Fail to Advance Commonwealth Payments,
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, May 16, 1991, at 19 (quoting Senator Loran Schmit: "'We
hired the help, we were supervising them, and they were thieves. Under those
conditions we have no recourse but to honor our commitments."); Joe Brennan,
Commonwealth Fight Goes On, Man Says, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Mar. 31,1991,
at IB); Leslie Boellstorff, Court Gives Depositors Little Room to Appeal, OMAHA
WORLD-HERALD, Mar. 30, 1991, at 1, 2 (quoting Senator Landis, "I don't know
what to do next to secure justice.").
573. The most frequently mentioned choice was to include, in a resolution seeking a
constitutional amendment authorizing a state lottery, language allowing some of
the proceeds to be earmarked for depositor reimbursement "not-withstanding
any other provision of this Constitution." The various options proposed are de-
tailed in five opinions issued by the Attorney General in the wake of Haman. See
Legislative Resolution 24CA; Will Certain Proposed Constitutional Language Al-
low Payment of Industrial Savings Depositors Out of State Lottery Proceeds?,
Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. No. 91051 (June 4,1991); Constitutionality of Bill Appropriat-
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That reality does not, however, mean that we should not examine Ha-
man closely in an attempt to learn from that decision. Indeed, Haman
arguably provides an almost perfect vehicle for a reconsideration of
the role of the court and the limits, if any, on judicial review in Ne-
braska in its wake.
President Jackson is reported to have said, in the aftermath of the
second Cherokee case, Worcester v. Georgia,574 "[wiell, John Marshall
has made his decision, now let him enforce it."575 Fortunately, senti-
ments of that sort, while frequently expressed, are largely ignored.
Part of the reason is that the individuals who fashion the decisions
have both a deep awareness of their role and a respect for the judicial
craft. In an address delivered in 1936, while he was still an Associate
Justice, Justice Stone observed that "[w]hether the constitutional
standard of reasonableness of official action is subjective, that of the
judge who must decide, or objective in terms of a considered judgment
of what the community may regard as within the limits of the reason-
able, are questions which the cases have not specifically decided."576
Those answers were arguably supplied a few short years later in O-
sen. It is worth noting, however, that Justice Stone characterized the
direction in which the Court would proceed in resolving the inquiry as
a quest for "the sober second thought of the community, which is the
firm base on which all law must ultimately rest."577 Professor Hart,
writing some years later, expanded this theme when he observed that
the Court's opinions must possess an "underpinning of principle" and
be "grounded in reason," given that the Court "does not in the end
have the power either in theory or in practice to ram its own personal
preferences down other people's throats."578 The Court, he observed,
must "be a voice of reason, charged with the creative function of dis-
cerning afresh and of articulating and developing impersonal and du-
ing Funds to Pay Commonwealth Depositors After Legally Amending the State
Tort Claims Act to Permit Large Tort Claims to be Heard by the Legislature
Rather than the State Claims Board, Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. No. 91050 (May 31,
1991); Constitutionality of Two-Part Amendment to LB 850, the State Claims
Bill, Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. No. 91042 (May 20, 1991); Amendment to LR 24CA
Which Would Require the Proceeds of a State Lottery to be Used to Repay De-
positors of Failed Industrial Savings Institutions, Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. No. 91036
(May 6, 1991); Constitutionality of Various Restitution Options for Common-
wealth Depositors in Light of Haman v. Marsh, Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. No. 91027
(Apr. 10, 1991)
574. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1932).
575. 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 759 (rev.
ed. 1926).
576. Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 25
(1936).
577. Id.
578. Henry M. Hart, Jr., Foreword. The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARv. L. REv.
84, 99 (1959).
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rable principles of constitutional law and impersonal and durable
principles for the interpretation of statutes and the resolution of diffi-
cult issues of decisional law."' 79
Those inclined to defend Haman can argue, and do so with the ut-
most sincerity, that the decision is consistent with the sentiments ex-
pressed by Justice Stone and Professor Hart. Viewed in this light,
Haman is the product of "sober second thought" and provides the
"voice of reason" in response to the (arguably) political compromise
and emotional response to depositor pleas embodied in L.B. 272A. In-
deed, viewed in this light the court's decision becomes a quintessential
expression of "impersonal and durable principles," dismissing as it
does potentially divisive claims for state reimbursement of private
losses in light of arguably settled understandings of the limits imposed
on legislative action by constitutional provisions.
As we have seen, the actual opinion in Haman cannot itself with-
stand much scrutiny and, as a result, has the potential to greatly un-
dermine rather than enhance our impression of the court and its
description and implementation of its role. It is, clearly, one thing for
the court to engage in an objective, honest, and dispassionate examina-
tion of the constitution, the legislation, and the interpretive matrix
within which limits are imposed on legislative enactments. It is quite
another to conduct, as the court did, an inquisition, within which the
positions espoused by the parties before it are twisted beyond recogni-
tion on a judicial rack, and the heretofore applicable rules of decision
discarded, modified, or misrepresented in an occasionally unprincipled
and never clearly explained manner.
Many will, I am certain, be inclined to characterize these judg-
ments as the sort of vituperation to which law professors are inclined,
an exercise in which they can freely engage because the stakes are far
less compelling than the adjudication of the real claims of real peo-
ple.58 0 Nevertheless, it seems to me that the implications of what the
court has done in Haman for the division of power between and
among the various branches of state government in Nebraska are sub-
stantial. It is axiomatic that the legislature sets the public policies of
the State of Nebraska, and an argument could be made that Haman
does not disturb that principle. To the extent the doctrine survives,
however, it does so in a highly altered form, one within which the real-
ities of what the court is doing belie the explanatory veneer with
which they gild the results reached.
L.B. 272A indicated, for example, that the Department of Banking
"knew or should have known" of the conditions that led to the demise
579. Id
580. Or, as they say, the reason why faculty politics are so vicious is there is so little at
stake.
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of Commonwealth Savings Company, including the "criminal actions,
violations of banking statutes, rules, and regulations, and mismanage-
ment" perpetrated by officers whose actions were subject to depart-
mental review.58s The legislature also found that departmental orders
issued "without regard to whether other industrial companies were
solvent... caused depositors to lose confidence in industrial compa-
nies" so that their assets were "continuously drained" and the compa-
-nies "forced to merge with or be purchased by other financial
institutions or to seek protection by reorganization under Chapter 11
...."582 And, when passed, L.B. 272A had the support of twenty-nine
senators who expressed their firm belief, through votes in support of a
measure whose contents could hardly be declared alien to them, that:
[The Legislature further finds and declares that the circumstances recited...
have seriously impaired the confidence of the people of this state in the Legis-
lature and in the enactments of the Legislature such as section 21-17,144, the
confidence of the people of this state in its financial institutions has been seri-
ously impaired, the welfare and stability of this state and its financial institu-
tions require that the people have confidence in the Legislature and in the
financial institutions that are organized pursuant to the enactments of the
Legislature, and the redemption of the guaranty to depositors by the Ne-
braska Depository Institution Guaranty Corporation will serve a necessary
public purpose and will effect a sound and necessary public policy.
5 8 3
The focus in Haman, and for that matter much of the public dia-
logue about that case and Commonwealth in general, has tended to
fall almost exclusively on only one of L.B. 272A's goals, redemption of
certificates of indebtedness to date incurred and unpaid. The plaintiff,
for example, began her discussion of her first proposition of law with a
castigation of "[t]he purported justification for the Act... set forth in
Sections 2 and 3," and then brushed the detailed Legislative findings
aside with the assertion that "[tihe Act does nothing more nor less
than compensate a specific identifiable and closed class of individuals
for losses predating the passage of the Act."5 8 4 This tendency to dis-
count, rather than respond to, the realities of L.B. 272A became even
more obvious in her third point, within which she simply refused to
credit the motivations of the legislature and its statements, declaring,
for example, that "there is nothing in the legislative history of LB
272A to support any such 'finding' that the people of Nebraska have
lost confidence or the Legislature or the state's financial
institutions." 85
The state devoted considerable space in its brief to lengthy extracts
from the legislative debate that presented quite a different picture.
581. L.B. 272A, § 2.
582. Id.
583, Id.
584. Brief of Plaintiff at 10, Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836 (1991)(No.
90-474)(emphasis added).
585. Id- at 27.
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One can, however, leave much of that behind, as a judicial matter,
given what appeared to be the traditional approach to statutory inter-
pretation. The court has stressed that when examining "words of or-
dinary meaning, plain, [and] direct" it will find that "they mean what
they say and say what they mean."5 86 It had also made it clear that it
is supposed to deal with the precise language of the act rather than a
fanciful construction of it: "[t]he constitutional validity of an act of the
Legislature is to be tested and determined not by what has been or
possibly may be done under it, but by what the law authorized to be
done under and by virtue of its provisions."587 Indeed, the obligation
to give precise effect to the entire measure means that "lt is not
within the province of a court to read a meaning into a statute that is
not warranted by the legislative language. Neither is it within the
province of a court to read anything plain, direct, and unambiguous
out of a statute."5 8 8
Paraphrasing the words of the court, "[t]he effect of the literal lan-
guage of [L.B. 272A] is to [make an appropriation to serve a necessary
public purpose and... effect a sound and necessary public policy.]" 8 9
The court, of course, was under no duty to summarily accept legisla-
tive declarations of public policy. As it stressed in Lenstrom v. Thone,
"[i]t is for the Legislature to decide in the first instance what is and
what is not a public purpose, but its determination is not conclusive on
the courts." 90 This role in the fashioning of public policy is both ap-
propriate and essential. It is not, however, unbridled: "to justify a
court declaring a statute invalid because its object is not a public pur-
pose, the absence of public purpose must be so clear and palpable as to
be immediately perceptible to the reasonable mind."591
These principles reflect an appropriate reluctance on the part of
the court to intrude in legislative matters and, in particular, to second-
guess the judgments of the legislature, especially those that reflect
policy and are predicated on facts. The court has, accordingly, stressed
that "[ilt will be presumed that the legislature acted with a full knowl-
edge of all facts and conditions essential to intelligent legislation."592
In the specific context of special legislation, it will also "be presumed
that the lawmakers based their exception on conditions of which they
had knowledge. An unreasonable or arbitrary classification does not
appear on the face of the act."593 To the extent that the judges them-
586. City of Scottsbluff v. Tiemann, 185 Neb. 256, 264, 175 N.W.2d 74, 80 (1970).
587. Bachus v. Swanson, 179 Neb. 1, 8, 136 N.W.2d 189, 194 (1965).
588. Id. at 4, 136 N.W.2d at 192 (citations omitted).
589. Lenstrom v. Thone, 209 Neb. 783, 788, 311 N.W.2d 884, 888 (1981).
590. Id, at 789, 311 N.W.2d at 888.
591. Id. at 789-90, 311 N.W.2d at 888 (citation omitted).
592. State ex reL Hall County Farm Bureau v. Miller, 104 Neb. 838, 840, 178 N.W. 846,
847 (1920).
593. Rushart v. Crippen, 99 Neb. 682, 684, 157 N.W. 611, 613 (1916).
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selves have doubts about the class created, caution is called for:
[We would not be so confident that, because "no apparent reason" was sug-
gested to the minds of the judges, there could not possibly be a sufficient rea-
son in the minds of the legislators. They are in a better position to know the
"conditions and wants" of different classes of population than are the
courts. 5 9 4
Prior to Haman the calculus invoked in the social and economic
arenas was that any constitutional "inhibition" must be clear and sub-
stantial, and that the statute in question is to be subjected to the low-
est or least intense sort of judicial scrutiny: "[m]easures adopted by
the Legislature to protect the public health and secure the public
safety and welfare must have some reasonable relation to those pro-
posed ends."5 95 The requirement was not that the court be convinced
that the statute is necessary or wise, but that there simply be "some
foundation in fact to justify [the] legislative action," in which case
"this court is powerless to substitute its judgment for that of the legis-
lature even if it cared to do so."596 This was true even when the legis-
lation in question engaged in a retroactive allocation of the benefits
and burdens of life in the state. For example, in Chicago, B & Q.R Co.
v. State the court spoke of "burdens designed to promote the safety
and welfare of the general public."597 The court did not, however, in-
dicate that such burdens may only be imposed prospectively, a deter-
mination that might have seemed compelled given the court's use of
the "preexisting obligation" rubric in Wakeley. After first stating that
"[a] statute does not operate retroactively from the mere fact that it
relates to antecedent events,"598 the court found both that the mea-
sure in question had retroactive effect and was a valid exercise of the
police power:
[T]he single purpose of the legislation, whether contemplating the erection or
reconstruction of the viaduct, is to reduce to a minimum the danger to life and
limb for which the railroad companies are chiefly responsible, and it is not
unreasonable to require the parties to maintain the street in a condition of
safety, for whose benefit and convenience it was originally rendered
unsafe.5 9 9
In doing so, the court emphasized a sense of the police power that is of
special importance in assessing Haman, stressing the need for "the
subordination of private rights to the public welfare, of the individual
to the community."60o
594. State ex reL Magney v. Hunter, 99 Neb. 520, 523, 156 N.W. 975, 976 (1916)(quoting
State ex reL Douglas v. Ritt, 79 N.W. 535 (Minn. 1899)).
595. United States Brewers' Ass'n v. State, 192 Neb. 328, 333, 220 N.W.2d 544, 548
(1974).
596. Nelsen v. Tilley, 137 Neb. 327, 332, 289 N.W. 388, 392 (1939)(emphasis added).
597. 47 Neb. 549, 564, 66 N.W. 624, 627 (1896).
598. Id- at 563, 66 N.W. at 627.
599. Id. at 574, 66 N.W. at 630.
600. Id. at 565, 66 N.W. at 627.
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In a very real sense, Haman represented the complaint of a citizen
who did not wish to subordinate her rights to what the legislature had
deemed to be the common good. It was obviously her prerogative to
question what the legislature had done. But the fact of her disagree-
ment, and for that matter the willingness of the court to agree with it
as a personal matter, did not mean that the legislative choice articu-
lated in L.B. 272A was constitutionally improper. This is perhaps one
of the reasons why the Haman court avoided all discussion of the
plaintiff's due process claims and provided no insight into the true im-
plication of Weaver. Taken to its logical extreme, the position
adopted in Weaver, which was in fact the due process position es-
poused by the plaintiff in Haman, would make the simple act of pro-
viding any public funds to private individuals a violation of due
process. That proposition, of course, reaches much too far in a society
that has adopted a far more compassionate view of its responsibilities
toward others. Accordingly, the contemporary vision of the police
power and due process, and in particular what constitutes a valid pub-
lic purpose, is both more far reaching and gives a truer meaning to the
court's longstanding maxim that the wisdom of the act should not be
at issue. The rule announced in Haman would, presumably, allow the
court to reach a different result in cases like Lennox v. Housing Au-
thority, in which it accepted legislative "findings" that the establish-
ment of "sanitary and wholesome" low-rent housing projects served a
valid public purpose.6 01 The same would be true of State ex rel
Creighton University v. Smith, where the court accepted the legisla-
ture's judgment that "the promotion and search for good health as a
benefit to all citizens of Nebraska" through cancer research was a
valid public purpose."6 02 It would also be quite inconsistent with any
number of other decisions, within which the court was willing to both
agree with the public policy objective and "finesse" otherwise fatal
constitutional proibitions.603 As indicated, one of the important ele-
ments of those decisions is the fact that the incidental benefit of a par-
ticular group was of no moment. Where the "primary purpose and
principal objective" of a statute are clear, the reality of indirect bene-
fits will not serve as a basis for its invalidation.604 As the court has
stressed, "[1legislation which serves a public purpose is not constitu-
tionally impermissible because incidental benefits may accrue to
others."605
L.B. 272A expressly declared that it sought to restore public confi-
601. 137 Neb. 582, 593, 290 N.W. 451, 457 (1940).
602. 217 Neb. 682, 690, 353 N.W.2d 267, 272 (1984).
603. See, e.g., Lenstrom v. Thone, 209 Neb. 783, 311 N.W.2d 884 (1981); State ex reL
Rogers v. Swanson, 192 Neb. 125, 219 N.W.2d 726 (1974).
604. State ex reL Creighton Univ. v. Smith, 217 Neb. 682, 353 N.W.2d 267 (1984).
605. Lenstrorn v. Thone, 209 Neb. 783, 790, 311 N.W.2d 884, 888 (1981).
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dence and that this is a "necessary public purpose and will effect a
sound and necessary public policy."606 This is significant since, in an
admittedly different context-the donation of public funds to chari-
ties--the court has stressed that "'the test is in the end, not in the
means.' "607 Relying on that decision, the court subsequently indi-
cated that:
[N]o hard and fast rule can be laid down for determining whether a proposed
expenditure of public funds is valid as devoted to a public use or purpose.
Each case must be decided with reference to the object sought to be accom-
plished and to the degree and manner in which that object affects the public
welfare.6 0 8
In this instance, the "object sought to be accomplished" was the
restoration of public trust, with the legislature determining that re-
demption of the deposits would promote that end. The plaintiff dis-
agreed, but as the court had stressed:
[I]n appropriating the public funds, if there is reason for doubt or argument as
to whether the purpose for which the appropriation is made is a public or
private purpose, and reasonable means might differ in regard to it, it is gener-
ally held that the matter is for the Legislature.
6 0 9
Relying on those principles, the court has also approved the transfer
of public funds to private entities, such as chambers of commerce, to
fund publicity related to industrial development.10 The court ac-
knowledged that "particular organizations or individuals" might bene-
fit. It stressed, however, that in light of the overarching public
purpose such a "[b]enefit... is only the incidental benefit which gen-
erally attaches in most public welfare legislation."611 The same phe-
nomenon was evident in the operation of the Nebraska Mortgage
Finance Fund Act, which has the practical effect of using the prestige
and financial stability of the state, albeit not public funds, to provide
the means by which private individuals may secure home mortgages.
As the court observed, "[n]ot only is this goal morally right, but from
the standpoint of good government it is essential." 612 The court also
discounted any implication that an intent or effect to aid the construc-
tion industry factored impermissibly into the Act's passage: "[t]he ben-
efits, if any, to be realized by the building industry are only incidental
benefits obtained by providing adequate housing for citizens of the
606. L.B. 272A § 3.
607. United Community Servs. v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 162 Neb. 786,800,77 N.W.2d 576,
587 (1956)(quoting Hager v. Kentucky Children's Home Soc'y, 83 S.W. 605 (Ky.
1904)).
608. State ex reL Douglas v. Nebraska Mortgage Fin. Fund, 204 Neb. 445, 458, 283
N.W.2d 12, 21 (1979).
609. Oxnard Beet Sugar Co. v. State, 73 Neb. 66, 67, 105 N.W. 716, 717 (1905).
610. Chase v. County of Douglas, 195 Neb. 838, 241 N.W.2d 334 (1976).
611. Id. at 847, 241 N.W.2d at 340.
612. State en reL Douglas v. Nebraska Mortgage Fin. Fund, 204 Neb. 445, 458, 283
N.W.2d 12, 21 (1979).
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state." 613
Moreover, the court has also stressed that citizens aggrieved by the
determinations made by their elected representatives find their rem-
edy at the polls, rather than in the court:
[The taxation] power has by the people been committed to the discretion of
the legislature, and the limits within which it may be exercised depend on, in
the absence of express limitations upon such power, upon the exigencies of the
public; and, for an abuse of the trust thus imposed, the remedy is an appeal to
the public themselves, in the manner ordained by the constitution.
6 1 4
The need for political redress arises even when the legislative measure
is itself discriminatory. For example, in Linenbrink v. Chicago &
North Western Railway,15 the court rejected a challenge to a statute
imposing liability on a railroad that had not fenced its right of way,
allowing two bulls to wander on the tracks and be killed. The railway
argued that the result was "harsh" and "discriminatory" since the
statute was the product of an era when railways were the dominant
form of transportation and did not impose liability on other, now more
pervasive carriers. The court conceded that the conditions giving rise
to the statute had changed. It stressed, however, that the measure
"reflects the legislative policy of the state and if incidental changes in
conditions are to be given consideration, it is a change in legislative
policy that must be sought and not a judicial holding."616 Indeed, the
court itself labors under a similar burden:
Whatever the personal views of this court may be as to the necessity of such
legislation, the fact remains that the legislature of the state concluded that a
reasonable basis existed for its enactment and, there being some foundation in
fact to justify legislative action, this court is powerless to substitute its judg-
ment for that of the legislature even if it cared to do so. 6 17
These were not isolated observations. They depict, rather, a consis-
tent thread in the court's prior treatment of social and economic legis-
lation. The message conveyed, prior to Haman, was that citizens were
free to work diligently to prevent the legislature from passing meas-
ures like L.B. 272A, an activity the plaintiff in Haman either did not
engage in, or, like the many others opposed to that measure, at which
she failed. With the passage of L.B. 272A, those individuals were then
free to express their disapproval through their votes and political ad-
vocacy for change, a process that can clearly be effective, as the defeat
of Governor Orr in the last election clearly attests. What those indi-
viduals were not arguably free to do was to ask the court to give force
to their personal preferences, invalidating a clear expression of public
613. Id. at 461, 283 N.W.2d at 23.
614. Board of Directors of Alfalfa Irrigations Dist. v. Collins, 46 Neb. 411, 424-25, 64
N.W. 1086, 1090 (1895).
615. 177 Neb. 838, 131 N.W.2d 417 (1964),
616. Id- at 843, 131 N.W.2d at 421.
617. Nelsen v. Tilley, 137 Neb. 327, 332, 289 N.W. 388, 392 (1939).
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policy that served a variety of purposes, solely because they and/or the
court disagreed with the wisdom of the measure.
The court, in rejecting the claims of a public purpose in L.B. 272A,
did three things. It first declared that there was in fact no moral obli-
gation, a decision predicated on a flawed and incomplete exposition of
the applicable precedents. It then, even as it attempted to deny that it
was doing so, changed the standard of review and invoked heightened
scrutiny to give it at least part of the leverage it needed to reach the
result it wished to fashion. Finally, it decided for itself that the public
purpose articulated in L.B. 272A could not possibly be a valid one,
since it would, in the court's estimation, produce precisely the opposite
results.
It is this third step, the court's substitution of its vision of the con-
sequences of L.B. 272A for the one articulated by the legislature, that
is perhaps the most troubling if the issue is the overall implications of
Haman, rather than simply whether the court was right in that case.
The impetus for the court's actions can, in some respects, be traced in
the plaintiff's brief, where she argued:
If we are to go beyond this, as the State, the Intervenor and the Amicus
urge, to grant legislative reimbursement in discharge of moral obligations, the
process and end result are completely without definition. What, for example,
is the meaning of a moral obligation? How and by whom is it determined that
such an obligation exists? From what sources does the obligation spring?
When is the moral obligation breached, and by what acts or omissions commit-
ted by what persons connected with state government? 61 8
The questions are interesting, but they are also largely beside the
point. It is, of course, possible to frame an answer to each one, and
indeed the court has arguably told us where to find many of them in
past decisions. In each instance, however, the court recognized that
both the questions and answers had been or should be supplied by the
legislature. The court, consistent with its proper role, was confined to
simply testing the constitutional propriety of the answer, rather than
itself framing the question and then posing the response. This is a
distinction of no small importance in a governmental system where
the legislature, rather than the courts, frames public policy and articu-
lates public choices. That, as the prior rhetoric of the court indicated,
was the system in place in Nebraska. Haman, in large measure, now
casts substantial doubt on whether that will again be the case, if in fact
it truly ever was.
Ms. Haman also provided a litany of examples, including "after-
the-fact reparations to crime victims claiming a failure in the criminal
justice system" and "patients claiming a failure of the state in its su-
618. Reply Brief of Plaintiff at 5, Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836
(1991)(No. 90-474).
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pervisory authority over physicians." 619 She concluded with the ob-
servation that "[t]he list is as long as the list of activities and
enterprises subject to state regulation." 620 That is, of course, precisely
the point. The list of potential moral obligations on the part of the
state is, and in a properly conceived and applied system of justice,
should be exactly "as long as the list of activities and enterprises sub-
ject to state regulation." The essence of a moral obligation claim is
that sense of outrage, the notion that government has somehow trans-
gressed those boundaries that define fair treatment of citizens and
compassion toward them when their infirmities arise from govern-
ment mis-, mal-, or nonfeasance. Such claims are, as I have indicated,
predicated on overarching notions of justice, rather than the dry ab-
stractions and prickly technicalities of law. They are also entirely con-
sistent with past practices in this state, practices engaged in by the
legislature and approved both tacitly and expressly in cases like those
of George Maurer, injured while on duty with the National Guard, 621
Joe Murray, improperly incarcerated, 622 and Opal Bredehoft, injured
while under the care and supervision of a state physician. 623
The court's willingness to pursue the specter raised by the plaintiff,
and itself produce a parade of horrors, is simultaneously commendable
and misguided. Obviously, it stretches the bounds of good government
to create, through a single legislative act, the impression that "every
time someone is injured, the state will rescue him or her."624 It is
nevertheless difficult, if not impossible, to see how a decision sus-
taining L.B. 272A could possibly have that purpose or effect. The mea-
sure itself spelled out, in considerable detail, a unique and (hopefully,
anyway) aberrant set of circumstances that combined to produce the
harms to be redressed. If we treat the Commonwealth situation in
that light, it seems doubtful that the state will be called upon to en-
gage in a government bail-out "every time someone is injured." But
even if it is, the hard reality is that the request will succeed only if the
aggrieved party can convince a majority of the legislature and the gov-
ernor that her cause is just. If she is able to do so, she should in fact
prevail, for that is the essence of government of, by, and for the peo-
ple, and the court's refusal to accept that reality smacks of judicial
arrogance.
The same observations arise in connection with the court's warning
619. Id at 5-6.
620. I&
621. See supra text accompanying notes 406-09.
622. See supra text accompanying notes 413 and 417.
623. The measure to compensate Ms. Bredehoft, supra note 416, was for the "great
physical pain and suffering" endured as a result of a burn received while she was
a resident of the Nebraska School for the Deaf. L.B. 426, Preamble, 1941 Neb.
Laws 426.
624. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 715, 467 N.W.2d 836, 848 (1991).
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that the "result" of a system within which moral obligations are recog-
nized "could be either economic bankruptcy or economic suffocation
through taxation."625 The first of these is sheer poppycock, as the
court well knows. Article XIII, section 1 of the Nebraska Constitution
forbids deficit spending, "except for the purpose of repelling invasion,
suppressing insurrection, or defending the state in war," conditions
that presumably did not factor in the court's analysis in Hamran. The
court has, accordingly, steadfastly refused to countenance revenue
measures that pose even the slightest possibility of debt.626 Moreover,
the statutory mechanisms that structure the state budget process, cou-
pled with the governor's line-item veto power, insure that "bank-
ruptcy" will not occur. The budget recommendations prepared by the
governor and submitted to the legislature "shall include a reserve re-
quirement... of not less than three percent of the appropriations in-
cluded in such budget."627 The tax rates required to sustain the
budget actually adopted, in turn, while set by the Unicameral, must
provide revenue of "not less than three percent nor more than seven
percent in excess of the appropriations and express obligations for the
biennium for which the appropriations are made."628 These require-
ments have "the purpose," and when followed will inevitably have the
effect, of "insur[ing] that there shall be maintained in the state treas-
ury an adequate General Fund balance, considering cash flow, to meet
the appropriations and express obligations of the state."62 9 Indeed,
the fact that the leaders of the Unicameral must meet twice a year
with the Tax Commissioner to review revenues and rates,63 0 coupled
with the fact that funds may be appropriated only by legislative act,63 '
guarantees that bankruptcy will never occur as a result of decisions
made by the Unicameral.
The second is potentially distressing and should be avoided, but is
also none of the court's business. Determinations regarding both the
necessity for and appropriate level of state taxes are the province of
the governor and legislature.632 The members of the court, like any
625. Id.
626. See, eg., State ex rei Douglas v. Thone, 204 Neb. 836, 286 N.W.2d 249 (1979); Ruge
v. State, 201 Neb. 391,267 N.W.2d 748 (1978); State ex reL Meyer v. Steen, 183 Neb.
297, 160 N.W.2d 164 (1968); State ex reL Bd. Educ. Lands & Funds v. Stuefer, 66
Neb. 381, 92 N.W. 646 (1902).
627. NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-125.01 (1987)(emphasis added).
628. Id- § 77-2715.01(1)(b)(1990).
629. Id.
630. See id. § 77-2715.01(2).
631. See NEB. coNsT. art II, § 22. A state warrant may not issue until an appropria-
tion is made for its payment, Fisher v. Marsh, 113 Neb. 153, 202 N.W. 422 (1925),
and "continuing" legislative appropriations are prohibited. Rein v. Johnson, 149
Neb. 67, 30 N.W.2d 548 (1947).
632. There is always the possibility that a claim could be lodged that tax rates have
become so high that they are confiscatory, a violation of due process. That is both
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other citizen, can justly become concerned if the tax rates approach
the "suffocation" level. Their redress lies, however, at the polls, and
not the bench, a lesson that numerous governors in particular have
learned first hand. Indeed, at the risk of repetition, one need look no
further than the recent demise of the individual who signed L.B. 272A
into law, then Governor now Citizen Orr, to see that the system works
quite nicely, thank you.
B. No State is an Island?
The extent to which the court has gone beyond accepted norms can
be readily discerned in a (relatively) brief examination of three areas:
its treatment of the credit argument, the general national approach to
the issue of moral obligation, and the manner in which every other
state faced with these problems has apparently responded to them.
1. "The Credit of the State"
The court was, ironically, on perhaps its soundest grounds when it
discussed the "claim" that L.B. 272A impermissibly pledged the
"credit" of the state.633 The substantive analysis was elegant, yet sim-
ple: if, as the parties defending L.B. 272A alleged, the class is open,
then any promise to fulfill future claims constitutes an impermissible
pledge of the credit of the state. The court explained that the purpose
of the applicable constitutional provision, article XIII, section 3, "is to
prevent the state or any of its governmental subdivisions from ex-
tending the state's credit to private enterprise." 634 That, the court
stated, "prohibit[s] the state from acting as a surety or guarantor of
the debt of another,"6 35 a situation that would arise if we read L.B.
272A as a declaration that the "state would be forever liable for the
losses of industrial company depositors . ,8"636
There are two problems with this. The first is that the court, by
ignoring entirely the circumstances under which redemption would
occur, seduces the reader herself into forgetting what L.B. 272A is all
about. That measure declared that the state would honor N.D.I.G.C.
unlikely and a very different state of affairs than that posed by Hamcan. Indeed, I
suspect it is far more impossible than the sequence of events the court recites as a
basis for finding the L.B. 272A class open.
633. The irony arises from the fact that this issue did not, in any realistic sense, repre-
sent a "claim" by the plaintiff. It was, rather, an ancillary observation raised in
response to the question of whether L.B. 272A created an open or closed class.
See supra text accompanying notes 96-98. The line of analysis the court employed
is, in turn, detailed at supra text accompanying notes 99-104.
634. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 718, 467 N.W.2d 836, 850 (1991)(citing United Com-
munity Servs. v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 162 Neb. 786, 77 N.W.2d 576 (1956)).
635. Id. (citing State ex reL Jardon v. Industrial Dev. Auth., 570 S.W.2d 666 (Mo.
1978)).
636. Id. at 720, 467 N.W.2d at 850.
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guaranties because the state was under a moral obligation to do so.
Since state laws and state officials were intimately involved in the cir-
cumstances leading to the inability of the corporation to meet its re-
sponsibilities, state involvement elevated what might otherwise have
been a purely private matter to one where redemption "serve[s] a nec-
essary public purpose and will effect a sound and necessary public pol-
icy."6 37 The message of L.B. 272A was then that the state would serve
as the "surety or guarantor" of its own "debts of honor." That is,
clearly, quite a different matter from a blanket promise to honor any
and all future N.D.I.G.C. defaults, a pledge that L.B. 272A most assur-
edly did not make. This assertion can be easily validated by contrast-
ing L.B. 272A's highly conditional language with, for example, the sort
of express promise articulated in Maryland, where the operative stat-
ute provides that "[i]t is the policy of this State that funds will be ap-
propriated to the Fund to the extent necessary to protect holders of
savings accounts in member associations ... "638
The immediate response to this, which is an argument the court
may have anticipated, is "[a]s previously noted, no moral obligation
exist[ed]."639 That conclusion is, as I have already demonstrated,
predicated on our willingness to accept what proves to be a misleading
and incomplete reading of the applicable precedents. But it is interest-
ing to note what happens if we assume, for the sake of argument, that
the court's interpretation of Wakeley is correct. In light of the court's
construction, what is it that L.B. 272A does? The answer is both obvi-
ous and devastating for the court's "credit of the state" analysis: L.B.
272A provides precisely the sort of "preexisting" notice necessary to
establish a valid predicate for future recognition of a moral obligation.
It is also important to understand what the court is trying to say at
this juncture of the opinion. The linchpin in the court's analysis is the
contention that redemption is a one-sided transaction, providing
everything for the depositors and nothing for the state. This position,
that the state receives no "valuable consideration," is a necessary as-
pect of the court's three part, cumulative inquiry. As the court indi-
cates, the test requires not simply that there be credit, but that it be
"given" or "loaned" to a private actor. That occurs in the case of L.B.
272A, the court argues, since all the legal claims have been settled or
dismissed, no moral obligation existed, and the claims assigned are
"relatively worthless."640
637. L.B. 272A, § 3.
638. MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 10-116 (1988).
639. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 721, 467 N.W.2d 836, 851 (1991).
640. Id at 720-21, 467 N.W.2d at 851 (1991). The court does not explain how it reaches
the conclusion that the claims are "relatively worthless" or the bases for its judg-
ment that the state "could never come close to receiving an equal amount to the
proposed distribution of funds. .. ." Id. at 721, 467 N.W.2d at 851. That may be
the case, but it is neither certain nor demonstrated by the court.
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It is quite likely that the court's premise is wrong, Weimer makes
it clear that the depositors are free to pursue alternate claims.641 The
dismissal of American Savings Co., which was a voluntary act by the
depositors, presumably does not foreclose that matter from being re-
opened. It is also evident that the case the court cites in support of
this argument, State v. Wendt,642 does not fully sustain the court's po-
sition. Nothing in Wendt indicates that the Washington court made a
judgment that the state could in fact recoup its actual costs. Indeed,
the court indicates that the transaction may be "unbalanced," since "in
allowing the injured worker to receive any excess recovery above
these amounts, the Department receives the indirect, but important,
benefit of that individual's cooperation." 64 3 Moreover, it is quite clear
that in Washington State "[t]he public benefit achieved from such ac-
tivities is the 'consideration' for the funds received."644 That, in the
context of L.B. 272A, means that consideration is in fact present when
the measure discharges the public purposes articulated by the Uni-
cameral, public purposes with which the court might disagree but with
which it is, in a proper exercise of the judicial function, not free to
dismiss for that reason, and that reason alone.
But even if what the court asserts is true, it has no bearing on the
actual issue, whether afuture redemption might provide valuable con-
sideration. That is, after all, precisely what we are talking about here,
the future. The court cannot tell us on the one hand that the credit
issue arises because the class is open, thus triggering potential future
liability, and on the other hand that we should assess whether there
will in fact be "valuable consideration" in the future in light of current
claims that are somehow "worthless." The court cannot possibly
know the value of any future redemption; for that matter, the court
cannot possibly know how much money the state would be required to
spend. The question, at least to the extent that we are concerned
about lending credit, is controlled by events about which we now
know nothing and which must be assessed on their own terms, when
they arise. The court cannot have it both ways.
Obviously, the court would be on somewhat sounder footing if the
situation were as it describes. For example, in Chase v. County of
Douglas 645 the court did hold that a provision authorizing localities to
641. See supra text accompanying notes 53-56.
642. 735 P.2d 1334 (Wash. App. 1987).
643. Id. at 1339. While the court might not agree, it is likely that almost every other
public official in Nebraska would consider "silencing" the Commonwealth deposi-
tors very valuable consideration indeed.
644. Johnson v. Johnson, 634 P.2d 877, 881 (Wash. 1981). Accord State ex reL Holmes
v. Krueger, 72 N.W.2d 734, 738 (Wis. 1955)("The contributions directed by the
statute together with the moral obligation are an adequate consideration for the
payments.").
645. 195 Neb. 838, 241 N.W.2d 334 (1976).
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issue bonds to finance the purchase of property for industrial develop-
ment purposes unconstitutionally pledged the credit of the state. The
Haman court is then correct to the extent that its discussion of Chase
recognizes that the extension of public credit for a purely private use
violates the constitution. There is, however, a fundamental difference
between the issuance of bonds, which by their very nature pledge fu-
ture income to retire a debt, and the appropriation of funds, if and
when the contingencies that would trigger the appropriation arise.
The evil condemned by the court in Chase was, accordingly, two-fold:
the bonds created a public debt, a debt that the court characterized as
allocating all of the benefits to the private actor and all of the risks to
the state.
That brings us to the second major difficulty with the credit analy-
sis, the validity and actual implications of precedents on which the
court relies. The Haman court tries to convince us that "[t]he state's
credit is inherently the power to levy taxes and involves the obligation
of its general fund."646 The court cannot possibly be telling us, how-
ever, that the "credit" of the state is implicated each time the legisla-
ture creates a future obligation in favor of a private individual. Under
that theory a host of state programs, each "promising" a particular
service or benefit to private individuals, in the future, would be uncon-
stitutional. 647 It must, instead, be trying to tell us something about
"credit," which, in the case of L.B. 272A, is at issue: "[t]he stated pur-
pose of the act is redemption of the guarantees of a private corporation
to depositors by obligating present and future taxes from the state's
general fund. This is precisely the activity article XIII, § 3, was en-
acted to prohibit."64s
Yes and no; as the authorities tend to verify, the evil toward which
constitutional prohibitions of this sort were directed was the "excesses
of the railroad bond era," a period during which "several state govern-
ments filled [a] financial vacuum by lending their credit or borrowing
646. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 719, 467 N.W.2d 836, 850 (1991).
647. The state's system of programs for the care and treatment of citizens with mental
retardation is, for example, predicated on the legislative declaration that "a pat-
tern of facilities, programs, and services should be available to meet the needs of
each person with mental retardation so that a person with mental retardation
may have access to facilities, programs, and services best suited to such person
throughout his or her life." NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-1,141 (1987). Any person at-
tending an existing regional program as of April 16, 1974 "may continue to do so
and actual costs shall be contracted and paid to the regions involved." Id. § 83-
1,143.07. The state institution, "[t]he Beatrice State Developmental Center[]
shall provide residential care and humane treatment for those persons with
mental retardation who require residential care ... and shall furnish such train-
ing... as they may be capable of learning." Id. § 83-218. These are positive com-
mands and articulate individual, future entitlements, as a matter of public policy.
648. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 720, 467 N.W.2d 836, 850-51 (1991)(emphasis
added).
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in order to purchase railroad shares."64 9 This historical reality, as sev-
eral courts have stressed, means that the definition of "credit" be-
comes extraordinarily important. If, for example, the state simply
"gives" tax money to private individuals, or authorizes future such ob-
ligations, "credit" per se is not involved. This is quite clearly the rule
in Nebraska since, as one of the cases cited by the Haman court makes
clear, the simple act of giving public funds to private actors for "elee-
mosynary" purposes does not violate article XIII, section 3.650 This is
true because, as a second case relied on in Haman emphasizes, "'the
constitutional prohibitions noted are not violated when money and
property are expended or utilized to accomplish a "public
purpose." ' "651
The court, possibly anticipating this, argues that "[t]he prohibition
against the pledge of the state's credit does not hinge on whether the
legislation achieves a 'public purpose,' when the pledge benefits a pri-
vate individual, association, or corporation."652 This statement follows
on the heels of the court's discussion of Chase and is curious given that
decision's recognition that article XIII, section 3 was not violated in
the case of the "publicity" objective precisely because a public purpose
was served.65 3 This is, as indicated, the view in Missouri and, for that
649. David E. Pinsky, State Constitutional Limitations on Public Industrial Financ-
ing: An Historical and Economic Approach, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 265, 277 (1963).
See also Arthur P. Roy, Comment, State Constitutional Provisions Prohibiting
the Loaning of Credit to Private Enterprise-A Suggested Analysis, 41 U. CoLO.
L. REV. 135 (1969); R.M.S., Comment, State Constitutional Limitations on a Mu-
nicipality's Power to Appropriate Funds or Extend Credit to Individuals and As-
sociations, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 95 (1959).
650. United Community Servs. v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 162 Neb. 786, 801, 77 N.W.2d 576,
587 (1956)(sustaining the legislative act authorizing the contributions, acceding to
the legislative determination that there is a "public purpose"). The court makes
it clear earlier that this is an "eleemosynary" act. Id. at 790, 77 N.W.2d at 582.
651. State ex reL Jardon v. Industrial Dev. Auth., 570 S.W.2d 666, 676 (Mo. 1978) (quot-
ing State ex reL Farmers' Elec. Coop. v. State Envtl. Improvement Auth., 518
S.W.2d 68, 74 (Mo. 1968)). The "public purpose" doctrine has, historically, pro-
vided the fulcrum upon which a variety of legislative enactments were deter-
mined to be valid. See generally Walton H. Hamilton, Affectation with Public
Interest, 39 YALE L.J. 1089 (1930); Charles M. Kneier, Municipal Functions and
the Law of Public Purpose, 76 U. PA. L. REV. 824 (1928); Brek P. McAllister,
Public Purpose in Taxation, 18 CALIF. L. REV. 137 (1930).
652. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 722, 467 N.W.2d 836, 852 (1991).
653. Chase v. County of Douglas, 195 Neb. 838, 847, 241 N.W.2d 334, 340 (1976)("It is
readily apparent that the benefit of the broad scope of these provisions redounds
to the public generally and not to particular organizations or individuals."). The
Haman court's discussion of Chase acknowledges the finding, but not the matrix
within which it was framed. The Chase court quoted at length from United Com-
munity Services on this point, stressing that in an article XIII, § 3 inquiry "'the
test is in the end, not in the means.'" Chase v. County of Douglas, 195 Neb. 838,
847, 241 N.W.2d 334, 340 (1976)(quoting United Community Servs. v. Omaha Nat'l
Bank, 162 Neb. 786, 801, 77 N.W.2d 576, 587 (1956)). Ironically, the quotation from
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matter, virtually every other jurisdiction. In Washington State, for
example, the court in Wendt concluded its discussion of "considera-
tion" with the observation that "[e]ven if the expenditures constitute
gifts or loans, [the constitution] does not prevent the State from ex-
pending money in exercising a 'recognized governmental func-
tion.' "654 That is true because to hold otherwise "would destroy the
efficiency of the agencies established by the constitution to carry out
the recognized and essential powers of government. It cannot be con-
ceived that the people who framed and adopted the constitution had
such consequences in view." 655
The court, perhaps sensing this, turns to Kentucky for support, cit-
ing McGuffey v. Hall.6 56 As the Kentucky court itself acknowledged,
however, this is not a universal rule, citing (strangely enough), Al-
mond v. Day, a Virginia case holding that "[w]hen the underlying and
activating purpose of the transaction and the financial obligation are
for the state's benefit, there is no loaning of credit."s5 7 Virginia was,
of course, a "persuasive" jurisdiction on the question of what standard
governs a special legislation inquiry, and the Haman court does not
instruct us at this juncture why Virginia decisions are not equally ap-
propriate sources of guidance on the state credit question. That is,
however, arguably irrelevant, since the Kentucky court itself subse-
quently embraced Almond as "persuasive," effectively overruling
those aspects of McGuffey on which the Haman court relied.658 More
United Community Services is itself taken from a Kentucky decision, Hager v.
Kentucky Children's Home Soc'y, 83 S.W. 605 (Ky. 1904).
654. State v. Wendt, 735 P.2d 1335, 1339 (Wash. App. 1987)(quoting Johnson v. John-
son, 634 P.2d 877, 881 (Wash. 1981).
655. Rauch v. Chapman, 48 P. 253,255 (Wash. 1897). The Washington court will invali-
date an action where the public benefit is not clear. See, eg., Lassila v. City of
Wenatchee, 576 P.2d 54, 58 (Wash. 1978)(city's "desire for a multipurpose theater
adjacent to its contemplated community center is a commendable purpose," but
"a salutary purpose does not validate an unconstitutional loan"). Arizona, the
jurisdiction cited in Haman to establish the purpose of the credit bar, see Haman
v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 718-19, 467 N.W.2d 836, 850 (1991)(quoting City of Tempe
v. Pilot Properties, Inc., 527 P.2d 515, 519 (Ariz. App. 1974)), recognizes the public
purpose exception, but requires that there be a balance between public and pri-
vate benefits. See, e-g., Kromko v. Arizona Bd. Regents, 718 P.2d 478, 481 (Ariz.
1986) (agreement serves a recognized public purpose and is neither a donation nor
a subsidy); Wistuber v. Paradise Valley Unified School, 687 P.2d 355, 357 (Ariz.
1984)("the Constitution may still be violated if the value to be received by the
public is far exceeded by the consideration being paid by the public").
656. 557 S.W.2d 401 (Ky. 1977).
657. 91 S.E.2d 660, 667 (Va. 1956).
658. The subsequent case is Hayes v. State Property & Bldgs. Comm'n, 731 S.W.2d 797
(Ky. 1987), in which the court stated that "[m]erely because the state incurs an
indebtedness for its benefit and others may incidentally profit does not bring the
action within the letter or the spirit of the prohibition of lending of state credit."
Id. at 800. The court states that it is "persuaded by the reasoning set out in"
Almond, a position that marks a decided shift from McGuffey, where the court
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tellingly, given the actual holding in McGuffey itself, the validity of
the approach was questionable to begin with, at least as applied to the
situation created by L.B. 272A. The Kentucky court has stressed that
there is a very important exception to the credit bar where a "guar-
anty arrangement" is implemented through "future appropriations if,
as and when made by the legislature out of revenue then currently
available to and expendable by it."659 That of course, is precisely what
L.B. 272A provided for;future appropriations by the legislature, if and
when the corporation is unable to fulfill the deposit guarantees for
funds deposited in institutions meeting the very specific conditions
spelled out in L.B. 272A.
2. Moral Obligation: A National Perspective
The second inquiry, the general treatment of moral obligation,
poses squarely the public policy question. Ironically, many of Justice
Cardozo's decisions as a member of the New York Court of Appeals
provide an especially appropriate means of establishing this context.
In Shaddock v. Schwartz, a 1927 decision, for example, Justice Cardozo
considered and rejected an argument predicated on the notion that "in
the absence of any statute to the contrary, acceptance by a municipal-
ity of the fruits of an invalid contract will not supply the basis for a
legal obligation on the footing of a quantum meruit."66 0 That is, to use
the phrasing employed in Haman, Justice Cardozo refused to accept
the argument that there can be no moral obligation where a statute
has not previously warned that such an obligation attaches. He ob-
served that the plaintiff's "conception of equity and fairness, the thing
demanded by good conscience, is one of a justice unrelieved by tender-
ness and charity."661 Justice Cardozo rejected the protesting tax-
payer's claim: "We think the council was not limited in its estimate of
moral obligation to this Draconian severity. An act is to be viewed,
not singly and in vacuo, but in the setting of the whole occasion, if we
would judge its moral quality."662 One year earlier, he laid waste to a
second Haman centerpiece, the notion that ignorance of the law is no
excuse. In People ex rel. Clark v. Gilchrist, a case dealing with the
interpretation of the state income tax law, Justice Cardozo stressed:
condemned the Almond rule as "too broad" and declared that the constitutional
provision "does not permit the state's credit to be given or lent for any purpose,
public or otherwise." McGuffey v. Hall, 557 S.W.2d 401, 410 (Ky. 1977). Hayes is
discussed with approval in Kelly Beers Rouse, Note, Facing the Economic Chal-
lenges of the Eighties-the Kentucky Constitution and Hayes v. The State Prop-
erty and Buildings Commission of Kentucky, 15 N. KY. L. REv. 645 (1988).
659. McGuffey v. Hall, 557 S.W.2d 401,410 (Ky. 1977)(citing Greer v. Kentucky Health
& Geriatric Auth., 467 S.W. 340, 342 (Ky. 1971)).
660. 158 N.E. 872, 874 (N.Y. 1927).
661. 1d.
662. Id.
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Returns had been made in reasonable reliance on the comptroller's regula-
tion. If there had been a mistake, it was mistake induced by the agents of the
state itself. Taxpayers thus misled had regulated their affairs on the assump-
tion that their tax accounts were closed. To reaudit returns so made might
impose a grievous burden. Mistake, even mistake of law, will lay the basis of
an equity which lawmakers may heed.6 6
3
Shaddock and Clark are part of a long line of New York decisions,
many written by Justice Cardozo, that recognized the compelling
force of moral obligation as a justification for otherwise tenuous legis-
lative acts. That court, by and large, adopted an approach to moral
obligation that was consistent with Wakeley-properly understood,
that is--and, accordingly, at odds with the one set forth in Haman.
For example, in a case posing many of the same issues that arose in
Nebraska, the New York court recognized the authority of the legisla-
ture to authorize the court of claims to hear a claim and award, and if
appropriate, damages for injuries sustained by a state worker.664 The
court observed that "[t]he Legislature... is not prevented from recog-
nizing claims founded on equity and justice, though they are not such
as could have been enforced in a court of law if the state had not been
immune from suit."665 One year later the court recognized that the
New York Constitution prohibited "[m]ere gifts and benevolences in
aid of private undertakings."666 It did not, however, "prohibit the rec-
ognition of claims that have their roots in equity and justice. '667 "The
question," Justice Cardozo wrote, "was for the Legislature whether
the equity of compensation was strong enough to merit recognition.
We cannot hold it to be illusory."668
One example of a decision that did not recognize the moral obliga-
tion, interestingly enough, involved the same issue that initially side-
tracked the Montana and Iowa courts, bonuses to veterans. In People
v. Westchester County National Bank the court held that the bonus
system, which would be funded by bonds, was a "mere gratuity" and
impermissibly pledged the credit of the state.66 9 The court stressed
that in every case recognizing a moral obligation "there was the foun-
dation of a claim against the state itself, however imperfect." 670 It rec-
ognized that "if there is any reasonable ground for the legislative
decision that a moral obligation exists, the courts may not inter-
vene."6 71 That ground, the court determined, was absent, a decision
that provoked an eloquent dissent by Justice Cardozo stressing the
663. 153 N.E. 39, 42 (N.Y. 1926).
664. Munro v. State, 119 N.Y. 444 (N.Y. 1918).
665. I- at 445.
666. Oswego & Syracuse R.R. v. State, 124 N.E. 8, 10 (N.Y. 1919).
667. AL
668. 1&
669. 132 N.E. 241 (N.Y. 1921).
670. Id. at 246.
671. Id at 247.
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"[g]reat achievement and great sacrifice [that] have been meagerly
rewarded."672
That view of the proper foundations for moral obligation did not,
however, lead the court to reject that predicate in a case that bears a
far greater resemblance to the situation in Haman than Cox, the deci-
sion the Haman court described as embodying a "factual situation par-
allel [to] the case at bar."673 In Williamsburgh Savings Bank v.
State674 the court recounted the history of a state authorized commis-
sion that had issued bonds to fund a flood control project. The bonds
were to be funded through assessments levied against the lands
benefitted. An "utter collapse of the plan to raise money" ensued, and
the court stressed that the claimant
relied upon the facts that this improvement project had been initiated by the
state; that it had been approved by a commission acting as an agency of the
state, and also by the state itself, and that as represented by the commission
there were lands ... which 'would stand as the security for the payment
'675
The legislature, recognizing this, authorized the bank to prosecute a
claim for recovery of its lost funds. The state defended the action by
trying to deny that there was any moral obligation. The court indi-
cated that recognition of such claims "is a privilege and not an obliga-
tion," and stressed that "[t]he state may, if it prefers, reject the calls of
justice, equity, and fair dealing, stand upon its legal rights, and leave
the claimant without remedy, and the state alone, through its Legisla-
ture, can decide which course it will pursue."676 The court noted that
the determination of whether there was a moral obligation was a ques-
tion of law, and found the obligation existed. It indicated that "[t]he
state approved and started on its disastrous course [with] the improve-
ment plan which has become the source of so much trouble."677 The
fact that the bonds in question were not a legal obligation of the state
was irrelevant; the claim pressed was a moral one, and the court
would "not permit it to be said, as a matter of law, that the state is
without any moral responsibility for what has happened and that it
must stand unresponsive when asked to relieve those whom indirectly
at least it has brought into an unhappy predicament .... ,"678
It would take very little to rewrite Williamsburgh Savings Bank
to fit the circumstances described by L.B. 272A and then use it to sus-
tain that measure. That would not, contrary to the impression created
by Haman, be either an unwarranted act or one out of the mainstream
672. Id at 248 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
673. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 710, 467 N.W.2d 836, 845 (1991).
674. 153 N.E. 58 (N.Y. 1926).
675. Id- at 60.
676. Id- at 61.
677. Id at 63.
678. Id-
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of judicial thought. Indeed, the response in almost every state that has
considered such measures has been overwhelmingly in favor of them,
an inquiry framed in many instances within the letter and spirit of the
principles articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Realty
Co., a decision that the New York courts quoted with approval in most
of the cases I have discussed. In that decision the Court observed:
To no other branch of the government than Congress could any application be
successfully made on the part of the owners of such claims or debts for the
payment thereof. Their recognition depends solely upon Congress, and
whether it will recognize claims thus founded must be left to the discretion of
that body. Payment to individuals, not of right or of a merely legal claim, but
payments in the nature of a gratuity, yet having some feature of moral obliga-
tion to support them, have been made by the government by virtue of acts of
Congress, appropriating the public money, ever since its foundation.679
Ironically, as part of the process of articulating this principle, the
Court felt compelled to stress that the federal government had at least
as much authority as those of the states to make such payments. The
Court cited a New York decision to the effect that a state "could recog-
nize claims founded in equity and justice in the largest sense of these
terms or in gratitude or in charity,"680 and acknowledged that the
powers of the federal and state legislatures were "different." Never-
theless, the Court observed, "it is believed that in relation to the
power to recognize and to pay obligations resting only upon moral con-
siderations or upon the general principles of right and justice, the Fed-
eral Congress stands upon a level with the state legislature."6 81
The question posed in Realty Co. was whether it was proper for
Congress to pay certain "bounties" to manufacturers and producers of
sugar that were owed pursuant to the Tariff Act of 1890. The Court
found that there was a "just debt," a term it defined to "include[s]
those debts or claims which rest upon a merely equitable or honorary
obligation, and which would not be recoverable in a court of law if
existing against an individual."682 The Court then stated:
The nation, speaking broadly, owes a "debt" to an individual when his claim
grows out of general principles of right and justice; when, in other words, it is
based upon considerations of a moral or merely honorary nature, such as are
binding on the conscience or honor of an individual, although the debt could
obtain no recognition in a court of law. The power of Congress extends at
least as far as the recognition and payment of claims against the government
which are thus founded. 683
Realty Co. was both a decision predicated on prevalent notions of
justice and equity accepted by various state courts and an opinion that
itself found an enthusiastic reception in the states once announced.
679. United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427, 440-41 (1896).
680. Id. at 443 (citing Town of Guilford v. Board of Supervisors, 13 N.Y. 143 (1855)).
681. I&
682. Id. at 440.
683. Id.
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However, the reaction was not universally favorable. In Minnesota,
for example, the court indicated that Realty Co. "has been very se-
verely criticized" and held that "[a] moral obligation upon the part of
the state must have something more substantial than legislation ob-
noxious to the fundamental law to rest upon-something more for a
foundation or starting point than a statute which is itself immoral."e8 4
The aspect of Realty Co. on which the decision rested, however, was
the question of whether an initial reliance on an unconstitutional stat-
ute could give rise to moral obligation. That situation was not present
in a case decided the year before in which the court accepted the doc-
trine of moral obligation and cited Realty Co. to that effect.6 8 5
Other states either rejected the doctrine outright or treated it in
such a crabbed manner that it had little practical effect. The Michigan
court, for example, bluntly rejected the concept in a sugar bounty
case, holding that "[t]his taxation is for no such public purpose that it
can be upheld."686 The act was, rather, an attempt "to take the prop-
erty of one citizen, and turn it over to another; to compel one class to
donate a part of its property to another." 68 7 In Idaho, in a case that
echoed many aspects of Weaver, the court considered whether a city
could levy a special tax assessment pursuant to a state statute that
authorized "municipalities to create a guaranty fund from general
taxes levied on the entire municipality, with which to pay deficiencies
in special local assessment improvement districts."688 The court an-
swered in the negative, rejecting an argument that moral obligation
saved the measure. It stated:
There is an equal moral obligation resting on the city as well as a legal and
constitutional one to respect and regard the rights of the taxpayer. The bond-
holder, when he purchased, knew the nature of the security he was purchas-
ing, and its limited value, and it was through no fault of the now additionally
burdened payer of the bond obligations that such original security has proved
faulty. As pointed out above, the external taxpayer has had no process at all,
and the internal, of a limited kind. As to the morals, they are certainly no
more than equal as between the bondholder and the taxpayer, and the consti-
tutional safeguards which are entitled to some consideration, as well as the
fundamental rights of the taxpayer, are entirely on his side. 68 9
684. Minnesota Sugar Co. v. Iverson, 97 N.W. 454, 457-58 (Minn. 1903). The sources of
these "severe criticisms" are not specified. If the question is one of the judicial
reception afforded Realty Co. it is quite clear that the reaction, on balance, was
overwhelmingly favorable. Indeed, the one jurisdiction consistently mentioned
as hostile, California, eventually changed its posture.
685. City of Minneapolis v. Janney, 90 N.W. 312, 316 (Minn. 1902).
686. Michigan Sugar Co. v. Auditor General, 83 N.W. 625, 627 (Mich. 1900).
687. Id.
688. Oregon Short Line Ry. v. Berg, 16 P.2d 373, 373 (Idaho 1932).
689. Id. at 375-76. The opinion generated a lengthy dissent, within which the dissent-
ing justices stressed that moral obligations had been recognized by the court in
the past. Id. at 381 (Leeper, J., dissenting)(citing Gem Irrigation Dist. v. Gallet,
253 P. 128 (Idaho 1927)).
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Seven years later, however, the Idaho court resorted "to both law and
equity" and rejected a lower court decision refusing to acknowledge a
moral obligation, stressing that it did "not appeal to us as a fair minded
or equitable justice, conceding (which we do not, nor the contrary)
that the statute is unconstitutional. ' 690
Decisions rejecting Realty Co., and the acknowledgment that ex-
penditures in discharge of purely moral obligations, were the excep-
tion rather than the rule and, as the Idaho and Minnesota decisions
indicate, exceptions that themselves often bred additional exceptions.
On balance, Realty Co. was then recognized far more often than not.
In Alabama, for example, during the same period that the Nebraska
court rejected the concept in Weaver, the court accepted the principle
in a number of decisions. In one case decided just months before
Weaver, and conjuring up images of Sayre and the unfortunate
George Maurer, the court considered "whether an appropriation...
from the general treasury of the state, in the satisfaction of a moral
obligation to a member of the state militia injured in the line of duty,
is a special or private law ... " 6 9 1 The court sustained the measure,
stressing that there was a public purpose, quoting from an Arizona
decision stating that "'t]he discharge of such an obligation is merely
the performance of a public act, and an appropriation for it is not ex-
pending the public funds for a private purpose.' "692 In an interesting
side issue that was strangely prophetic of Haman, the court explored
"who are those affected whose interest or disinclination may oppose
the enactment," answering that "[n]aturally it would be those whose
money is appropriated." 693 Nevertheless, "[t]he money belongs to all
the people of the state, whose representatives are making the appro-
priation."694 The propriety of such actions, the court emphasized in
this and subsequent cases, was largely for the legislature to deter-
mine,695 and the constitutional provision against taxing one class of
citizens for the private benefit of another "does not mean that it may
not be done as a means or incident to a public purpose sought to be
accomplished or to satisfy a public duty to that individual."696
In Kentucky the court observed that "[t]he Legislature may make
an appropriation in recognition of moral or equitable obligations, such
as a just man would be likely to recognize in his own affairs, whether
690. Alberthesen v. State, 96 P.2d 437, 440 (Idaho 1939).
691. State v. Clements, 126 So. 162, 162 (Ala. 1930).
692. Id. at 163 (quoting Fairfield v. Huntington, 205 P. 814, 818 (Ariz. 1922)).
693. M at 162-63. The specific question was whether the act was "local" and therefore
required, pursuant to the applicable constitutional provision, publication of the
intent to pass the measure.
694. Id. at 163.
695. Board of Revenue & Road Comm'rs v. Puckett, 149 So. 850, 852 (Ala. 1933).
696. Beeland Wholesale Co. v. Kaufman, 174 So. 516,524 (Ala. 1937). See also State ex
reL Dorlan v. Stone, 6 So. 2d 898 (Ala. Ct. App. 1942).
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by law he is required to do so or not."697 The legislature could not
recognize such claims when they were predicated on an initial act that
was unconstitutional.698 But the constitutional prohibition against
special legislation, for example, did not prevent the legislature from
"right[ing] an individual wrong ... or for personal injuries or to au-
thorize suits and payment of judgments for such injuries sustained by
the tort of an officer or employee of the state."699 Connecticut recog-
nized that "[s]tates, as well as individuals, can recognize merely honor-
ary obligations," and that "[t]he equal protection of the laws is not
denied by treating different classes of persons in a different way, if it
be [in] a way not inappropriate to the class, and the class be set apart
from others on reasonable grounds."0o And the Florida court, in a
holding that expressed the outer limits of judicial deference, stated
that "the power to ascertain and determine the obligations within this
class [is] entirely political and legislative." 701 Illinois, a jurisdiction
whose decisions the Haman court found of value, was equally strong
in its defense of moral obligation. Unlike many states, it found no
problems with a World War I bonus measure, finding that it served a
public purpose and that to the extent that moral obligation was argued
"it cannot well be doubted that, if it does exist, the state may provide
for it."702 It held, as a general rule, that moral obligations were proper
bases for state appropriations and that the state could provide funds to
the widows of legislators,70 3 increase the pension benefits paid to the
widow of a fireman,70 4 increase school teacher annuities,705 and vali-
697. Board of Educ. v. Talbott, 86 S.W.2d 1059, 1063 (Ky. 1935).
698. Id. at 1065.
699. Department of Fin. v. Dishman, 183 S.W.2d 540, 544 (Ky. 1944).
700. Norwich Gas & Elec. v. City of Norwich, 57 A. 746, 749 (Conn. 1904).
701. Carlton v. Mathews, 137 So. 815, 835 (Fla. 1931). Additional decisions recognizing
moral obligation include: Opinion of the Justices, 170 A.2d 647 (Me. 1961); Port of
Portland v. Reeder, 280 P.2d 324 (Or. 1955); Harbold v. City of Reading, 49 A.2d
817 (Pa. 1946); State for Use & Benefit v. Hobbs, 250 S.W.2d 549 (Tenn. 1952);
Watauga Valley Gas Co. v. Evans, 241 S.W.2d 511 (Tenn. 1951); Kilpatrick v. Com-
pensation Claim Bd., 259 S.W. 164 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924); Gross v. Gates, 194 A. 465
(Vt. 1937); Lewis County v. McGeorge, 92 P. 268 (Wash. 1907). A West Virginia
decision, State ex rel. Cashman v. Sims, 43 S.E.2d 805 (W. Va. 1947), was one of a
long line of cases in that state recognizing the doctrine and prompted an annota-
tion stating that "it is generally recognized that an appropriation of money for
payment of the obligations of the state is not an appropriation for private pur-
poses, and such obligation, to be free from constitutional restriction, need not be a
legal obligation, but may be a moral obligation." Annotation, What Constitutes
Moral Obligation Justifying Appropriation of Public Moneys for Benefit of an
Individual, 172 A.L.R. 1407, 1408 (1948).
702. Hagler v. Small, 138 N.E. 849, 855-56 (Ill. 1923).
703. People ex rel Douglas v. Barrett, 19 N.E.2d 340 (Ill. 1939); People ex rel McDavid
v. Barrett, 19 N.E.2d 356 (Ill. 1939).
704. People ex rel. Schmidt v. Yerger, 172 N.E.2d 753 (Ill. 1961).
705. Voigt v. Board of Educ., 108 N.E.2d 426 (Ill. 1952); Krebs v. Board of Trustees of
Teachers' Retirement Sys., 102 N.E.2d 321 (Ill. 1951).
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date "anticipation warrants."70 6 And Justice Holmes, while still on
the Massachusetts court, observed that "some latitude is allowed to
the legislature. It is not forbidden to be just in some cases where it is
not required to be by the letter of paramount law."707
Perhaps the most compelling formulation of the doctrine, from the
perspective of the issues posed in Haman, is found in Indiana. In a
decision focusing on the question of taxation for private versus public
purposes the court observed:
An exercise of the powers of government may cause injury to particular indi-
viduals and, under some circumstances, the moral obligation may be such to
justify an exercise of the taxing power in favor of private persons. Such obli-
gations may go beyond the limits of common law liabilities and be such as a
just man would recognize in his own affairs, whether by law required to do so
or not.7
08
The court defined the moral obligation as arising under circumstances
where "some direct benefit was received by the state as a state, or
some direct injury... suffered by the claimant under circumstances
where, in fairness, the state might be asked to respond, and there must
be something more than mere gratuity involved."70 9 It then stated
that there was no "gratuity" involved where a bank had failed and the
state sought to reimburse a county for funds lost that had been depos-
ited in compliance with the dictates of a state public depository law.
The recognition of the moral obligation, and the concomitant costs as-
sociated with it, were proper, the court argued, since "It]he Legislature
may have reasoned that the burden placed upon the taxpayers was
necessary and proper to the end that confidence in the government
and respect for its courts should not be materially weakened."7TO
These sentiments, which tracked precisely those that impelled L.B.
272A, were even more pronounced in Hanly v. Sims, 711 an earlier case
involving Vincennes University, a private institution. The court was
asked to assess the constitutionality of an act authorizing the issuance
of bonds "'against the state, in full and final settlement of said claim
and of all other demands.' "71-2 The claims had arisen as a result of a
706. Dimond v. Commisioner of Highways, 9 N.E.2d 197 (IM. 1937); Berman v. Board
of Educ., 196 N.E. 464 (IlM. 1935).
707. Earle v. Commonwealth, 63 N.E. 10,10 (Mass. 1902). This gives me a Holmes and
a Cardozo in favor of moral obligation, which (at least in my estimation) is the
equivalent of throwing a perfect game (and then some) against the Haman
court's Souter. This is, I suppose, the baseball trading card school of judicial re-
view. I mean, who would trade a 1956 Mickey Mantle (MVP, Triple Crown, with
a .353 average, 52 homers, and 130 RBIs) for a Jim Pyburn? You can look Pyburn
up; he may be a nice man, but to paraphrase Sen. Lloyd Bentsen, "he's no Mickey
Mantle."
708. State ex reL Jackson v. Middleton, 19 N.E.2d 470, 475 (Ind. 1939).
709. 1&i
710. Id.
711. 93 N.E. 228, 228 (Ind. 1910), reh/g denied, 94 N.E. 401 (ind. 1910).
712. Id at 228 (quoting 1907 Ind. Acts 497).
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series of events involving certain lands granted to the state by Con-
gress for the university. Some of those lands were erroneously sold,
and after an initial sequence of legal actions the legislature in 1895
made an appropriation "in full settlement of all claims against the
state."713 The university subsequently sought additional funds, and
the act at issue in Hanly resulted. The court considered a variety of
arguments against the measure, including a special legislation claim.
The court rejected the objections, characterizing the measure as a
proper settlement of a debt, a term it defined to include those obliga-
tions that "'rest upon a merely equitable or honorary obligation...
and would not be recoverable in a court of law if existing against an
individual.' "714 In language echoing the strong deference articulated
by the Florida court, it stated that "[i]t was within the province and
power of the Legislature to investigate and determine this question for
itself, and, when so determined, that conclusion is and should be bind-
ing on other coordinate departments of the state government."715 The
court then declared:
It is not becoming a sovereign state to weigh its obligations to an injured and
helpless subject in an "apothecary's scales." While the state is not required to
be generous, nevertheless, it at least ought to be just in its dealings, and it may
well set an example of complete justice in making voluntary reparation, long
deferred, in a matter involving its honor and fair dealing.7 1 6
As Haman demonstrates, these sentiments did not prevail in Ne-
braska, nor was Haman the only instance in which the court was
asked to recognize moral obligation within the specific contexts pro-
vided by Realty Co.. As indicated, the court was asked by the attorney
general during the argument of Weaver to recognize the principles
articulated in Realty Co. as a basis for sustaining Chapter 33.717 The
court refused the invitation, and did so without mentioning Realty Co.
in either that decision or Hubbell Bank. The reason for that may lie in
a much earlier case, Oxnard Beet Sugar Co. v. State,7 18 in which the
court rejected an attempt to claim a bounty for the manufacture of
sugar. The court held that the measure authorizing the appropriation
violated the constitutional provision requiring that "[n]o bill shall con-
tain more than one subject and the same shall be clearly expressed in
[its] title."719 The argument was made that this legal infirmity did not
serve as an absolute bar to the appropriation, there "still [being] a
moral and equitable duty resting upon the Legislature to pay the
bounty," a contention that the court acknowledged "seems to receive
713. Id. at 229.
714. Id. at 230 (quoting United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427, 440 (1896)).
715. Id. at 231.
716. Id.
717. See supra text accompanying notes 506-08.
718. 73 Neb. 57, 102 N.W. 80, reh'g overruled, 73 Neb. 57, 105 N.W. 716 (1905).
719. NEB. CONsT. art III, § 14.
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some support in the language used by" Justice Peckham in Realty
Co..720 There was, as indicated, more than "some support" for this
proposition since the Court did not consider the potential unconstitu-
tionality of the act creating the moral obligation to be a barrier.721
The Nebraska court, nevertheless, stated:
We are unable to understand any principle either of equity or good conscience
that should estop the people of the state of Nebraska by an unauthorized act
of the Legislative department of their government, especially when such act is
attempted to be enforced in the face of a direct prohibition in the Constitution
or basic law adopted by the people. An unconstitutional statute is a legal still-
birth, which neither moves, nor breathes, nor holds out any sign of life. It is a
form without one vital spark. It is wholly dead from the moment of its con-
ception, and no right, either legal or equitable, arises from such an inanimate
thing.
7 2 2
The court then, on the request for rehearing, held that the defect
could not be cured, at least to the extent that the state could as a mat-
ter of public policy appropriate funds for this purpose: "The legisla-
ture cannot appropriate the public moneys of the state to encourage
private enterprises. The manufacturing of sugar and chicory is a pri-
vate enterprise and the public money or credit cannot be given or
loaned in aid of any individual, association, or corporation carrying on
such enterprises." 723
Almost the same issue arose just four months prior to the decision
in Weaver in Anderson v. Lehmkuhl,724 in which the court held that a
measure designed to "validate and cure" certain defects in bonds is-
sued by the First Farmers' Electric District was unconstitutional spe-
cial legislation. The court found that "this is a special and purely local
act, applying only to this particular district, and for that reason, if for
no other, is in violation of constitutional restrictions." 725 It rejected
moral obligation since the law under which the bonds had been issued
was itself unconstitutional. While "curative" acts were permissible,
"[a] bond or contract which rests on an unconstitutional statute is void
and creates no obligation to be enforced by subsequent legislation."726
These decisions are at least somewhat troubling given their appar-
ent rejection of moral obligation as a predicate for retroactive legisla-
tion. Each presents, however, certain distinguishing factors that make
it arguable whether they in fact constituted a repudiation of the doc-
trine actually articulated in Wakeley. The first Oxnard opinion is, ul-
720. Oxnard Beet Sugar Co. v. State, 73 Neb. 57, 65, 102 N.W. 80, 83 (1905).
721. "We are of the opinion that in either case the appropriations of money in the act
of 1895 ... were constitutional and valid." United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S.
427, 434 (1894).
722. Oxnard Beet Sugar Co. v. State, 73 Neb. 57, 65, 102 N.W. 80, 83 (1905).
723. Oxnard Beet Sugar Co. v. State, 73 Neb. 57, 68, 105 N.W. 716, 717 (1905).
724. 119 Neb. 451, 229 N.W. 773 (1930).
725. 1& at 460, 229 N.W. at 777.
726. Id at 461-62, 229 N.W. at 777.
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timately, of little bearing since there was no claim in Haman that any
of the predicate legislative acts were unconstitutional. The constitu-
tional problem was posed, rather, by L.B. 272A itself and the conten-
tion that it constituted special legislation. The second Oxnard opinion
is more troubling, since it seems to impose a barrier to the use of pub-
lic funds for private purposes. That limitation does not, nevertheless,
seem to have survived the narrow confines of that decision. As indi-
cated, any number of subsequent cases recognized the ability of the
legislature to either compensate or give "gifts" to private individuals
or associations. The power to do so, under certain limited circum-
stances, was recognized even in Cox, a case that did not pose the sort of
barriers the Haman court would have had us believe were articulated
within it. Anderson, in some respects, comes closest to Haman, given
the "closed class" aspects of that decision. The Anderson court re-
jected an appeal to the rule in Cunningham, repeating the "hard cases
make poor law" argument of the dissenting justice in that case. 727 It
would be a mistake, however, to read total repudiation of the power of
the legislature to aid the electric district into that case, since the court
concluded the decision with the observation that "[i]n our opinion the
general incorporation laws will permit the organization of a company
that will give the relief desired and carry out all obligations of the
district, legal [and] moral." 728 Moral obligations could, it seems, be
recognized, provided that a special law was not enacted where a gen-
eral one would suffice.
3. Redemption of Deposits: The Lessons from Other States
This is graphically illustrated by a third reality, the manner in
which other states have responded to the demise of state or privately
insured banks. At least ten states have experienced situations much
like those that surrounded Commonwealth. 72 9 Three, Kentucky, Ten-
nessee, and Oklahoma, had no state insurance fund while others, like
Colorado and Ohio, had sufficient funds in their insurance pools to
cover all claims.730 Still others, while nominally insured, found them-
selves in circumstances like those that prevailed in Nebraska, creating
a need for legislative and legal responses. The legal predicates for the
actions and their details have varied; some states completely abolished
the guaranty mechanisms, while others reformed them.731 The pat-
727. See supra text accompanying notes 148-52.
728. Anderson v. Lehmkuhl, 119 Neb. 451, 463, 229 N.W. 773, 778 (1930).
729. They are California, Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Utah. The states are listed, and various aspects of
their situations described, in Barry Stavro, supra note 6, at 52; and Fred Knapp,
Other States Understand Commonwealth Tragedy, SUNDAY JOURNAL-STAR (Lin-
coln), Oct. 30, 1988, at lB.
730. Barry Stavro, supra note 6, at 53; Fred Knapp, supra note 729, at 5B.
731. Compare S.B. 119 (Ohio)(abolishing the Guaranty Association), and 1986 Iowa
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tern that emerges is, nevertheless, one in which state legislatures have
responded in a positive manner and the acts fashioned have either not
been challenged or, if attacked, questioned because they did too little,
rather than too much.732
For example, in the wake of its industrial crisis Maryland passed a
comprehensive reform measure that included a statement that "[i]t is
the policy of this State that funds will be appropriated to the [Deposit
Insurance] Fund to the extent necessary to protect holders of savings
accounts in member associations, and to enable the Fund to meet its
obligations under a hardship withdrawal plan or partial distribution of
assets."733 The state attorney general has issued an opinion conclud-
ing that this provision does not unconstitutionally pledge the credit of
the state,734 and the litigation that has ensued has dealt with the im-
plementation and nuances of the guaranty fund, rather than its consti-
tutionality.735 Under the terms of the plan, at least $110 million in tax
funds have been paid to depositors.73 6 California, in turn, authorized a
state loan guaranty not to exceed $66 million to reimburse losses in-
curred through the failure of Western Community Loan Center,737
stating that "it is in the interest of this state's economy to act to stabi-
lize this financial crisis" and "in the public interest to assist Guaranty
Corporation by appropriating money.., to provide security for a guar-
ante e supporting and securing a loan to Guaranty Corporation or toprovide a loan directly to Guaranty Corporation."738 The legislature
Acts 226 (terminating the guaranty effective July 1, 1988), with 1985 Cal. Stat.
1011 (reforming the provisions), and 1985 Md. Laws 16,1986 Md. Laws 15 (same).
732. The situation in Iowa, which had a guaranty law, see IOWA CODE §§ 536B.1-.28
(1991), is worth noting. The Iowa court has rejected three attempts to secure
reimbursement in the wake of the failure of the Morris Plan of Iowa. See Eldred
v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 468 N.W.2d 221 (Iowa 1991)(rejecting claim against cor-
poration for breach of fiduciary duty); Eldred v. McGladrey, Hendrickson &
Pullen, 468 N.W.2d 218 (Iowa 1991)(rejecting claim against accounting firm for
audit misrepresentations); Unertl v. Bezanson, 414 N.W.2d 321 (Iowa 1987)(re-
jecting claim against corporation, officers and owners). The tenacity of the liti-
gants suggests there will be further actions.
733. MiD. FIN. INsT. CODE ANN. § 10-116 (1986). The Maryland situation and legislation
are discussed in Steven L Batoff, Maryland' Savings and Loan Crisis of 1985:
The Resulting Legislative Reform, 16 U. BALT. L. REV. 403 (1987).
734. 70 Op. Att'y Gem Md. 180 (Oct. 15, 1985).
735. See, e.g., State v. Hogg, 535 A.2d 923 (Md. 1988); United Wire, Metal & Mach.
Health & Welfare Fund v. State Deposit Ins. Fund Corp., 512 A.2d 1047 (Md.
1986); Chevy Chase Say. & Loan, Inc. v. State, 509 A.2d 670 (Md. 1986). A federal
RICO suit was also filed, with the court finding that at least a portion of the claim
was valid but that abstention was appropriate in light of ongoing state proceed-
ings. Brandenburg v. First Md. Sav. & Loan, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 717 (D. Md. 1987),
aff'd sub nom. Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179 (4th Cir. 1988).
736. Fred Knapp, supra note 715.
737. 1985 Cal. Stat. 1011, 1024. The provisions are reprinted as a Historical Note to
CAi. FIN. CODE § 18023 (West 1989).
738. Id.
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made it clear that "the action taken is not in any manner to be con-
strued as a precedent or to imply that the state has any legal obligation
to so act now or in the future and... is based solely upon the facts,
circumstances, and conditions which prevailed at the time of the
seizure of Western Community by the commissioner." 739 The action
does not appear to have been challenged; had it been, it would have
almost certainly been sustained given the line of California cases rec-
ognizing the right of the legislature to articulate a public purpose and
appropriate public funds to private individuals.740
The picture that emerges from all of this is of a legislative and judi-
cial landscape whose contours are substantially different from the one
sketched in Haman. That decision, both in theory and effect, stands in
stark contrast to the holdings of virtually every other court on the
issue of moral obligation. It also presages a set of circumstances
within which the court has cast itself as a virtual equal partner with
the Unicameral in the fashioning of public policy in Nebraska. That is
not, the counsel with which this section began notwithstanding, a
world where one must be "mad" or they would never have entered to
begin with. It is, nevertheless, a world into which the court should
venture infrequently, reluctantly, and with a healthy appreciation of
the risks it runs. Haman does not, in large measure, reflect a court
that is willing to subject itself to such strictures. Nor, for that matter,
does it provide a vision of a court that knows how to gracefully leave
that world, if indeed it wishes to.
VIII. CONCLUSION
"How are you getting on?" said the Cat, as soon as there
was mouth enough for it to speak with.
"I don't think the Court plays at allfairly," the Unicameral
began, in a rather complaining tone," and they all quarrel so
dreadfully one can't hear one's self speak--and it doesn't seem
to have any rules in particular; at least if there are, nobody
attends to them-and you've no idea how confusing it is all the
things being alive; for instance, there's the arch I've got to go
through next walking about at the other end of the ground-
739. Id.
740. See, e.g., County of Alameda v. Janssen, 106 P.2d 11 (Cal. 1940); City & County of
San Francisco v. Collins, 13 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1932); Patrick v. Riley, 287 P. 455 (Cal.
1930); Daggett v. Colgan, 28 P. 51 (Cal. 1891). California had initially been hostile
to claims arising from moral obligation, and was often cited as a minority jurisdic-
tion. See, e.g., Mills v. Stewart, 247 P. 332, 335 (Mont. 1926); Oregon Short Line
R.R. Co. v. Berg, 16 P.2d 373, 380-81 (Idaho 1932)(Leeper, J., dissenting). Some
observers, like Judge Leeper in Oregon Short Line, disputed the characterization,
pointing out that the cases were inconsistent. It is clear, nevertheless, that the
California court's view has changed.
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and I should have croqueted the Court's hedgehog just now,
only it ran away when it saw mine coming!"
"How do you like the Court?" said the Cat in a low voice.
"Not at all," said the Unicameral: "it's so extremely-"
Just then she noticed that the Court was close behind it, listen-
ing: so she went on "-likely to win, that it's hardly worth
while finishing the game. "741
Professor Ely concludes Democracy and Distrust with the observa-
tion that "constitutional law appropriately exists for those situations
where representative government cannot be trusted, not those where
we know it can."742 His theory, that "courts can play a useful role in
forcing Congress to perform its constitutionally-contemplated func-
tions,"74 3 poses risks, since there is a "paradox... between the call for
deference to the considered products of legislatures and the observa-
tion that legislative products are frequently unconsidered." 744 More-
over, as he stresses, while it might be true that "[i]f we can just get our
legislators to legislate we'll be able to understand their goals well
enough," there is also the possibility that while "we may... still end
up with a fair number of clowns as representatives,... at least then it
will be because clowns are what we deserve."745
There is much in Haman that forces us to believe that the court
reached its result precisely because it assumed Nebraska's elected rep-
resentatives could not be trusted. It became, accordingly, the court's
obligation to serve as the guardian of the public welfare, to, as it were,
"send out the clowns." There is also, to be fair, a strong sense that the
court felt it was being asked, one too many times, to approve a pa-
tently transparent legislative attempt to avoid constitutional stric-
tures. In some instances in the past the measures in question
reflected, as the court believed to be the case in Haman, "draftsman-
ship" that was just a little too "artful." In others, like the liquor li-
cense and property tax cases, they showed a legislature either
unwilling or unable to discern the import and effect of prior decisions
of the court.
There will ultimately be instances where what we or the court
might perceive to be legislative density in fact reflects the complexity
of the subject; many of the matters on which we expect our represent-
atives to act pose extraordinarily difficult questions. There will also,
741. ALICE, supra note 1, at 113 (Ch. VIII: The Queen's Croquet-Ground).
742. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AD DimTRus. A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 183
(1980).
743. John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a
World Where Courts Are No Different from Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REv. 833, 878-
79 (1991).
744. Id. at 879.
745. ELY, supra note 742, at 134.
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all too often, be situations where the legislature is deliberately defying
the court or, more likely, is subservient to the political pipers who oc-
casionally (frequently, in some cases) call the legislative tune. There
is certainly an element of both these impulses in the property tax
cases, a sequence of decisions that was clearly on the court's mind as it
considered Haman. Indeed, the close congruence between many of
the perspectives found in Haman and those articulated in the various
opinions leading to MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline v. State Board of
Equalization Assessment make it clear that part of the reason L.B.
272A went to its demise was the spill-over effect of one too many at-
tempts by the Unicameral to avoid its constitutional responsibilities in
the taxation realm.
Quite frankly, there is something very comforting about a court
that is willing, indeed determined, to question closely legislative mo-
tives and to read into the traditional rational basis test an element of
true rationality. There is, at least as I understand the term, nothing
especially "rational" about a constitutional test that finds a picture of
Spuds McKenzie, accompanied by his troika of adoring and usually
scantily clad women, distracting when on the side of a Federal Express
truck, but not a hazard to automobile navigation or pedestrian safety if
displayed on Budweiser's own vehicles. Yet "rational basis review"
yields precisely that result. In the actual case, Railway Express
Agency, Inc. v. New York, the United States Supreme Court conceded
that "a violation turns not on what kind of advertisements are carried
on trucks but on whose trucks they are carried."746 The regulation
therefore allowed one entity to do precisely what another was forbid-
den, in the same manner and on the same streets. Guided by the prin-
ciple articulated in Olsen, the Court nevertheless concluded:
The local authorities may well have concluded that those who advertise their
own wares on their trucks do not present the same traffic problem in view of
the nature or extent of the advertising which they use. It would take a degree
of omniscience which we lack to say that such is not the case. If that judgment
is correct, the advertising displays that are exempt have less incidence on traf-
fic than those of appellants.747
Railway Express remains good law; indeed, the Court has made it
clear that in most instances it will not even examine whether the basis
on which it sustains the statute was in fact the motivating factor for its
passage: "Where, as here, there are plausible reasons for Congress'
action, our inquiry is at an end. It is, of course, 'constitutionally irrele-
vant whether this reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision,'
... because this Court has never insisted that a legislative body articu-
late its reasons for enacting a statute."748 More tellingly, it has
746. 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949).
747. Id. (emphasis added).
748. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980)(quoting Flem-
ing v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960))(citation omitted).
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stressed that the Court does not have a roving commission to correct
the mistakes of its less perceptive elected colleagues: "[tihe Constitu-
tion presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even im-
provident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic
process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no
matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted."749
This would, presumably, be the same outcome in Nebraska, if we take
seriously the language of decisions that embrace Railway Express and
speak of a quest for "any" reasonable legislative motive.750
These were not, however, the principles that impelled the Haman
decision, and as a matter of judicial one-upmanship there is much that
can be said for the world view implied, albeit not for the result or the
means by which it was reached. Simply put, scrupulous recognition of
the full implications of what we label rational basis review leads, more
often than we would care to admit, to absurd results. It is then possi-
ble to praise Haman if, as the decision seems to indicate, totally
unquestioning deference will now be the exception rather than the
rule in Nebraska. This would be especially appropriate if one calls
into question-as I routinely do-the true motivations of the senators
who vote for particular measures. Haman, for example, clearly sig-
nals that the court will question closely any legislative classification
that, while open in theory, is closed in fact. That being the case one
can only marvel at legislative actions in the wake of Haman that
promise special tax credits to specific companies7 5l and at attorney
general opinions indicating that such proposals are constitutional.752
Obviously, the "right" result is ultimately a matter of both opinion
749. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)(footnote omitted).
750. See, e.g., State v. Davison, 213 Neb. 173, 177, 328 N.W.2d 206, 209 (1982); Botsch v.
Reisdorff, 193 Neb. 165,174,226 N.W.2d 121,128 (1975). In Botsch the court, citing
Railway Express, made it clear that the era within which it might substitute its
judgment for that of the legislature "long ago passed into history," Botsch v. Reis-
dorff, 193 Neb. 165, 176, 226 N.W.2d 121, 128 (1975), and Justice McCown stressed
that it was for the legislature, and not the court, to determine if a policy judgment
valid in 1931 was to remain in force. Id. at 181, 226 N.W.2d at 131 (McCown, J.,
dissenting in part).
751. Henry J. Cordes, Tax-Credit Backing Is Bait to Build Corn Milling Plant, OMAnA
WORLD-HERALD, July 18, 1991, at 17.
752. Constitutionality of Legislature Act Providing Tax Credits to Producers of Cer-
tain Ethanol and Ethanol Coproduct Fuels (LB 754), Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. No.
91047 (1991)(May 24,1991). The opinion found the measure constitutional as long
as there was the possibility of "additional future beneficiaries," a qualification
added in the face of a proposed amendment that would limit eligibility to compa-
nies whose "final application" had been approved by April 1, 1991. My reading of
the opinion leads me to believe that the bill had a very narrow purpose and that a
court following the Haman doctrine would look beyond the language of the bill
to that purpose, even if the offending amendment was not added. It is, of course,
irrelevant in some respects whether the court would do this; the point is that
Haan authorizes it to do so.
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and circumstance, with judgments about what seems necessary or ap-
propriate changing in the face of new realities. The infamous "switch
in time that saved nine" may be fact or fiction; what often matters
most in our delicately balanced constitutional system is our perception
of courts, justices, and justice, a matrix within which subsequent reve-
lations have no bearing on what we believed to be true at the time.
The harsh reality is that the judicial branch often seems no less sus-
ceptible to turning a "blind constitutional eye" when the situation ap-
pears to warrant it. Thus, the rule in Almond is "too broad" when the
issue at hand is malpractice insurance reform, a legislative initiative
that may have tread on one too many vested interests.753 It is less
troubling, and worthy of embrace, when the question is the location in
state of a Toyota plant producing up to 200,000 cars annually and em-
ploying up to 3,000 people.754
The Nebraska court does not seem to fall within this judicial camp.
Its treatment of the property tax question, for example, seems to re-
veal a court wed to its particular constitutional vision regardless of the
consequences that its decisions might have for the tax policy and, po-
tentially, economic welfare of the state. That, if indeed it is the impe-
tus for the property tax decisions, is a commendable trait.
Nevertheless, there is something deeply troubling about a court that
feels it either necessary or appropriate to issue "special releases" on
the subject during the course of a legislative session.75 5 This may be
compassionate adjudication, a pronouncement of the court rendered in
violation of its own long-standing practices precisely because it wishes
to assist senators wrestling with seemingly intractable problems. It
may also be hubris, a proclamation on high from judges who believe
that elected representatives are incapable of discharging their govern-
ance responsibilities and in need of a swift judicial kick. The court's
approach in Haman, within which it arrogates the role of protector of
the public fisc, suggests it is the latter.
There is, admittedly, a deeper problem with this, since it is often
difficult, if not impossible, to determine what the actual legislative
motive might be. The recognition of that reality has colored many de-
cisions, just as the willingness to infuse motivations has been a sub-
stantial factor in others. We can, accordingly, find a chief justice
telling us that a lack of clarity in the legislative history compels defer-
ence to the agency charged with administering the act in one in-
753. The reference is to McGuffey v. Hall, 557 S.W.2d 401 (Ky. 1977), discussed at
supra text accompanying notes 656-59.
754. That, of course, was the underlying reality in Hayes v. State Property & Bldgs.
Comm'n, 731 S.W.2d 797 (Ky. 1987), discussed at supra text accompanying notes
658-59.
755. See Henry J. Cordes & Leslie Boellstorff, Court to Give Surprise Today To Tax
Session, OMAHA WoRLD-HERALD, July 10, 1991, at 1.
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stance,7 5 6 while that same lack of clarity produces quite a different
result in another.75 7 As a result there is great appeal in the position
championed by individuals like Justice Scalia, who urges that we focus
exclusively on the text-unless, of course, fidelity to the text stands in
the way of the "right" result.7 5 8
There are, it often seems, as many different approaches to judicial
review as there are individuals who write about the subject. The theo-
ries espoused, in turn, often exhibit a mind-numbing complexity. My
purpose in writing this particular Article was neither to add to the list
of alternatives nor embrace or explicate one or more of the current
candidates, although "democracy and distrust" is clearly a theme that
attracts me. The principle objective was, rather, to reflect on what a
particular decision might tell us about judicial review and the judicial
craft as currently practiced in Nebraska. My perspective, as I con-
ceded at the outset, is not that of the disinterested observer. I think,
nevertheless, that my reaction to Haman would have been a great deal
less vituperative if I had been offered an opinion that at least at-
tempted to convey an impression of honest reasoning and an intellec-
tually complete exposition. In my estimation, what we were given in
Haman does neither. That, I suspect, may ultimately prove to be the
saddest fact of all in the already unfortunate chain of events triggered
by Commonwealth's demise.
So the Court sat on, with closed eyes and half believed itself
756. In Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991), in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, the Court deferred to the Secretary of Health and Human Service's revised
statutory interpretation and sustained the family planning abortion counseling
"gag rule." The Court found the statutory language and the legislative history
"ambiguous" and deferred to the right of the Secretary to change prior rules
based on a "reasoned analysis."
757. In EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991), the statutory language
relied on by the agency to reach its interpretation that Title VII applies outside
the United States was also "ambiguous." But, the Chief Justice observed, the
EEOC "offers no basis in experience for the change" at issue, and that interpreta-
tion was "neither contemporaneous with [the statute's] enactment nor consistent
since the statute came into law." Id. at 1235.
758. In the EEOC case Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment but disagreed with
the conclusion that the agency was "not entitled to the deference normally ac-
corded administrative agencies .... " Id. at 1237 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). But, since deference is not "abdication," and the
agency judgment not "reasonable," he joined the Court's judgment. In the abor-
tion counseling case he was notably silent, a silence that was intriguing in light of
Justice O'Connor's well-reasoned dissent arguing that "neither the language nor
the history of § 1008 compels the Secretary's interpretation .... Rust v. Sulli-
van, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1789 (1991)(O'Connor, J., dissenting). A somewhat activist
posture seems appropriate, accordingly, when it contributes to the demise of Roe
v. Wade, a result that Justice Scalia has argued for. See Webster v. Reproductive
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 535 (1989)(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment).
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in Moral Obligation Land, though it knew that it had but to
open them again, and all would change to dull reality-the
grass would be only rustling in the wind, and the pool rippling
to the waving of the reeds-the rattling teacups would change
to the clatter of keyboards, and the Queen's shrill cries to the
voice of a clerk with a memorandum--and the sneeze of the
baby, the shriek of the Gryphon, and all the other queer noises,
would change (it knew) to the confused clamour govern-
ment--while the lowing of appellants in the court room would
take the place of the Mock Turtle's heavy sobs.
Lastly, it pictured to itself how its little legislative sister
would, in the after-time, be herself a grown-up coordinate
branch; and how she would keep, through all her riper years,
the simple and loving heart of her childhood; and how she
would gather about her other aggrieved citizens, and make
their eyes bright and eager with many a strange tale and
promise of legislative redress, perhaps even with the dream of
Moral Obligation Land of long ago; and how she would feel
with all their simple sorrows, and find a pleasure in all their
simple joys, remembering her own child-life, and the happy
summer days.7 5 9
759. ALICE, supra note 1, at 163-64 (Ch. XII: Alice's Evidence). These lines end Car-
roll's tale, as they do mine. I suspect his will endure far longer.
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